EVENTS IN THE BALTIC

Otago Daily Times, Issue 26770, 13 May 1948, Page 7

EVENTS IN THE BALTIC

CHURCHILL MEMOIRS

By WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

The 1000-mile-long peninsula stretching from the mouth of the Baltic to the Arctic Circle had an immense strategic significance. The Norwegian mountains run into the ocean in a continuous fringe of islands. Between these islands and the mainland there was a corridor in territorial - waters through which Germany could communicate with the outer seas to the grievous injury of our blockade. German war industry was mainly based upon supplies of Swedish iron ore. which in the summer were drawn from the Swedish port of Lulea, at the head of the Gulf of Bothnia, and in the winter, when this was frozen, from Narvik, on the west coast of Norway. To respect the corridor would be to allow the whole of this traffic to proceed under the shield of neutrality in the face of our superior sea power. The Admiralty staff were seriously perturbed at this important advantage being presented to Germany, and at ■ the earliest opportunity I raised the issue in the Cabinet.

When eventually I presented the case in the House of Commons, in April, 1940, I said: “ During the last war, when we were associated with the United States, the Allies felt themselves so deeply injured by this covered way, then being used specially for U-boats setting out on their marauding expeditions, that the British, French and United States Governments together induced the Norwegians to (undertake to) lay a minefield in their territorial waters across the covered way in order to prevent abuse by U-boats of this channel. It was only natural that the Admiralty since this war began should have brought this precedent—although it is not exactly on all fours and there are pome differences —this modern and highly respectable precedent, to the notice of his Majesty’s Government, and should have urged that we should be allowed to lay a minefield of our own in Norwegian territorial waters in order to compel this traffic which was passing in and out to Germany to come out into the open sea and take a chance of being brought into the Contraband Control or being captured as enemy prize by our blockading squadrons and flotillas. It was only natural and it was only right that his Majesty's Government should have been long reluctant to incur the reproach 6f even a technical violation of international law.”

They certainly were long in reaching a decision. At first the reception of my was favourable. All my colleagues were deeply impressed with the evil; but strict respect for the neutrality of small States was a principle of conduct to which we all adhered. Rival Moves

Almost at this very moment (as we now know), German eyes were turned in the same direction. On October 3 Admiral von Raedaer, Chief of the Naval Staff, submitted a proposal to Hitler, headed “Gaining of Bases in Norway.” He asked, “ That the Fuhrer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval War Staff on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the north. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to fain bases in Norway under the comined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving our strategic and operational position.” He framed, therefore, a series 9f notes which he placed before Hitler on October 10. “In these notes,” he wrote, “ I stressed the disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would have for us: the control of the approaches to the Baltic, the outflanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on Britain, the end of our pressure on Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for us of the occupation o'f the Norwegian coast: outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine barrier, as in the year 1917-18. . . . The Fuhrer saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to consider the question himself.

Rosenberg, the Foreign Affairs expert of the Nazi Party, and in charge of a special bureau to deal with propaganda activities in foreign countries, shared the admiral’s views. He dreamed of “ converting Scandinavia to the idea of a Nordic community embracing the northern peoples under the natural leadershio of Germany.” Early in 1939 he thought he had discovered an instrument in the extreme Nationalist Party in Norway, which was led by a former Norwegian Minister of War named Vidkun Quisling. Contacts were established and Quisling’s activity was linked with the clans of the German Naval Staff through the Rosenberg organisation and the German Naval Attache in Oslo . ,

Quisling and his assistant, Hagelin, erme to Berlin on December 14. and were taken bv Raed°r to HiPer to discuss a political stroke in Norway. Quisling arrived with a derailed plan. HHler, careful of secrecy, affected reluctance to increase his commitments, and said he would prefer a neutral Scandinavia. Nevertheless, according to Raeder, it was on this very day that he gave the order to the Supreme Command to prepare for a Norwegian operation. Of all this we, of course, knew nothing. The, two Admiralties thought with precision along the same lines in correct strategy, and one had obtained decisions from its Government. Soviet Fears

