DOOMED ARMY

Otago Daily Times, Issue 25175, 16 March 1943, Page 2

DOOMED ARMY

AXIS FORCES IN TUNISIA ROMMEL NOW IN COMMAND ■ SYDNEY, Mar. 13. Rommel’s “Suicide Army” along the Mareth Line is working frantically day and night preparing for the Eighth Army’s attack, which the Germans know is inevitable, since their bid to delay it failed, says the Sydney Morning Herald’s war correspondent, Mr William Munday. j ..... They know they are doomed; their future is marked out for them as clearly as if it had already happened; They know Hitler and II Duce have written them off —a lost force with only losing battles still before them. The Afrika Korps, toughened old foes of the Eighth Army, will probably fight all the way back to Tunis, although they have not been anything like the same in morale or strength since the dashing days of El Alamein. Rommel, as has been established, is now in supreme command of the Axis North African forces, with von.Arnim, the former commander in Tunisia, his subordinate. Further evidence confirms that Rommel did not direct the Axis offensive from the Mareth Line. The morale of the Afrika Korps, ljJke that of other German units on this front is reported to Be low. Rations and conditions generally are Bad, so that many would be pleased to be captured. Surrender or Dio Many of the Italians must die or surrender where they are. They are in groups which are completely immobile and cannot hope to escape when the Mareth Line is overwhelmed. Not even the Young Fascists, who are growing very old indeed in the service of II Duce in North Africa, are likely to be relishing that fact or ,0 appreciate the motives of the German commander in preferring to preserve German units as a fighting force as long as possible. . .. But any future resistance by the Germans is unlikely to be any more pleasant for them than what is in store for the enemy in the Mareth Line when the Eighth Army storms it , It is now known \Bat the hnpor£ ance the Germans attached ter their offensive was considerable and the blow of its utter failure must have been eauallv great. Just before the attack the colonel of a panzer grenadier regiment went hastily around among his trnons saving* “ You are now about to enter She dfclsive battle against tee Fiehth Army. We must win.” He reneated forcefully: “We must win." But the German infantrymen were quick to observe how the Nazi colonel diately turned his car about and drove smartly to the rear. The Germans went into British shelling so terrinc that the Italians who merely heard it staved in their slit trenches for 48 hours They remember El Alamein. h There isno question that the enemy drive was a fall-scale attack deigned to cut off the Eighth Army’s advanced : positions. Devastating Reception Far sooner than the most confident - had expected-and there is no confldence to equal that of the men of the Eighth Army—the Germans had abandoned their onslaught. The shock administered to the morale of the 10th Panzer Division, which was m its first engagement with the Eighth Army, more than enemy losses, heavy as these were, was a deciding factor enemy withdrawal The reception given the 10th Panzers, and those who came with them, was more devastating than our blows at El Alamein. At El Alamein the enemy was able to fight and hit at us a few times. Here they took all the punches, and were able to give none. In addition to the 52 tanks entirely lost to the three panzer division* in - the battle, between 15 and 20 other tanks were badly damaged by shell hits, and were towed away. Only a very small unit of British tanks was engaged at all, giving support to some temporarily hard-pressed British anti-tank gunners. One of these British tanks was hit by a shell, and slightly damaged—that was the enemy’s total score on our armour. The Axis lost at least 2000 men killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. Our losses were fewer than 120 men. Enemy losses in vehicles and guns are estimated to have been at least 20 time* greater than ours. The relative effects on the morale of the opposing armies are obvious.