THE OTAGO DILY TIMES THURSDAY, December 7, 1939. GERMANY AND RUSSIA

Otago Daily Times, Issue 23985, 7 December 1939, Page 8

THE OTAGO DILY TIMES THURSDAY, December 7, 1939. GERMANY AND RUSSIA

The price which Germany mhst pay for Russian friendship, or at least for the pact between her Government * and the Soviet, has already been the subject of a wealth of speculation. Comment on the subject from foreign sources within the past few days has been of interest. From Madrid has come a published statement, not lacking apparently some official endorsement, to the effect that Moscow will continue to do its utmost to benefit from Germany’s forced benevolence. That is sufficiently obvious. The conviction is steadily strengthening in wellinformed British circles that the occupation of Finland, like that of. the Baltic States, was insisted upon by Russia prior to the conclusion of the Soviet-Nazi pact. The Madrid news agency goes on to say, “ Hitler will again curse the war which prevented him from fulfilling the promises which made him popular among those who wished to see the world freed of the Bolshevist menace.” More direct still in its implications is the declaration of an Oslo journal which says: “This is world revolution on the march. Germany should now see what forces she has unleashed over Europe. The Allies should understand that peace is preferable to a beaten, Sovietised Germany.” The apprehensions of smaller Powers situated as Norway is are understandable, but the Allies can be relied upon to take reckoning of all the possibilities envisaged in predictions of such sinister import. In the existing situation Russia is more or less free to pursue her own aims" while the rest of Europe is tom by war. Respecting these aims many different opinions are finding expression. In some quarters, M. Stalin is credited with the devilish idea of provoking a world-war in order to plunge Europe and the world into revolution. The view of a writer in the Nineteenth Century is that this is a somewhat improbable suggestion, as a world revolution would discredit the whole edifice of the Russian stabilised “ Total State ” and the whole theory of “ Socialism in one land.” The conclusion reached is that for M. Stalin it was a case of making once for all impossible a coalition between Germany and the Western Powers, - so fraught with danger for Russia. Other commentators reiterate that the main policy of the Soviet, that of bringing about world revolution, has never varied, and that Moscow has openly adhered to the conviction that a world war, with the Soviet sitting back and strong enough to make an attack upon itself improbable, offered the best chances for success in the achievement of such an objective. As for Germany the agreement with Russia has marked a striking departure from the programme outlined by Herr Hitler in detail in his “ Mein Kampf,” and it Is conceivable that he believed that the pact would enable him to achieve his ends as regards Poland without war. The agreement was symptomatic of some desperation on the Fuhrer’s part. By aligning herself with Russia, Germany has incurred the odium associated with such a partnership. The danger to herself of “ Sovietisation ” may not be altogether imaginary: there is no saying what her defeat may spell. In war the moral aspect counts. Already Germany and Russia have too much in common. A writer in the National Review uses plain language in asserting, “All those things which to us are hateful in the Nazi regime

have been borrowed from Moscow. Terror, concentration camps, forced labour, secret police, the spy and hostage systems, the suppression of all free speech and the persecution of religion—all these have come direct from Russia. The only differences are one of name and the fact that in the Soviet Union they have been accompanied by wholesale massacres and bestialities far surpassing anything that has occurred in Germany.”