THE CZECH CRISIS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 23593, 1 September 1938, Page 14

THE CZECH CRISIS

MARCH THREATENED ATTITUDE OF GERMANY An interesting resume of the view taken in prominent quarters concerning the relations between CzechoKlovakia and Germany was gathered by the writer in conversation with responsible politicians at a reception for the foreign press given by Foreign Minister Kami! Krofta, telegraphed G. E. R. Gedye from Prague to the -New York Times recently. Reliable information makes it possible to confirm that when the Czechoslovak Minister inquired in Berlin on May 20 what, the meaning was of German troop movements near the frontier, he was told that, although these were not directed against Czechoslovakia, if her policy continued unchanged, Germany intended to march to "liberate" her "oppressed" German minority. It is considered here that good relations with Germany began soon after the war and reached their zenith with the conclusion of an arbitration treaty—which is still "in force —drafted in connection with the Locarno Conference. Although the relations began to deterioriate immediately after Chancellor Adolf Hitler's assumption of power, the process was at first a slow one; indeed, .when Germany denounced- the Locarno Pact Czechoslovakia received direct assurances that this would 1 not affect the arbitration treaty. In March, 1936, after Hitler had referred to the possibility of pacts of arbitration. between Germany and her neighbours. Czechoslovakia was told on inquiry that the remark applied also to her. Efforts to arrange such a treaty in discussions in the winter of 1936-37 led to nothing. In the spring it was realised reluctantly that Germany would not conclude a pact. The Czechs find consolation in the fact that the existing arbitration treaty in itself operates against aggression. . There was no serious change in the relation right up to last autumn, when various questions concerning the attitude of the press in both countries, the admission of German books into Czechoslovakia and other questions were amicably settled. During 1938 isolated attacks on Czechoslovakia in the German press developed into regular interference in her internal affairs, the writer was told. In March Hitler referred to •' 10,000,000 Germans outside the Reich in two States," saying that they were oppressed. After the Austrian annexation it was impossible for Czechoslovakia to avoid drawing the inference that the remaining 3,500,000 were her own Sudeten Germans. Later Field-marshal Hermann Goering also spoke of "rescuing" Germans oppressed abroad. The writer is now able to confirm that at the time when Germany invaded Austria she was so afraid of the consequences that she asked Czechoslovakia whether it was intended to mobolise and the reply was negative. The annexation was accepted as a fait accompli without protest. Although negotiations for a readjustment of commercial relations were begun and arte still going on, the German press campaign against this country has continued violently. There were threats that Germany must intervene if the blood of any Czech citizens of German race were shed. Throughout the Sudeten districts there was a whispering campaign that '"Der Tag" was near, and that the Czech crown would become worthless because the German mark would soon be introduced. Leaflets written in Czech—but not by Czechs—were secretly distributed, telling the Czechs that resistance to Germany was useless. At the height of this campaign came the news of the German troop concentrations near the frontier. On May 20 the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin was instructed to ask whether these were directed against this country. He was told that this was not the case, but that if the Czechoslovak policy were not changed Germany would march "to rescue" the Sudeten Germans as Hitler had threatened,

That same night Czechoslovakia called out one class of reservists and all her specialists; had Germany not denied aggressive intention, the writer was assured that 10 classes would have been mobilised at once instead of one. . This partial mobilisation was not admitted officially to have been a measure of protection against German aggression but was said to be one to restore order and confidence in the frontier area. This being so, Czechoslovakia regards as unfounded and fantastic the German accusations that her move was provocative and designed to depict innocent Germany as would-be disturber of the' peace. Subsequent German broadcasts and the press outcry about very minor incidents were sheer invention or gross exaggeration. Apart from the regrettable killing of two Henleinists who disregarded repeated orders to halt on the night of mobilisation, no single German has been seriously injured. Most ridiculous of all, the writer's informants said, was a charge made in Germany that Czechoslovakia was trying to provoke an aggressive war against the country of 75,000,000 inhabitants, or alternatively that she was doing this in the interests of international opponents of the existing regime in Germany. It was pointed out that whoever else might escape, Czechoslovakia was doomed by her situation to be among the victims of a war that she might provoke with any of her neighbours. The self-evident fact is considered here as a more than sufficient answer to all such incredible accusations of warlike intentions on the part of this country. . .