Meanwhile the Scandinavian peninsula became the scene of an unexpected conflict which aroused strong feeling in Britain and France, and powerfully affected the discussions about Norway. As soon as Germany was involved in war with Great Britain and France. Soviet Russia in the spirit of her Pact with Germany, proceeded to block the lines of entry into the Soviet Union from the west. One passage led from East Prussia through the Baltic States; another led across the waters of the Gulf of Finland; the third route was through Finland itself and across the Karelian Isthmus to a point where the Finnish frontiei was only 20 miles from the suburbs of Leningrad. The Soviet had not forgotten the dangers which Leningrad had faced in 1919. Even the White Russian Government of Kolchak had informed the Peace Conference in Paris that bases in the Baltic States and Finland were a necessary protection for the Russian capital. Stalin bad used the same language to the British and French missions in the summer of 1939; and we have seen in earlier chapters how the natural fears of these small States had been an obstacle to an Anglo-French Alliance with Russia, and had paved the way for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement.

Stalin had wasted no time; on September 24 the Esthonian Foreign Minister had been called to Moscow, and four days later his Government signed a Pact of Mutual Assistance which gave the Russians the right to garrison key bases in Esthonia. By October 21 the Red Army and Air Force were installed. The same procedure was used simultaneously in Latvia, and Soviet garrisons also appeared in Lithuania.

Thus the southern road to Leningrad and half the Gulf of Finland had been swiftly barred against potential German ambitions by the armed forces of the Soviet. There remained only the approach through Finland. Early in October Mr Passikivi, one of the Finnish statesmen who signed the peace of 1921 with the Soviet Union, went to Moscow. The Soviet demands were Sweeping; the Finnish

The Russo-Finnish War

frontier on the Karelian Isthmus must be moved back a considerable distance so as to remove Leningrad from the range of hostile artillery. The cession of certain Finnish islands in the Gulf of Finland; the lease of the Rybathy Peninsula, together with Finland’s only ice-free port in the Arctic Sea, Petsamo; and above all, the leasing of the port of Hango at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland as a Russian naval and air base, completed the Soviet requirements. The Finns were prepared to make concessions on every point except the last. With the keys of the Gulf in Russian hands the strategic and national security of Finland seemed to them to vanish. The negotiations broke down on November 13, and the Finnish Government began to mobilise, and strengthen their troops on the Karelian frontier. On November 28 Molotov denounced the Non-Aggres-sion Pact between Finland and Russia: two days later the Russians attacked at eight points along Finland’s 1000-mile frontier, and on the same morning the capital. Helsingfors, was bombed by the Red Air Force. Unexpected Resistance

The brunt of the Russian attack fell at first upon the frontier defences of the Finns in the Karelian Isthmus. These comprised a fortified zone about 20 miles in depth running north and south through forest country deep in snow. This was called the “ Mannerheim Line,” after the Finnish Com-mander-in-Chief and saviour of Finland from Bolshevist subjugation in 1917. The indignation excited in Britain, France, and even more vehemently in the United States, at the unprovoked attack by the enormous Soviet Power upon a small, spirited, and highly-civilised nation was soon followed by astonishment and relief. The early weeks of fighting brought no success to the Soviet forces, which in the first instance were drawn almost entirely from the Leningrad garrison. The Finnish Army, whose total fighting strength was , only about 200,000 men, gave a good account of themselves. The Russian tanks were encountered with audacity and a new type of hand-grenade, soon nicknamed ‘‘The Molotov Cocktail.”

It is probable that the Soviet Government had counted on a walk-over. Their early air raids on Helsingfors and elsewhere, though not on a heavy scale, were expected to strike terror The troops they used at first, though numerically much stronger, were inferior in quality and ill-trained. The effect of the air raids and of the invasion of their land roused the Finns, who rallied to a man against the aggressor and fought with absolute determination and the utmost skill. It is true that the Russian division which carried out the attack on Petsamo had little difficulty in throwing back the 700 Finns in that area. But the attack on the “Waist” of Finland proved disastrous to the invaders.' The country here is almost entirely pine forests, gently undulating and at the time covered with a foot of hard snow. The cold was intense.

The Finns were well equipped with skis and warm clothing, of which the Russians had neither. Moreover, the Finns proved themselves aggressive individual fighters, highly trained in reconnaissance and forest warfare. The Russians relied in vain on numbers and heavier weapons.

