PACIFIC NAVIES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 19502, 10 June 1925, Page 4

PACIFIC NAVIES.

AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE. A; NAVY LEAGUE PROPOSAL. Recently representatives of the various branches of the Navy League in Australia asked the Minister of Defence (the Hon. E. K. Bowden) to build a floating dock capable of accommodating .super-Dreadnoughts, instead of the 13,0C0-ton dock which had been agreed upon earlier in April, writes Frank Clarke, president of the Victorian Navy League, in the Melbourne Argus. The dock agreed upon could not take capital ships or the greatest of our liners, and, as Mort s Dock at Sydney can already cater for lighter vessels, the now Government dock seems to be chiefly a blow at private enterprise. All defence schemes are on false premises that do rot suppose the eventual arrival of the Empire’s battle fleet, and that fleet cannot go to any part of the world where it cannot be docked. Sydney has the dock-building facilities, but a floating dock of super-Dreadnoughts could be towed to any defended harbour where our defence authorities deem it would bo best placed, and they in turn would consult Admiralty strategy on the point. This dock is suggested as auxiliary to Singapore. The main proposition can be most briefly put by saying that Singapore covers the Burma and Mesopotamia oilfields, India, and tho Suez Canal, but it 4500 miles from Sydney, and “lame ducks” after an action off eastern Australia would have a poor chance of limping homo 4500 miles through countless islands capable of sheltering enemy submarines aud through narrows readily mined • Japan has always been a. good and peaceful neighbour to Australia —no responsible Australian wants to create an atmosphere of suspicion towards her —but she is our only possible sea foe, and the study of the sea position between the two countries is well understood by her to be entirely defensive on Australia’s part without any hint of provocation or dislike. Ships based on Singapore would lie on the flank of any attack on Australia, threatening transports, supply ships, and even fighting units in their passage. A cardinal factor in that theory, apart from the distances, is that Japan, has a mandate over the Caroline and file Marshall Islands. She is bound by treaty not to fortify them; but it would ba folly for her to approach a fight with the British Empire without providing, when the time came, half-way houses of refuge which, moreover, would flank tho Singapore-Japan line. The outstanding feature is that Singapore is 2400 miles from the Carolines, and 3300 miles from the Marshalls. If the former were a covering naval station and the latter a supply base, Singapore would bo an impossibly far flank for effective raids, would, in fact, be just as much, but no more, on the flank as Portsmouth is on the flank of tho United States. In an action fought off New York, it would be ten days’ steam back across the Atlantic for waterlogged British ships; it would be the same or more after any attempt to interrupt the Japanese line via. tho Carolines, Singapore-Japan (2400 miles). Singa-pore-Caroline (2400 miles), explain why Japanese statesmen •do not express violent distrust of Singapore. It is 4500 miles from Singapore to Sydney; it is only 4500 miles from Japan to Sydney, or 2500 from the Carolines to Sydney. If. therefore, an action were fought off Sydney, super-Dreadnoughts that might be disabled would have to return for docking at Singapore, 4500 miles —17 days’ steam at 11 knots, an almost impossible journey, whereas in such an action Japanese injured ships travelling at 11 knots would reach the Carolines in nine and a-half days. For the protection of Western and Northern Australia, Singapore is as near or nearer than Sydney or other east coast ports, and lies in a real flanking position to the Japanese lines of approach. Two considerations occur here adding to the usefulness of Singapore in the defence of Australia. In the first place, the former by protecting the oilfields of Asia and by an easy patrol of the straits separating the largo islands on the SingaporeBioomo or Singaporc-Darwin lino could provide safe passage behind the lines to Berth at least, and at slight risk to Melbourne, of oilships and the via Canal or Cape munition ships, which are vital to our continuance in war. Secondly, tho same patrol would confine raiding enemy cruisers to the immensely long approach to the Indian Ocean round Tasmania, thereby rendering our export’ trade considerably safer under light cruiser convoy. . There is another most important angle from which to view an Australian superDreodnought dock. Last century our fathers built the Empire by means of a ring of coaling stations round the world ■ they ensured the mobility ot the British mercantile marine. To-day, an equally insistent problem is the mobility of the British fleet round the world. There is a super-Dreadnought dock in South Africa, and the fleet could go there; one is to be placed in Southern Asia at Singapore, and the fleet can go there; to complete the ring and the mobility there should bo one in Australia to link up these two. It must bo repeated that all efforts to provide for the naval /defence of Dus continent are fallacious if the British fleet cannot eventually* back up the Australian squadron, and it is a sheer impossibility to send great battleships to protracted warfare in oceans where they cannot be docked whatever happens. The cost of a 15,000ton dock is said to be £300.000, whereas tho cost of tho greater floating dock here proposed has been estimated at £650,000, and it will provide real constructional work, as distinct from mere assembling of parts, for all the men, foundries, and yards that are available. New Zealand would probably share in its cost. The Washington Treaty may not last for ever, and in time Australia may desire a capital ship or ships of her own when it is remembered how the Australia alone rendered the Schamhorst and Gneisenau useless at tho beginning of the Great War; but we cannot have such a ship without a dock, unless we are content to send her for all scraping and repairs to Singapore or South Africa. In conclusion, such a dock in peace time could earn its keep by taking the 20,000-ton liners which already grow too long for any existing accommodation. These are the main reasons which prompted the Navy League in Australia to endeavour to lead public opinion on the subject; ihey are not the ideas solely of one man, but are the conclusions of a number who are either retired naval men in the League, .or who endeavour to educate themselves in sea defence. Naturally they have no official approval, because it would not have been proper to ask it in advance, nor prematurely to have divulged plans arcepied by those responsible for our safety. There is. however, a field for the Navy League in thus educating public opinion in advance of Government action, and it is earnestly hoped that more, peoole will join the league and support its vitally important work.