PALESTINE TROOPS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 23704, 11 January 1939, Page 9

PALESTINE TROOPS

VINDICATED BY WAR OFFICE A STATEMENT ISSUED THE ALLEGED ATROCITIES “ABSOLUTELY BASELESS” (United Press Association) (By Electric Telegraph—Copyright) (British Official Wireless) RUGBY, Jan. 9. (Received Jan. 10, at 6.30 p.m.) A statement issued by the War Office says it considers that in view of the absolutely baseless allegations which are being broadcast by persons and organisations, unfriendly to Britain, of atrocities by British troops in Palestine it is desired to make public a description of the real situation in that country, together with the truth of the actual measures which are being taken. The statement says;— “ The character of the British soldiers is too well known to require vindication, but the fact remains that categorical accusations have been levelled against him and are being assiduously disseminated in foreign countries.” This authentic description of what is actually happening in Palestine to-day provides a categorical answer to their accusations. Although there is at the present time an armed rebellion in progress in Palestine the War Office strongly emphasises that there is no organised rebel army in the accepted sense against which troops can act to the exclusion of the remaining peaceful citizens. Throughout the country rebels and peaceful citizens are inextricably mixed. The total number of permanent active rebels in the whole country does not exceed 1000 to 1500 men split up in small bodies under the command of various leaders. These men are rebels under arms and often operate in uniform and form a permanent nuclei of rebel gangs. These small parties are reinforced as required by temporary detachments of armed fellahin from neighbouring villages. The methods by which such reinforcements are obtained vary. In parts of the country where rebel sympathisers are strong and the organisations best, definite village detachments with leaders and arms are in existence. Elsewhere villagers are pressed into service by permanent gangs for fixed periods and provided with arms. Elsewhere again, no regular gangs exist, but small parties of rebel sympathisers combine by night for such activities as sniping and sabotage, which become a recognised and remunerative racket. No Organised Fighting “At the present time the rebels aim as far as possible to avoid being brought to action by troops. Except when a gang is surprised under arms there is no organised fighting. Otherwise by day both permanent and temporary rebels conceal their arms and uniforms and mingle _ indisr tinguishably with peaceful citizens. Practically every village in the country has at one time or another harboured and supported the rebels and assisted in concealing their identity from Government forces. While in many cases this was done from sympathy, in the remainder the same result has been achieved by the terrorists. Campaign of Assassination “For months now a relentless campaign of assassination has been waged against all Arabs suspected of favouring the Government or giving information against the rebels. Consequently a village where a majority of informants would be willing to assist the Government has been terrorised by the rebel minority into aiding them. There is no central co-operation or organisation of rebel bands, the general policy being more or less directed by the Mufti and the higher Arab committee, but within Palestine the fighting leaders are practically independent in their own areas. Two of the principal leaders are Abdul Rahim el Haj Mahtmed, titular commander-in-chief, who operates in Samara, and Aref Abdul Razzik, who commands rebel bands numerically almost as great in the same area. These two leaders are on such bad terms that on more than one occasion open hostilities have almost broken out between them. Their relations with the Mufti are worth describing, as they typify not only the complicated situation in Palestine, but also two different facts displayed by the present rebellion, on the.one hand to the outside world and on the other hand to the unfortunate Arab population. Principal Rebel Leaders “Abdul Rahim is a man of good family and some education, and is a more honest and genuine patriot than the majority of the rebels. He has so far as possible within ms rights endeavoured to conduct the campaign on decent lines, and dislikes intensely the assassination and intimidation waged against all moderate Arabs who might opppse the Mufti’s policy. He maintains an attitude of considerable independence to orders from the Multi, frequently refusing to carry them out when they offend his principles. For this reason and because formerly he had moderate political connections, he is regarded with suspicion by the Mufti, but is retained in his position partly for his not inconsiderable organising ability, but still more because his known good character and high principles make him an admirable figurehead for external propaganda, which seeks to represent the rebellion as a pure and patriotic movement.

“Aref Abdul Razik is a man of much lower integrity, with less education than Rahim, and entirely unprincipled. Starting as a very minor leader a year ago, he achieved his present position by a career of utter ruthlessness and implicit obedience to the Mufti’s orders. In consequence he enjoys the complete confidence of the rebel leaders outside Palestine, and is their principal agent in the maintenance of the terrorist grip on the Arb population. Incidentally, he undoubtedly pockets a large ‘rake off’ from forced contributions to the rebel funds, which Rahim does not do.

“Elsewhere there are practically no major leaders controlling a number of gangs, and the various minor leaders are almost completely independent and often at open enmity with each other. In addition to there being no standing armed rebel force against which troops can act, there is no central organisation the

destruction of which would cause the rebellion to collapse. Rebels’ Grip Weakened “There are definite signs that as the grip of the rebels on the countryside is weakened by military action, the position will be further complicated by the entrance of Arab antirebel gangs who wish to take revenge on those who have supported the rebel terror. One such gang is already active near Jenin. In urban areas there are two principal rebel elements —the more educated effendis class, which is engaged in organising supplies and finances and the general maintenance and administration of gangs, the running of rebel courts and similar activities—and the lower class of terrorist thugs who, by assassination, abduction and intimidation of all sorts, maintain their grip of terror on the town population as effectively as that of the armed gangs on villages. Although the effendis have in the mam supplied administrative capacities, they have not gained any real control of the fighting leaders. In Jaffa Abdul Razzim and a local leader, Hassam Salameh, have their own agents working for them and extorting money from the town, with the result that quarrels over the division of the spoils and the allotment of victims for fleecing are continuous.”