EGYPTIAN DISPUTE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 26243, 29 August 1946, Page 7

EGYPTIAN DISPUTE

NO SOLUTION YET INTERNAL ISSUES INVOLVED SIDKY’S FATE IN BALANCE (From E. G. Webber, N.Z.P.A. Special Correspondent.) LONDON, Aug. 27. Several London newspapers to-day publish reports that, as a result of representations from the dominions, Britain is likely to adopt a much stiffer attitude in negotiating with Egypt for treaty revision. New Zealand has not made representations on the matter, but both Field-marshal Smuts and Dr Evatt are reported to have urged that a full withdrawal of British troops from Egypt at the present moment would dangerously weaken Mediterranean communications at a time when it is felt there should be no weakening anywhere. Technically, if the British Government decides to make no further concessions to the Egyptians and to stand on treaty rights, it need not withdraw troops further than the canal zone and could maintain them there until 1956 when the treaty finally expires. It is doubtful, however, whether technical rights would prove sufficient: Renewed Wafdist Activity Reports from' Egypt suggest that the fate of Sidky Pasha's Coalition Government hangs largely upon the success of Egyptian proposals for treaty revision. Sidky cannot depend upon any solid body of supporters, and the Wafdists, under the leadership of Nahas Pasha, are already making strong political, capital out of the breakdown of negotiations with Britain. If the negotiations make no further progress and no way is found by Sidky of saving his face, the present regime mav be displaced by a Wafdist-backed administration. In view of the well-known opposition of King Farouk to Nahas, it is unlikely that the Egyptian war-time Premier will return to office, but it is virtually certain that the “Ward, as the most influential single party m the country, would dominate the new administration. Any which replaces Sidky is bound to do so on the claim that it can succeed where Sidky failed, and in the present temper of Egyptian politics this is likely to take the form of a renewed antiBritish agitation. Such agitation in the Egyptian leader of the Arab League would prove most embarrassing to Britain in the present delicate state of Middle Eastern affairs. The Egyptians, of course, know this, and are likely to use the weapon. Whether they will know when to, stop, however, is another question. British Protection Still Needed Despite anti-British riots and other hostile demonstrations. British influence is still strong in Egypt, and in the light of recent experience the more responsible Egyptian politicians are likely to force the necessity for British protection. Unfortunately, Egyptian policy to Britain lias become the shuttlecock of Egyptian domestic politics, and in the rough and tumble which is certain to ensue if the present talks break down, nationalist prejudices and the heat of domestic arguments may upset discretion. One argument which may dissuade Egyptian leaders from further alienating British sympathy is the growing spread of Communism in their country. Recently, Moslem leaders m Egypt proclaimed Communism contrary xo the laws of Islam, and though the movement probably represents chiefly a surging up of the underprivileged classes, the big landholders and politicians who still dominate the country are likely to think carefully about precipitating any internal trouble they may not .be able to conIt is * perhaps significant that the Wafdists recently proclaimed a close affinity with Socialism, and on this score they cannot afford to be indif ferent to the goodwill of Mr Attlee's Government. Main Points of Dispute

The present suspension of the talks is due to failure to agree on three major counts. The first is the time table for British evacuation, the second the conditions under which British troops will have the right of re-entry upon Egyptian soil, and, thirdly, the future of the Sudan. At the moment the second is the main stumbling block. The Egyptians claim that only war or the immediate threat of war against Egypt or near neighbours should entitle the British to re-enter Egypt. The British argue that, as war is made these days, this is insufficient, and that in event of the threat of war to

a larger area, -the British should sthl be entitled to reoccupy Egypt. In view of the opinions of some of the dominions and the reported recommendations by the British Chief of Staff, Mr Bevin is unlikely to give way on this issue. Britain is also most unlikely to give way to the Egyptian clamour for the Sudan. It is felt that neither Egypt’s prior record as administrator in the Sudan nor her historical claims justify her demand to reassert sovereignty over the Sudanese. One question being asked is whether, if Mr Bevin adopts a “ tougher ” line with Egypt, Britain has troops available to maintain order in the event of violent' repercussions. Already, with armies of occupation in Austria, Germany, and commitments in the Far East, Palestine, Greece, and Italy, demands upon Britain’s much-reduced post-war army are considerable.