LITERATURE.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 19252, 16 August 1924, Page 4

LITERATURE.

ADMIRALS ALLt

THE DARDANELLES AGAIN. By Constant Reader. The story of tho Dardanelles campaign has boon told over and over again and from many points of view; the naval and military authorities have each had their say; and it hag boon described by English, Australian, New Zealand, French, and Gorman authorities. A concise and careful summary of tho inception, direction, and conclusion of the expedition is given by Mr Archibald Hurd in “Sons of Admiralty.” A more detailed account is contained in “The Dardanelles,” by Majorgeneral Caldwell; whilst, Major J. G. Gillam’s “Gallipoli Diary” introduces the more personal touch. In “Tho WorldCrisis—l9ls,” Mr Winston Churchill puts hig case for tho campaign both personally and officially, and uow comes upon the scene Lord Wester-Wemyss with his story. Admiral Wemyss has not a great deal to say that has not been told before, hut in’s book on “The Navy in tho Dardanelles Campaign” has special interest at the present time—and for two reasons. Tho question of a successor to Viscount Jcllicoe as Governor-General of Now Zealand is being actively canvassed, and amongst tho probable nominees both Lord Wester-Wemyss and Admiral Sir John Michael do Robeck have been mentioned. Indeed, Lord Jellicoe has said that he could not desire a more suitable successor than Admiral Robeck. Lord Wcmyss’u book has a good deal to say about Admiral Robeck besides the author’s personal view of the matter, and for this reason it has special significance for the Now Zealand reader. It was on January 23, 1915, that as a result of an informal meeting between Mr Asquith, Mr Winston Churchill, and Lord Fisher, the Dardanelles campaign was definitelv decided upon. On February 19 Admiral Carden, in pursuance of tho plan arranged, opened The bombardment of the entrance forts in tho Dardanelles. On March 16 Admiral Carden, for health reasons, was compelled to resign his command, and on the following clay Viceadmiral de Robeck was appointed by telegram to succeed him. On February 13. Lord Wemyss, who since the outbread of war had been in charge of a cruiser squadron perpetually patrolling the mouth of the English Channel, was summoned to the Admiralty, and was informed by the First, Lord (Mr Winston Churchill) that he was to command an expedition to East Africa to capture tho German cruiser Konisberg. Three days later bo was curtly informed that the expedition wag off, and he went to Whitehall “in a towering rage.” There ho met Lord Fisher, to whom, in consequence of a serious disagreement, he had not spoken for seven years. “When, therefore, ho came towards me, “writes Lord Wemyss, “with outstretched hand the situation was not without its embarrassments, but—war was raging, he was First Sea Lord, I a Junior Rear-admiral, so I resolved to lot bygones bo bygones, and whilst somewhat reluctantly taking the proffered hand, corild not help remarking that tho war brought odd people together.” It was then that Lord Wemyss was informed by Mr Winston Churchill that it had “been decided to attempt to force the Dardanelles, and that tho island of Lemnos, to be ceded to us by Greece, would bo the base of operations.” Lord Wemyss wag to bo Governor of Lemnos, and commander o? the base, but, beyond instructions to proceed there with tho utmost despatch, ho received no orders and no indication as to lhe_ line of conduct to pursue. When he arrived at Mudros arid visited Admiral Carden ho could get no further enlightenment. Lord Wemyss says, after a reference to tho position:—

These episodes merely exemplify the endless difficulties to bo contended with and were solely duo to the anomalous position I had been placed in. Appointed in London Governor of an island which on my arrival I found being governed by its own legitimate officials, administering a town over whose inhabitants I had no legal authority, commanding a base situated in a territory that was in theory if not in fact neutral, and for whoso safety and well-being I was responsible, my task was rendered none tho easier from my entire ignorance of the actual political situation. Was Greece a secret ally? or was she a neutral whose neutrality was being flagrantly violated? What was her position towards the Entente Powers or their towards her? It was only in tho light of knowledge gained much later that I began to understand her attitude towards the Allies

during the Gallipoli campaign After detailing some of the difficulties encountered in catering for tho needs of the Australian and French troops who were continually arriving at Mudros, and indicating that he was kept quite in the dark as to tho proposed campaign. Lord Wemyss continues:—

