MARRIED TEACHERS.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 19688, 15 January 1926, Page 10

MARRIED TEACHERS.

question of dismissal. TEST CASE. NO BUSINESS OF THE COURT. (Fbom Cob Own Correspondent.) LONDON, December 1. A few months ago Air Justice Romer gave a decision in a test case relating to the vexed question of the enforced retirement or dismissal of women teachers on their entering into marriage. The case m question was that of Airs Ethel Short v the Poole Corporation. The judge upheld the claim that the resolution of the Corporation in discussing Airs Short was invalid, ultra vires their statutory powers, and inoperative to terminate her contract of service. , ... She was the wife of the borough libranafi. The local authorities had inquired into her financial affairs and those of her husband, and had taken the line that if her husband could afford to support her she should give way to an unmarried successor. She claimed that the resolution to dismiss her was passed, not in the _ best interests of education, but for ‘*an alien and irrelevant reason. M The judge said it was not in the best interests of the community to debar a married woman from teaching, and that the council’s motives were alien and irrelevant/* and he therefore pronounced the notice of dismissal to be- invalid. The case was next taken to the Court of Appeal composed of the Alaster of the Rolls and Lords Justices Warrington and Sargant, who have unanimously reversed the decision of Air Justice Romer. THE JUDGMENT. The ALacter of the Rolls gave judgment, in the course of which he said that by virtue of the Eduction Act, 1921, Section 3, the Poole Corporation were constituted the local education authority; by Section If they were charged to maintain and keep efficient the elementary schools within their area; and by Section 148, Sub-section 1, they were authorised to appoint teachers to hold office during their pleasure. No question arose as to Mrs Short s efficiency. On August 6, 1921, she marrie i Mr Short. On July 31, 1924, she, in common with other married women teachers, received a notice terminating her engagement at the expiration of one month The question then arose whether the . Corporation had the power, in the circumstances, to serve the notice, and whether the notice was operative. The P ow . e o r , s f lTen to the corporation by section 148, subsection 1, were not circumscribed; the teachers held office during the pleasure of the authority; the authority could not impose limits upon its powers if the statute had not done so. On February 6, 1923, the corporation adopted a resolution to the effect that no appointments of female married teachers whose husbands were alive and capable of supporting them be made, and that it be a condition of appointment in the future that in the event of a woman teacher marrying, she should forthwith resign her employment. On May 6, 1924, they adopted a report of the Education Committee recommending that notices be given to such married women as were employed to terminate their engagements unless they could satisfy the committee that some sufficient reason existed for continuing the engagements, and that the managers of non-provided schools be recommended to take similar action. The circumstances affecting Mrs Short were not considered a sufficient reason for retaining her services, and on July 30, 1924, notice' was given to her dismissing her as from August 31. At the trial a letter sent through the town clerk to the managers of the non-provided schools was put in as containing the evidence for Mrs Short at its high-water mark. It stated that the corporation were led to their decision because (1) they considered that the duty of a married woman was primarily to look after her domestic concerns, and that they regarded it as impossible for her to do so and effectively and satisfactorily act as a teacher at the same time; and (2) it was unfair to the large number of young unmarried teachers seeking situations that those positions should be occupied by married women who presumablyhad husbands capable of maintaining them. COURTS COULD NOT INTERFERE. The Act indicated that where the authority exercised its discretion bona fide, and not arbitrarily, the courts could not interfere. Where the discretion was exercised the courts were slow to interpret the action taken as invalid. The corporation contended that they had acted without corruption or mala tides, therefore their action could not be challenged; that they had acted strictly with a view to educational ends. Where the exercise of the discretion of an authority was challenged it was for those who challenged it to prove that their view' was right, and in his judgment that proof had not been given in uiis case. The course adopted by the corporation might be subject to criticism, but it was not for this court to pronounce upon that criticism so long as the discretion had been properly exercised. In his opinion the appeal should be allowed, with costs of the appeal and the trial. Lord Justice Warrington said he could see nothing done in the present case which ■was alien to the keeping efficient of the schools. If the adoption of the corporations policy were due to a desire that single women might be encouraged to undergo training with a fair hope of employment, it would not be irrelevant to their duties. Mr Justice Romer had laid stress on the fact that in some cases the corporation had retained the services of married women teachers. In his lordship’s opinion that only amounted to this, that the corporation, while seeking as an ideal to maintain exclusive employment for unmarried women, had abstained from dismissing in cases where hardship would be caused. REMEDY WITH THE ELECTORS. Lord Justice Sargant, also agreeing, said that when elementary education was entrusted to publicly-elected bodies, a very wide discretion was necessarily invested in them, and it must have been contemplated that a considerable diversity of opinion would arise as to their methods. The normal critics of those methods would be, not the courts, but the electors, to whom the authority would have to give an account of their stewardship. In no case had the courts interfered except where there had been corruption, mala fides, or an exceeding of authority. A decision to employ only unmarried teachers could not be interfered with, however mistaken such a decision mght appear. The town clerk’s letter dd not purport to represent the views of anyone but the Education Committee. and could not be held to bind even the members of that committee, still less could it be taken to reflect the reasons which actuated the general council. It could not be used as in the nature of an admission, nor did it prove that the corporation had acted mala fide. He could find nothing to indicate that the corporation acted with any other purpose than fulfilling their duty in regard to education. The appeal was accordingly allowed, with costs here and below.