JAPAN AND SOVIET

Otago Daily Times, Issue 24205, 25 January 1940, Page 12

JAPAN AND SOVIET

REORIENTATION, OF FOLIG^ DIVERGENT INTERESTS IN • CHINA t " SURVEY OF EASTERN SCENE For years past .the " inevitability" of war with Soviet Russia.has been an obsession in influential Japanese circles, political as well as military. It was to this obsession that Japan's enormous rearmament programme was due—not to any fears of a conflict- with China; - whose military prowess was regarded with contempt (writes Mr H.'G. W. Woodhead. 0.8. E., Shanghai correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald). The obsession persisted long after the outbreak of the China' incident, as was evidenced by the maintenance in Manchukuo of 350,000 to 500,000 of Japan's best troops, and the reluctance of the Kwantung Army to become involved'in hostilities other than .those calculated to improve its strategic position vis-a-vis ISoviet Russia. Underlying this obsession was the intense—one might •' almost say the fanatical—hostility . of., the, .Japanese Army to militant Communism. Hostilities 'in China were 'from the outset depicted as resistance to the spread of Communism in Eastern Asia, and are so justified to this very day. The signature of the Anti-Comintern Pacts with Germany and with Italy was described as the bulwark of Japanese policy. > and, if anything seemed' certain in the combinations and "permutations of Far Eastern politics, it was that- any agreement or understanding with Moscow must be considered out of the bounds of practical politics. In these days, however, when "the scum of the earth" suddenly profess friendship for "the bloody assassins of the workers," one cannot be sure, how far ideological differences remain a factor in international relations,.Alarm in T0ki0.'."..;.•.' That the conclusion of the BerlinMoscow Pact came as a great shock to, and was regarded as a cynical betrayal by, Japan is indisputable; Had it' not been for the inflexible opposition of the democracies to her "New Order in East Asia" 1 policy, Japan would probably have switched over to the opposite camp. This was, impossible without a reversal of her China policies, which the army would not tolerate, and so Japan faced complete isolation, coupled with the certainty that, ,if she became involved in a war with Soviet Russia, there was not the slightest prospect of Germany creating a diversion in the west. The collapse of Japan's fundamental policy of hostility to Russia and cooperation with the Axis Powers was calculated to cause serious apprehension in Government circles in Tokio, where the facts regarding the hostilities on the Outer Mongolian borderwere known. The Nomonhan operations, which lasted intermittently from May to September, were, it is now known, on a far larger scale: than was ever admitted in Japan. Represented to the Japanese public as mere localhostilities 'in which the Japanese Kwantung Army was uniformly victorious,, and the losses of Soviet aircraft were : astronomical, it must have come as an enormous shock to be told that Japanese casualties exceeded 18,000. ,

It is not surprising, in. view of developments in Europe and the volte face of the Reich, that. Tokio should have been. anxious to break away before becoming involved in war with the Soviet. It was presumably on Japanese initiative that a truce in .the Nomonhan region was negotiated, and came into effect on September 15. Though hostilities were suspended on that date, and the stipulations relating to exchanges of dead and. prisoners, etc., have been fulfilled, boundary demarcations still remain to be effected, and there are already rumours that the Kwantung Army's suspicions have' been aroused by Moscow's alleged orocrastination in tackling. this prob-. lem. Paving the Way Immediately, on his arrival in Tokio the new Soviet Ambassador,. M. Constantin Smetahin, was granted a long interview, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, although he had not then presented his credentials. It was reported that this interwiew was intended to pave the way for formal negotiations for the amicable settlement of various pending, problems. Admiral Nomura was stated to have pressed for an eight-year fishery agreement, to obviate the inconvenience of temporary annual pacts. Many outstanding issues between Tokio and Moscow ought to be susceptible of settlement by negotiation, especially, if, as now seems probable, both parties are anxious to reach an agreement which will leave, them free to pursue their own policies in the Far East and in Europe respectively. Whether a -comprehensive settlement is possible is open to question;, still more is the possibility of a non-aggres-sion pact. There have been sensational, but apparently, unfounded, rumours of proposals to divide China into Soviet and Japanese spheres of influence. With goodwill on both sides no serious d-iffU culty should, however, be experienced in settling such issues as the Manchukuo boundary, the Siberian fisheries, the completion of the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway, .and exchanges of Consular representatives'.. The claims of the Japanese in Northern Saghalien, where the operation of their