On March 16, in response to a message of the Vice-Admiral, lying off Tor.edos, I proceeded there in a destroyer, and found him ill and obliged to give up tile command. The situation thus created was a delicate one, for his departure would leave mo the senior officer, since Rear-Admiral do Robeck, his second in command of tho squadron operating against the forts, though older and senior to mo in the service was actually my junior on the Rear-Admiral List. Hero was I, organising the base, an arduous task inevitably bound to suffer from a change of command,' whilst do Rebeck was in the middle of a complicated operation, in full possession of and knowing its most intricate details of which I was completely ignorant; yet surely the senior officer’s place was with the squadron at the front. I discussed the situation from every point of view with him and with Commodore Keyes, his chief of tho staff, and eventually made up ray mind that no other course was open to me except to return to Mudros to carry on my work there, leaving thoperations in do Robeck's hands. I accordingly telegraphed my decision to tho Admiralty, and added that, if they considered it desirable to make de Robeck an acting Vico-Admiral, a step in my opinion very desirable on account of the presence of the French Rear-Admiral rendering the question ot command otherwise difficult, I was ready to serve under do Robeck’s orders. It is hard'y necessary to state that I did not come to that conclusion without considerable heartburning and a Litter feeling of disappointment, but I had no doubt in rny mind that, under the peculiar circumstances the decision was the right, one to take, and it bad the happy result tnat for tho remainder of the campaign de Robeck and I worked together _ with ihe greatest cordiality and friendship. And so I returned to'Mudros sore and disappointed, I must confess, yet conscious of the correctness of my conduct.

Lord Worn,yss records that on March 18 was fought the naval kittle resulting in the loss 'of the Irresistible, the Ocean, and tho Bouvet, and very nearly in the loss of the Inflexible,—“a battle which finally put an end to all hopes of forcing tho Dardanelles without the assistance of tho Army.” The next day Lord Wemyss visited de Rohcck at Tonedos and “found him naturally enough somewhat depressed at the turn of events. Ho spoke of disaster, a term I begged him not to use.” Tho narrative follows a well worn track in describing tho combined naval and military attack on the Dardanelles, including I lie Oallipoli landing and culminating in the evacuation. Lord Wemyss approaches tho campaign from a somewhat different angle from tho other writers, and while ho agrees as to the main facts, his deductions are different. Some personal touches colour the pages. Describing the combined French and English armies, Lord Wemyss says: “Through all this motley crowd there is a continual stream of’ perspiring Australians, carrying huge loads of stores and pushing improvised carts. They are magnificent specimonts of tho raw material of humanity. 1 think I have never seen finer.” At a later date lord Wemyss gives a typical English view when ho writes:

It is five weeks to-day since we landed tho army and beyond being firmly established on tho Peninsula \vc are very little further than we were then. More men — more men —that is always ifne cry. . . From nil I hear the Australians are an odd mixture, on somo situations quite magnificent, in others hopeless. Full of dash and resource thev are as yet but imperfectly disciplined, though I believe a great deal better than they were. Of course there aro all sorts among, them landowners, barristers, architects, adven-

turers, miners, loafers—all are jostling one another in their ranks and the colonel of one of the regiments has all his life

been a school master. It must be difficult

to get such a jumble of humanity to think on anything like (he same piano.

