New Techniques in War

Otago Daily Times, Issue 24771, 22 November 1941, Page 4

New Techniques in War

War Into Europe: Attack in Depth.

At least two members of the Inter national Brigade in the Spanish war have established their reputation as constructive writers on modern warfare. They are Tom Wintringham and Hugh Slater. Mr Slater’s “ Home Guard for Victory" received general commendation, and his War Into Europe: Attack in Depth should mee( with a similar reception From beginning to end the book is conspicuous for admirable clarity and commonsense; it shows the author as a thoughtful, honest student of military technique and a convinced and consistent democrat. The twenty-seven page summary of the war up to the Albanian campaign, with which he begins the book, is really brilliant In this he carefully shows how the Nazis adapt their methods to suit differences in nationality, opportunity, and topography. For instance the

By Hugh Slater. (Gollancz.) 7s,

shock troops who occupied Oslo mainly by means of a twelve-piece brass band and vociferous renditions of “Roll out the Barrel,” and the 2000 Nazis who remained concealed in the hold of a neutral ship in Rotterdam for a week before they began their deadly work, are but two modifications of the German technique. From the fighting in France he draws three moral lessons. First, highly-trained and mechanised shock troops are much more effective than conscript masses—one need only compare the 150.000 Nazis who overran France with the 300.000 unprotected infantrymen who were killed while slowly wading against the enemy positions at Passchendaele Secondly, it is a mistake for a nation to leave its military affairs entirely to the military—Mr Slater recalls Clemenceau’s bitter observation. “ War is too serious a thing te bfe left to the direction of soldiers.” Thirdly. the oldes* generals are not necessarily the best, nor even the most loyal— Weygand. Gamelin, and Petain have much to learn from at least one of their juniors He draws seven conclusions on methods and weapons—tanks are the only fully effective antitank counter, and the best kind of mobile short-range artillery; dive bombers arc the best kind of heavy long-range artillery: mortars are even more valuable than they used to be; the threat of fire is often as effective as fire; night operations may be expected to become increasingly normal, and during the day-time smoke-screens are likely to be more and more used Mr Slater explains how the modern practice of attack in depth has rendered obsolete ideas of unbroken lines of communication and well-defined fronts. He argues, and, it seems, on valid grounds, that this type of warfare is most suited to democratic regimes. For not only will the soldiery be more self-reliant and better able to work independently, since they have not been trained in the totalitarian system of blind, unquestioning subservience; but also the citizenry will be eager to defend their rights and not likely to use the veapons their country gives them in support of the Nazi invader. Since the whole population is likely to be affected by attack, and not merely the fringe near the Bhttlefront as under the whole system of warfare, disaffected elements will play a far greater part than before—Fifth Columnists can now be used as never under previous strategy—and Mr Slater claims this as support for his plan for

an "attack in depth" on Western Europe. He gives alternative plans for the manoeuvre and envisages the probable results, including Russia’s entry on behalf of the democracies, but the most important and encouraging statement of the book we can quote. The technical machinery of war has developed in such a way as to make it impossible for a Fascist dictatorship to organise against the modern tri-dimen-sional strategy of attack in depth, and nowadays the detailed means of successful military campaigns demand a democratic regime.” E. R- !>•