coal and petroleum concessions "Is al-." : leged to -have. been completely stulti- ; ; fled by Soviet restrictions are ; likely tit''" prove more difficult of adjustment. <*&;£ As a" result of the' first interview be- -. 'tween Admiral Nomura and M. Smetanin, it is stated that a common- viewpoint has been reached upon a RussoJapanese trade agreement. If any such agreement be reached, it: mustobvf-' '!"' ously be upon.a barter*basis, as* Japan has now little, if any, foreign •"currency ~L. to.spare-. It is difficult, 'however, to'; see what commodities or manufactures' ; desired by-Japan and. Soviet "Russia respectively ■ could -attain : - sufficient^' 1 volume to give such.an'agreement seri* -"*■' ous importance. Soviet Russia^.inr'the"' matter of raw materials, is .almost selfcontained, but it may be' doubted'; whether, after meeting its own'"requirements and exporting limited"sup- * ralies to. Germany, there will remain' any-surplus of those, commodities of'"" which Jaoan is most' in need; iWhat" Russia and : .Japan would'most'like "to;" export to each other are those" ft manufacturesi:which neither fex[ulres"._" •"

Political Difficulties

Assuming.that,some .agreement can be reached on economic arid bburidary issues, .there remain political problems on which the standpoints of Moscow- ; and -Tokio are-.so, far apar ; t- ; . ; that £ .a- fo mutually- satisfactory . solution j seemi ; i impossible. The Soviet's occupation of; ; .Outer Mongolia, and -its steady--.infil-u. tratiori into-. Sirikiang; Soviet assistance in material and personnel to ■- king Government, and support of .the-., Chinese Coirimunists; the .-."existence: of»., ; a mutuall assistance, pact -between the -.- Soviet"arid. Outer,-Mongolia,-and a ripri-^« aggression pact .between * China and.-> Russia; and the oft-reiterated.policy- ■fjfciri supporting the Chinese Government' , against " Japanese aggression," tute a series of formidable'-if notcin*. c auperable obstacles- to a comprehensive.. ■ economic'and political agreement .with -- ; Japan--' ■,-. :■.'■:, S. ->-■■*■-•;--: -; : :..''.--:: ;;?K One of the avowed objects ofdth'e*? -present- :hostilities' in -China being'" Japan's desire to create a favourable:*-, strategic position for and Manchukuo, vis-a-vis Soviet Russia and the Communist menace,, it ;seems scarcely, 'imaginable that theliKwan'tun» Army, or indeed Japanese military circles generally";'would put any confidence in Soviet assurances of npnaggression. The conclusion .by Moscow •of a formal non-aggression pact with :rokio would be a flagrant violation of '.the Nanking pact'of -AuJßUst'2l, 1937, and imply a -.complete*;reversal of ;Soviet policy. Even M. Stalin's unscrupulousness, one fancies, would hardly be equal to conniving at the overthrow of the Chiang Kai-shek res., gime} arid the bf-'taj.. Japanese-sponsored'" ahti-Communist ] ■.'„' regime, "supported by the Japarife.se;', Army and pledged to resist, the. spreid' of Communism m the Far East.' >, ?) r ; ' Divergent Interests , : "" .;.'; A real Russo-Japanese rappro'cherment seems, practicable only,, it. brie or;,-,',-; other of the- parties completely : aban-> . dons its Far Eastern policy. Of Japan,-; so doing there seeiris no likelihood)." It.; she were to do so it would be.more,.rf advantageous to her to seek the friends • ship and goodwill of the democracies«S* than of the Soviet A Russian reversal -- of policy, which could only result inplacing Japan in a dominating.position :■ over the whole of the-Far East,' is. in- ■"■ conceivable, even if one ignored, her * moral obligations "to China. r-:5.7 i ; - - While, therefore, an agreement Pn ! . v t boundaries and economic and fisheries; ; issues may be reached, which.wpuldV reduce the "present tension between., Moscow and Tokio, a. comprehensive''.. . political agreement appears to .be out-: side'the bounds of practical, politics...Russia's recent betrayal of the. West- , ern democracies was bad enough, bit.., did result in her. securing a. large tract''..' of. Polish territory without having -to ",\. light ..for it. One. .cannot, imagine anyconceivable advantage that would - ats , .-, crue from throwing over. China, .and,, v , conniving at the establishment of a.'-,-Japariese- protectorate over this coun- > try. An agreement to share"the-'spbils '- could hardly be. acceptable.to Japan,..? who certainly, has rip desire to aug-, . ment her military, responsibilities. by ~.-, agreeing to the existence of a.Chirie'se-.-Communist State in the .western-half - of China, , „.- , . " Japan's - main avowed objective-being" f* the unrooting of Communist influence ' ; throughout China and the ■ establishment of a huge' anti-Communist buffer ' State .on the Continent, it appears'.: grotesque to imagine'her conceding W- ? the Soviet a free hand in vast areas'■ \ which 1, her own armies" have not occu- * pied, and' whose artificial frontiers— "''-". not to mention racial partition—would confront her with- military ■'problems''" '•-hich it would obviously be beyond', her capacity to shoulder indefinitely.,'■"