WAR DISCLOSURES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 20643, 15 February 1929, Page 12

WAR DISCLOSURES.

BY M. POINCARE. FLEEING FRENCH ARMIES. JOFFRE’S FAILURE. Remarkable war disclosures are made in the fifth volume, of the memories of ;M. Poincare, which has just been published in Paris (states the Daily Mail). The volume covers the early months of the war, and js. indispensable for their study and comprehension, whether from the political or military standpoint, while it is full of striking personal touches. It explains much that was hitherto obscure in the French strategy, and it shows that the President of the Republic (which high and responsible'position M. Poincare then filled), was systematically kept in the dark by the, French staff. The references to Great Britain and the British troops are without exception generous and even enthusiastic. It was not with a light heart that M. Poincare found France at war: “We lacked heavy artillery; the Chambers’ delay in voting the loan and the special credits for which the Government had asked had retarded the reorganisation of our military equipment. We had our 4000 field guns .. .

but they had the defect of only firing with a flat trajectory, and could not, like the German howitzers, conceal themselves behind, the crest of hills and with their high-angle fire search a terrain that was invisible to the gunners. We had only 300 heavy guns. . . . The Germans had 5000 field guns, 1500 light howitzers, and 2000 heavy howitzers, long-range guns, and large mortars.” The French Army, in fact, was badly equipped for a great war. , . FAILURE OF THE SIfAFF.

It is quite clear that M. Poincare had no faith whatever in the French plan of campaign, and that he deeply regretted the failure of the French staff to give swift aid to Belgium when Liege was attacked* “The- staff,” he writes, “ judged / that it was impossible to attempt anything. This involuntary desertion plunged us—-Viviani (Premier), Messimy (War Minister), and myself—in deep despair. But we did not feel authorised to Impose our . will upon the command in-a question .which was strictly military, and we resigned ourselves to the inevitable.” ' f '

Joffre, unfortunately, was ■ entirely wrong as to the German plans; and"it soon became clear to the French President that things were not going well for France, though he was told little or nothing of what was happening. Whatever happened, Joffre was ready With assurances that it was all for tie b’esf. What dreams he entertained are here revealed. . ■

■ “We arc accentuating our offensive in the East,” writes M. Poincare, on August 17, 1914. “Headquarters arc preparing for the investment of Metz, which is guarded, so they believe, by only a single army corps. They hope also to penetrate into Alsace between Sarrebourg and Strasbourg.”

EIGHT CORPS IN FLIGHT. Already the Belgian's were complaining bitterly of being left in the lurch. “ One must admit,” says M. Poincare, “that appearance gave some justification to such reproaches. .■ . . It • is regrettable that 'in presence of the swift invasion of Belgium the execution of our concentration kept us so long within our northern frontier.” ■ M.. Poincare was still waiting for information about this “ war in the dark” (as he calls it) from Joffre wEen “ telegrams arrived which, stated that according to the German staff communiques, eight French arjny corps-were in flight between Metz and the Vosges,, leaving in the hands of the Germans 10,000 prisoners and 50 guns. . . . It is intolerable that we are reduced to ignorance of the actual result of battles on which depends the existence of France.” ' ■

There were other astounding-incidents. General d’Amade and a. whole French army of territorials disappeared, andwere afterwards found miserably Equipped in another part of the country.' Lille was evacuated hurriedly and great stores of munitions were abandoned there. A telephone * message came in from the great town of Nancy: “By superior orders, officials are leaving Nancy for Paris.” ! Whb Had. given these orders, what did this' departure mean? I sent to the Ministry of War. They knew nothing there, except that Nancy no longer answered on the -telephone. Both from that Ministry and from the Elysee we repeatedly called the place up. In vain. There was the silence of death. THE ADMIRABLE BRITISH.

For 'the British troops in these dreadful hours of dismay and confusion the author has warm praise: “The. British Army showed admirable military qualities, good discipline, courage, physical and moral soundness, but its right was left exposed by the retreat of our sth Army.” , . . It was perhaps as well for the Allies that the secret report which Joffre made to the French Government to explain his defeats was not disclosed at the time. He wrote: “ I am compelled to act on the evidence which I have. Our army corps, notwithstanding the numerical superiority which had been assured them, have not shown in open country those offensive qualities which their partial successes at the outset led us to expect. . . . We are, therefore, con-

demned to a defensive, supported by our fortresses and physical obstacles, yielding as little territory as possible.” M. Poincare tells us that most of the Ministers were “filled with consternation ” at these disclosures, as well they might be. In this tragic moment that future leader of France, M, Ciomenceau, lost all self-control. M. Viviani, the Prime Minister, described an interview with him thus: “I found him-in a state of furious exasperation. ‘No, no,’ he told me, ‘ don’t count on me. In a fortnight you will be torn to pieces.' No, I won’t have any part in it. But you are the victim of the Jesuits. It is that Castelnau who is the cause of the defeats in. Lorraine. An end must he put to that.’ After this outbreak of passionate words Clemcnceau dissolved into tears, and, suddenly humanised by his sorrow, flung himself into my arms. But he still refused to promise me his support.” With M. Poincare he had another scene, in which, after enduring a storm of abuse from him, M. Poincare had to tell him, “You are off your head.” But as the author nobly adds, M, Clemcnceau was the one man who, when all seemed lost, was capable of saving .everythin", as his after history proved. SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION.

We arc now informed that the withdrawal of the French Government to Bordeaux was due to Joffrc’s insistence and indeed to his belief that the Germans were going to take Paris. The battle of the Marne bought a great improvement in the position, but a new source of alarm arose almost at once; Headquarters continued to issue daily bulletins of such an extravagant optimism that, if the War Minister had not very wisely corrected them and toned them down, public opinion would have been nourished day after day on new illusions. The War Minister was further pre-occupied by the state of our artillery and munitions. ... 'We have only (on September' 19, 1*914) enough field gun ammunition for one month.

The effect ,of this was quickly felt in the check of the Allied offensive: “The commander-in-chief . informed .us (on October 1) that,the necessity of sparing field gun ammunition has compelled bin.

to renounce the offensive at several points.” The French and British, not the Gennans, were being; besieged; anl the Allies had as yet none of the tus for a trench •war. j THE KING’S ACTION. 1

Among the. many interesting facts con* tained in • the later pages is the King's account to M. Poincare of his attitude on the outbreak of war; “ I was always of opinion,” he said, “ that England must act against Germany if Germany declared war on France. But when you wrote to me (on July 31, 1914) on this matter, I was forced to answer you with reserve, because my Government had not then made up its mind, and British feeling was not ready for intervention. I told Grey: ‘lt is your business to give the country information; you can,' surely make it..understand that England cannot stand aside from the conflict.’ In actual fact Grey was able without difficulty to open the eyes of the,immense majority of the English.” There is repeated reference to the disgraceful outrages committed by certaih of the German troops, in killing French civilians and wantonly destroying private property wtihout military excuse. They fell savagely on M. Poincare’s belongings, A report from Joffre on October. 9, 1914, states: “ Some time ago they violated the family vault of the President at Nubecourt, and yesterday from near St. Mihie’ they have executed a systematic long' range fire against the personal property of the President at Sampigny. No military reason justified the choice of, this objective. The proof is to be found in this, that only the President’s house has suffered.” ‘