NOT ALARMED

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22393, 15 October 1934, Page 12

NOT ALARMED

AMERICA AND THE AIR THE BOMBING FETISH AN ARMY REPORT. Several cherished fetishes of those who deem the' United States open to disasr trous attack from the air are assailed by the findings of the War Department Special Committee on Army Air Corps (states the New York Times). The committee, comprising distinguished civilians as well as arniy officers, is quite specific on the subject. “ The idea that aviation, acting alone,” it says, “ can control sea lanes or defend the coast, or produce decisive results in any other general mission contemplated under our policy, are all visionary, as is the idea that a very large and independent air force is necessary to defend our country against air attack.” The work of contemporary writers is then cited who describe aircraft crossing the seas and bombarding American cities with high explosive and gas, with resulting destruction to the whole population. . . THE DROPPING OF GAS BOMBS. “ The committee has had computed,” the report says, “the quantity of gases of various, kinds necessary for effective concentration on. areas of given sizes; these computations show the fallacy of the idea presented. To carry sufficient bomba for such a destructive effect would require aircraft in numbers beyond the ability of any nation to maintain, even if a type of aeroplane capable of crossing the ocean with a military load, attacking and returning to its base, can be developed.” The air invasion of the United States and the air defence of the United States are conceptions, the committee deems, of those who fail adequately to consider the effect of ocean barriers and other limitations. Aircraft in sufficient numbers to threaten serious damage could be brought against America, it asserts, only in conjunction with sea forces or ’with land forces which must be met by forces identical in nature and equally capable of prolonged effort. BASES HELD ESSENTIAL. In this connection the conclusions of the latest War Department study made by general officers of the line, general officers of the General Staff, and the Chief of the Air Corps,, are cited. This study scouts the idea that invasions by air from overseas are practical matters. It analyses the whole plan of such attack and lays stress on the indispensable services on. the ground which are vital to any successful mass operation from the air. It says in part: — “In any study of the employment of air forces it should be realised that the said forces cannot operate without bases, land or floating. Furthermore, the facilities associated with such bases must include all those instrumentalities and utilities necessary for operation and maintenance of the air forces. The importance of these bases may-be appreciated by realising that between 80 and 90 per cent, of the personnel of an air force is associated with these bases and their supply facilities. While the facilities at, such bases' may be somewhat limited in- temporary emergencies, they will have to be extensive to care for and to permit the operation of any large air force,,in fact of any force that is in excess of 25 to 50 aeroplanes. To secure land bases, an enemy would have either to seize a suitable harbour ort the American coast, land his forces, and occupy considerable terrain, then set up the facilities necessary for his air force, or establish similar land bases, including air installations, near the American borders. OCEAN STILL SAFEGUARD. ; . “ In the former case the, enemy would have, to overcome the harbour defences and the mobile army and occupy sufficient terrain to establish, and to protect against counter-attack, his landbased aviation, before such aviation could be psed. During such operations the only aircraft available to the enemy vVould be his fleet-borne aviation, and our own Air Force could, concentrate superior forces to interrupt the development. ; ■■ “ Proposals are sometimes • advanced to the effect that land-based bombing aeroplanes of foreign nations can cross the Atlantic of Pacific, rendezvous at some selected point,, deliver a concentrated attack on some vital objective, and then return to home bases. '• Or with laud or floating bases established en route and in territory contiguous to our nation, an air force superior to bur own could launch a decisive attack- against some vital area In the United States. “ These proposals cannot be accepted as a possibility under the present stage of air development. Preparation of adequate bases ’in peace would. be convincing evidence of ah intent to attack and would disclose an enemy’s proposed plan of operations. Appended hereto Is an analysis of General Balbo’s flight of 24 Italian aeroplanes. For this flight, eight air bases in foreign countries were established, with 11 surface vessels as agents thereof. The weather services of four nations were utilised. Advance preparations were started in May; the flight was ready in early June, but could not start until July 1. Thirty-three days were consumed between the time of readiness for departure and arrival at destination, 6063 miles distant, covered in 46 hours of flying in 15 days from start to arrival.” .. . Declaring that there are a confidential number of important strategic areas in the United States, the study says that while the strategical importance of ail these areas demands such peace-time development of ground installations in each area as will make, possible their defence, plans contemplating a distribution of forces, both land and air,, in all those areas, irrespective of possible enemies and consequent relative importance of. those areas, would be unsound from a military as well as an economical view-’ point. “ The development of aviation,” the study continues, “ has greatly increased the difficulties of overseas invasion. Both for long-range reconnaissance offshore to detect the approach of enemy expeditions and for the attack of such expeditions before they reach the shores, a properly constituted Army General Headquarters Air Force provides a unit hitherto lacking in war.”