DEFENCE POLICY

Otago Daily Times, Issue 25952, 19 September 1945, Page 6

DEFENCE POLICY

AUSTRALIA PLANNING 0 TWO NEW FACTORS ARISE (N.Z.P.A. Special Aust. Correspondent) (Rec. 5.5 p.m.) SYDNEY, Sept. 18. Firm decisions on Australia’s postwar defence policy are not likely tp be taken for some time yet, but the stage is arriving where the service departments can begin to plot their ideas of future defence establishments for the consideration of the Government.

As the Herald’s Canberra correspondent says, two happenings of this year—the advent of the atomic bomb and the U.N.C.1.0. decision for a world security organisation—have introduced incalculable elements into the planning. No clear idea exists in Australia of the extent to which the atomic bomb will make other methods of warfare obsolete, and involve complete changes in present ideas of the proper defence strategy for this country,. U.N.C.1.0. has left two distinct problems. One is that of the type and size of the contributions which Australia will be expected to provide under the security scheme. The other is the extent to which Australia can rely on the scheme for filling its announced objectives. Three Safeguards

There is scepticism in some Government quarters on whether U.N.C.1.0. will v/ork as well in practice as on paper. The broad Australian lines on post-war defence were outlined by the late Prime Minister, Mr Curtin, in March last. The security of Australia or any part of the British Commonwealth in the future would, he said, rest on three safeguards. These were a system of collective security which could be organised on a world' and regional basis, the degree of Empire co-operation which could be established, and national defence, the policy for which was purely the responsibility of the Government concerned. The extent and nature of a Government’s defence policy would be influenced by the degree of reliance that could be placed on the other two safeguards. Mr Curtin thought that the security of Australia and New Zealand could be best achieved by a system of defence based on an island screen to the north of both dominions, requiring sea power, air power, and military garrisons, with the installation of facilities such as docks, aerodromes, and defences. In actual practice he held it was impracticable for Australia and New Zealand to defend the area unaided, and co-operation with Britain and the United States and other Powers with Pacific possessions became essential. Air Strength Required It is understood that estimates are already being prepared of the air strength required in peace-time against the possibility of aggression directed at Australia. Army plans for peace will be evolved in the long transition period during which the demobilisation of the war-time army will be preceding. and the occupation will have to be maintained of some previous Pacific occupational areas. Three schools of thought appear to be arising on the most efficient peacetime system of land defence. One favours a professional standing army. The opponents of this proposal suggest the Government may have to ensure that such an army, if constituted, will not function chiefly to provide employment for too high a proportion of war-time officers. The second wants a continuance of compulsory military training on .more efficient lines than those of the system which obtained after the last war. The third is inclined to minimise the importance of an army in the air and atomic bomb age.