Under date July 83, 1915, this note occurs: “Generals seem to spring tip like mushrooms in the night, and each one's Staff seems to bo more glittering than the last; I hope their usefulness is in like proportion. . . . 1 gather that the English public are somewhat depressed, not that there is anything to bo depressed about, only they have been lured on by false insinuations to hope for groat things which cannot come off. Tim people latest out from England arc raging against Northcliffe and Lloyd George, who, they tell mo, arc hound np together. God! What I feel about the politicians! The other day there was an armistice on the Peninsula, to bury the dead; while it was going on a Turkish officer strolled up to onr lines and found a chaplain reading the service over a largo grave. When it was finished, he took off his fez, looked down into tho grave, and said in a loud voice: ‘Cod bless all true .soldiers and eternally damn all politicians.’ Tho Turks., aro a hard enemy and have fought cleanly all through. ...” This is tho gravamen of tho complaint expressed in tho concluding chapters of tnis book—l ho eternal bungling of the politicians over and over again bringing to nought tho matchless bravery of the soldiers and tho superb dash and courage of the navy. But for this bungling, Lord Wemyss avers, Turkey would have been Britain’s ally and not her enemy. But for this bungling the Dardanelles Campaign would have been properly planned, wholeheartedly entered upon, and carried to a victorious conclusion. Instead of this it, was hatched at haphazard treated as a side-show of small moment, and terminated when a little more courage would have carried it through. For in the opinion of Lord Wemyss, even the evacuation was a grave tactical blunder. He agitated for another naval attack on the Straits. Admiral do Rebeck having left tho scene of action. Lord Wemyss was made an acting ViceAdmiral, and on December 21 bo sent a personal telegram (o Mr Balfour, developing his arguments in favour of tho naval attack. Ho writes: This. I pointed oul, would under any circumstance stand an excellent chance of success; but now this chance seemed enhanced by information received that the Turkish morale hud been much shaken by tho late blizzard and by the growing dislike with which German ascendancy wag regarded at Constantinople; and now. when all tho world believed that we were about to evacuate the Peninsula, the chances of surpise and therefore of success were increased. I knew, I told him, that the General Commanding in Chief did not think the army could attack with success, but I believed he under-estimated the effect of the presence of a naval force above the Narrows and controlling ■ the straits. Such being the case, I submitted that the naval attack be delivered with the understanding that the army should be ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity offered by its success, and I ended >■ by reiterating that the Turkish Armv on the Peninsula would be cut off from Constantinople and when aware of the situation the effect upon them might be so groat ns to prove decisive even without the intervention ot the army. Lord Wemyss regards the “fatal decision” to evacuate Anzac and Suvla as “a disastrous mistake.” “So what good,” he exclaims, “ was the sacrifice of invaluable lives and costly treasure squandered in the campaign, if, at the last moment, victory was thus to be allowed to slip from our grasp. That further naval action would have entailed heavy losses is probable, hut the sacrifice would have been no greater than those offered up almost daily on the Western fronts with less chance of success ; and can anyone doubt that tho results of a success here would have been more far-reaching than in any other theatre of the war? Once through the Narrows, an almost limitless vista opened out; Turkey would have been reduced to a negligible factor, Russia joined up with her allies, Egypt saved, our prestige in the East placed on an immutable basis at the cost of some ships incapable of facing the enemy’s main fleet and of lives that their owners were only too ready and willing to give.” The two concluding chapters of this hook are the most important. Written eight years after the Dardanelles campaign was fought and lost, they present “an objective view” of its inception, conduct, and abandonment, taken by “one who shared in nil its hopes and illusions, in some of tho excitement and much of the montonv. ” Penned before Mr Winston Churchill’s second volume appeared. Lord Wemyss sees nothing in that chronicle to cause him to modify his expressed opinions. He laments tho “diplomatic neglect” into which a “storm centre” like Constantinople had been allowed to drift and the “lack of foresight” with which the situation was handled prior to 1914. Because of the absence of tho British Ambassador from Constantinople, tho British Government was not kept informed of the negotiations in July, 1914, between Germany and the Young Turk party, leading to the alliance between the two States signed on August 2. “To this ignorance.” says Lord Wemyss, “must be attributed the escape of the Goebeu and Breslau with all its fateful consequences.” This diplomatic failure was accompanied by “a lack of anticipation of military action in the Near East.” Instead of tho Dardanelles campaign being part of a preconceived plan, “the higher strategy of the war,” it was undertaken at. the invitation of Russia merely as “a demonstration” to divert tho Turkish armies in the Caucasus. To this was added a third weakness—“a lack of a central authority for the conduct, of tho war ” Lord Wemyss concludes—and his judgment will carry widespread conviction:— Politically and strategically the conception of the campaign was correct, and had it been properly planned and methodically carried out, there is no reason why it. should not have been crowned •with success; but rushed info ns it was, without forethought or preparation, devoid ot plan, treated as a side issue, with improvisation as tho only means whereby daily requirements could bo met, it was little less than a crime, which could hardly have been committed had the body of men who sanctioned its inauguration been properly organised with a view to carrying' out the work committcrl to their charge. ITio losses incurred during this abortive campaign reached the stupendous figure cf 120,246, and might well have been far greater had it, not been for the good fortune in the matter of fine weather aflending the evacuations, the possible casualties of which had been estimated at 20,000. ._ . . As it is, mismanaged from the outset, starved of tho men and munitions which alone could ensure certain success, the cause of suffering greater than can he said, borne with a forliludo even greater, abandoned at the moment when victory was still within grasp, the campaign of the Dardanelles will remain through all ages to come an imperishable monument to tho heroism of our race, to the courage and endurance of our soldiers and sailors, to the jack of vision and incapacity of our politicians.