All along this front the Finnish frontier posts withdrew slowly down the roads, followed by the Russian columns. After these had penetrated about 30 miles they were set upon by the Finns. Held in front’ at Finnish defence lines constructed in the forests, violently attacked in flank by day and night, their communications severed behind them, the columns were cut to pieces, or, if lucky, got back after heavy loss, whence they came. By the end of December the whole Russian plan for driving in across the “ waist ” had broken down.

Meanwhile the attacks against the Mannerheim Line in the Karelin Peninsula fared no better. North of Lake Ladoga a turning movement attempted by about two Soviet divisions met the same fate as the operations farther north. 1

By the end of the year failure all along the front convinced the Soviet Government that they had to deal with a very different enemy from what they had expected. They determined upon a major effort. Faulty Deductions

They decided to concentrate on piercing ■ the Mannerheim Line by methods of siege warfare in which the power of massed heavy artillery and heavy tanks could be brought into full play. This required preparation on a large scale, and from the end of the year fighting died down all along the Finnish front, leaving the Finns so far victorious over, their mighty assailant. This surprising event was received with equal satisfaction in all countries, belligerent or neutral, throughout the world. It was a pretty bad advertisement for the Soviet Army. In British circles many people congratulated themselves that we had not gone out of our way to bring the Soviets in on our side, and preened themselves on their foresight. The conclusion was drawn too hastily that

Russian Army had been ruined by the purge and that the inherent rottenness and degradation of their system of Government and society was now proved.

It was not only in England that this view was taken. There is no doubt that Hitler and all his generals meditated profoundly upon the Finnish exposure, and that it played a potent part in influencing the Fuhrcr's thought.

All the resentment felt against the Soviet Government for the RibbentropMolotov Pact was fanned into flame by this latest exhibition of brutal bullying and aggression. With this was also mingled scorn for the inefficiency displayed by the Soviet troops and enthusiasm for the gallant Finns. In spite of the Great War which had been declared, there was a keen desire to help the Finns by aircraft and other precious war material and by volunteers from Britain, from the United States, and still more from France. Alike for the munition supplies and the volunteers, there was only one possible route to Finland. The ironore port of Narvik with its railroad ove? the mountains to the Swedish iron mines acquired a new sentimental if not strategic significance. Its use as a line of supply for the Finnish armies affected the neutrality both of Norway and Sweden. These two States, in equal fear of Germany and Russia, had no aim but to keep out of the wars by which they were encircled and might be engulfed. For them this seemed the only chance of survival. But whereas the British Government were naturally reluctant to commit even a technical infringement: of Norwegian territorial waters by laying mines in the Leads for thenown advantage against Germany, they moved upon a generous emotion, only indirectly connected with our war problem, towards a far more serious demand upon both Norway and Sweden for the free passage of men and supplies to Finland. Narvik Again

I sympathised ardently with the Finns and supported all proposals for their aid; and I welcomed this new and favourable breeze as a means of achieving the major strategic advantage of cutting off the vital iron ore supplies of Germany. If Narvik w s to become a kind of Allied base to supply the Finns it would certainly be easy to prevent German ships loading ore at the port and sailing safely down the Leads to Germany. Once Norwegian and Swedish protestations were overcome for whatever reason, the greater measures would include the less. The Admiralty eyes were also fixed at this time upon the move-

ments of a large and powerful Russian ice-breaker which was to be sent from Murmansk to Germany, ostensibly for repairs, but much more probably to open the now-frozen Baltic port of Lulea for the German ore ships. I therefore renewed my efforts to win consent to the simple and bloodless operation of mining the Leads, for which a certain precedent of the previous war existed.

My memorandum was considered by the Cabinet on December 22, and I P u:?.i ed the case to the best of my ability. I could not obtain any decision for action. Diplomatic protest might be made to Norway about the misuse of her territorial waters by Germany, and the Chiefs of the Staff were instructed to consider the military implications of any possible future commitments on Scandinavian soil. They were authorised to plan for landing a force at Narvik for the sake,of Finland, and also to consider the military consequences of a German occupation of Southern Norway. But no executive orders could be issued to the Admiralty. In a paper which I circulated on December 24, I summarised the Intelligence ReDorts which showed the nossibilities of a Russian design upon Norway. The Soviet were said to have three divisions concentrated at Murmansk nreparing for a seaborne condition. “It may be.” I eluded, “ that this theatre will become the scene of early activities.” Thi« nroved only too true; but from a different quarter. (World Copyright Reserved.)