ÆGEAN OPERATIONS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 25393, 26 November 1943, Page 3

ÆGEAN OPERATIONS

AID TO 1 ITALIAN CAMPAIGN ENEMY FORCES CONTAINED RUGBY, Nov. 24. Mr C. R. Attlee, the Deputy Prime Minister, in the Address-in-Reply debate in the House of Commons, made a statement on the JEgean operations, which, he said, should be considered in the light of the general strategy of the war week by week. Allied armies had moved forward in Italy, although the country was mountainous and the ways of approach narrow and winding. The toil of U-boats had maintained a high level. A heavier and still heavier weight of bombs had been dropped on Germany from the west and south with growing effect on war industry and morale. The enemy had to divert a largo part of his air force to purely defensive operations, which also made heavy demands on man-power. Guerrilla activities in the Balkans and Greece had steadily increased, and in all occupied countries resistance was growing. The Russian summer campaign had passed without pause into autumn and also winter war with no slackening of the offensive. These operations, sustained with great valour and skill by their own and Allied forces, were not disconnected efforts, he said, but each had a bearing and effect on the others. Hitler must see them as part of a concentric attack and dispose his forces to try to parry the blows. If he sent more aircraft to Western Europe, Italy, or the .ffigean he would have so much less on the Russian front, and to the extent that he would have to keep extra divisions in occupied Europe, he would have so much less on the fighting fronts. Every commitment was added weight against his forces, already taxed and strained. Referring to the Mediterranean, Mr Attlee recalled that the hazardous enterprises at Salerno, Sardinia, and Corsica had been undertaken beyond the range of fighter protection, and said that risks must be run to obtain commensurate advantages. Twofold Objective

The /Egean actions had a twofold objective—first, to help the attack in Italy by causing the Germans to disperse their forces; and, secondly, to take advantage of the fleeting opportunities which the collapse o_’ Italy brought. , ~ In early September Crete was held by 55,000 troops, including 30,000 Germans, and Rhodes by 9000 Germans and 40,000 Italians. There were'Germans on other islands, but only Italians in the Dodecanese except Rhodes and Scarpanto. Here was an opportunity to extend and harass the Germans and to obtain strategic gains of great value. The night General Alexander landed at Salerno General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson despatched a small party to Rhodes. Despite overwhelming numerical strength, the Italians made no effort to deal with the Germans, and nothing could be accomplished. Attention was then given to Cos and Leros, though these were well within the range of enemy fighter activities. Cos was important for its airfield and Leros for its naval base. Very good work was done by the navy in running troops and transport under the great disadvantages offered by the narrow waters. Its work was augmented by transport aircraft. • The immediate result was to attract the enemy’s air resources. First-line aircraft which might have been used in Italy, Sardinia, and Corsica were retained in the /Egean, where sorpe 35 per cent, of the German Air Force, including some brought from the eastern front,. had been used. Constant Air Attack

Cos was lost by only a narrow margin, but the loss affected the defence of Leros, which might have been evacuated, but with the knowledge of the effect of such a course the Com-mander-in-Chief of the Middle East, with the support and approval of the Government, decided to hold the island. Unfortunately, unfavourable weather curtailed air attack by heavy bombers. Mr Attlee said that the British garrison on Leros numbered 4000. Counter-at-tacks, which at first succeeded, later failed in the face of constant air attack, and incessant attacks by German troops landed at night created weariness too great for the garrison to resist. The loss of Leros was a matter of profound regret, but the operation contained enemy forces during a critical period of the invasion of Italy and inflicted serious losses on the enemy. Had the attack not been made wc should have-been blamed for lack of enterprise in not trying lo exploit a situation which offered opportunities. Arguments against operating beyond the range of really elective air cover were considered, but were disregarded because other considerations and hopes were held to outweigh them.