THE WAR NEWS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 24255, 25 March 1940, Page 9

THE WAR NEWS

WHAT IT MEANS THE WAITING GAME By Major-general Sir Charles Gwynn February 9, 1940. Compared with the tremendous opening;, of the last .warj.. the strangeness of the present “static” war has (riven rise to many conjectures and much , discussion. It must be _ remembered, however, when comparison is made with 1914, that it was German initiative then that drew us into the struggle. " - . If von Moltke had elected to stand on the defensive in the west and had used his main armies against Russia, as many Germans consider he should have, we might then have experienced a long period of preparation and inactivity such as we are now going through. As it was, we had no alternative then but to exert ourselves immediately to the utmost. When, in 1915, an opportunity came to use a respite to develop our strength we . threw it away in a number of illconceived offensives. The sea warfare now, of course, goes on both defensively and, as far as possible, offensively. Why, however, are the Allied armies sitting in their trenches and why, especially, are the air forces not attacking the innumerable land targets Germariy offers and which reconnaissance has located? No answer has officially been given to those questions. Silence undoubtedly tests the morale and patience of the people. Trust in British leaders is the immense source of strength which protects morale and preserves patience under such a test. Some of the Points One can. I think, strengthen this trust by considering some of the points which obviously must influence Allied military policy. The Allied armies cannot morally or politicslly be justified in violating neutral, territory. A sea-borne attack on German coast is obviously out of the question. The army, therefore, cannot attack, except on the front between Switzerland and Luxemburg. Half of that front is covered by the practically impassable Rhine. The other half is protected not only by the Siegfried defences, but also by numerous natural obst&cl6s> To attack the unshaken German Army on such restricted and unfavourable ground, and with the element of surprise lacking, would be less excus- : ‘:le than the Passchendaele offensive. There at least only part of a weakend 'German Army was attacked, and there were compelling reasons for attacking it. Germany, on this front, is presented with a similar problem. In spite of the superior strength of her army, she has shown no disposition to attempt to break through the Maginot Line. Can she under pressure of blockade remain inactive? That is a question only Germany can answer. If the blockade is intolerable, she may invade Luxemburg and the Low Gentries, thus trying to turn the Maginot defences. Once she violates neutral territory, she presents a new strategic problem to the Allies calling for counter offensive action or for defence of a new front It is understandable, therefore, why so far as their armies are concerned, the Allies must await Ge ™ initiation. Meanwhile, the Allied Army is growing in strength, so there are good reasons for believing that ff Germany on economic grounds is forced to take the initiative she will do so as soon as she judges whether conditions are favourable. The situation which enforces inactivity on to the Allied armies does, of course, apply to air operations. Why then is air activity in the Imd war confined to reconnaissance and occasional air encounters? I surmise that the main reason is semi-political—an unwillingness _to initiate a form of warfare in which the civil population and their property musit unavoidably become involved. If, that fo rm of warfare is inevitable, let the other side incur the odium of starting it. It is possible that Germany may shrink from exposing her population to such a test. She may elect to use her air power in direct connection with land and sea operations. We should willing abide by such restrictions as Germany imposed on its use in; such circumstances. • , . In war there can be no certainty as to the enemy’s course of action; and should Germany, counting on'supplies from the East, continue to make no move, a change in Allied policy might \y> necessary. Offensive action in some form would presumably be taken if ionly in order to increase the effect of‘economic pressure by causing Germany to expend her resources.