MAJOR MOVE?

Otago Daily Times, Issue 25565, 19 June 1944, Page 5

MAJOR MOVE?

FURTHER ACTION PROBABLE EISENHOWER WAITING TO STRIKE (N.Z.P.A. Special Correspondent) LONDON, June 16. “ Operations In Normandy have shown a considerable achievement for a period of little more than a week, but it would tax credulity unduly to suggest that in this and in the Italian and the Finnish campaigns can be discerned the major parts of the general engagement which is scheduled for the present summer,” says ' Strategicus ’’ in the Spectator. “ There are sufficient strains on the intelligence already. Lavish candour as to the insignificant, and miserly doling out of the essential, inevitably breed a certain virtuosity of speculation. The ‘Atlantic Wall ’ was, for instance, dismissed as if fiction were ever accepted for the true, with the result that the task of the landing was made to appear much easier than it was. In fact, multiplicity of reports not so much added to our news of ‘ the clash in the west which is speeding towards a terrific climax,’ as General Dietmar says, blurred its outlines. “If we attempt to get back to objectivity we have to realise, though the expedition to Normandy is potentially

one of the most important operations at present in being, the Italian campaign is engaging the greatest. number of enemy divisions and the Finnish the fewest. Speculation as to the present strength of the Twenty-first Army Group is not encouraged, but the Germans are putting it at about 25 divisions, and it is thought that General Montgomery is engaging some 13 to 15 German divisions.

“It can be seen that the original plan in Normandy was intelligently ambitious in offering to attack a left flank that was over 60 miles from the thrust which threatened one of the main objectives—Cherbourg. Indeed, it is because of that bait that the Allies have not only been moving forward against nodal points of communications with growing success, but at the same time have been narrowing the door by which the enemy can reach Cherbourg.' “If there be any dangers for the enemy there it is obvious that even greater dangers cloud von Runstedt’s strategic decisions. General Montgomery expgcts to engage the enemy’s strategic reserve, but even if discretion should counsel us to turn a Nelsonian blind eye to the country north of the Seine von Runstedt cannot but be well aware of its potentialities. “Action from the air imposed a not ineffective barrier on the flank of the Twenty-first Army Group, and for present purposes that should restore the Seine to military use which sometimes has tragically failed, but there remains a considerable inviting stretch of coastline which is so well known in this country.

“ One thing may be said; it is difficult to imagine that the enemy can now do more than contain the Allied force at best. That is indeed a dismaying success, and General Eisenhower will undoubtedly make use of his opportunity to launch other attacks when the enemy commits himself to a strategic counter-blow.”