GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

Otago Daily Times, Issue 19135, 1 April 1924, Page 7

GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

NO PLAN OF ATTACK. ILL-CONCEIVED NAVAL VENTURE. DISCLOSURES BY ADMIRAL WEMYSS. Ctm* Association—Bt Telopwph—Copyright LONDON, March 60. The following is the first section of the Australian Press Association's extract* from the memoirs and diaries of Admiral-of-Lhe-Flcet ixnd Wester 'Wemyss on tlie Gallipoli campaign in 1915 : Lord Wemyss relates that he was summoned to the Admiralty on February 16, and told that an attack on the Dardanelles was impending, and he was to proceed to Lemnos immediately. The instructions following his visit brought a reconciliation with Lord Fisher, with whom he had quarrelled in 1908, when the former suggested that Lord Wemyss had become subservient to the Naval Secretary. On his arrival at Malta Admiral Limpus asserted that the Turks loathed Germany, and would not fight further when once they felt the pressure of war. Reaching Mudros on February 24, he found everything helpful lacking. The outer iorts at the Dardanelles had already been bombarded. The plans for the combined operations were not disclosed, except that a brigade of marines was available to occupy the forts as soon as they were silenced. The one bright spot was that as no instructions had been received, he would ask for. none, but choose his own way of salvation or damnation. The arrival of a battalion of Australians on March 7 had a beneficial effect on the inhabitants. General Birdwood arrived at Lemnos on March 1. Then he first learned that 40,000 troops were expected to assist, the manner of doing so depending on the result! of the bombardment. With General Birdwood he interviewed Admiral Carden, who was tending to the view that the concealed guns and mobile batteries must be silenced before progress was possible against the inner forts. The intensive bombardment was discontinued on March 8, when it was apparent that considerable military assistance would bo essential. Lord Wemyss went on to say that the Australians ‘were as magnificent a body of men as he had ever seen. He thought the Canadians fine raw material, bat the Australians were finer. They were wild, of course, but such pleasant-looking devils. “They always seemed pleased to see me.” The deficiency in the transport 1 arrangements, said Lord Wemyss, was another dis closure of the manner in which the campaign was planned. He also mentioned that the orders from Homo were contradictory. He ' suggested that safety required the taking over the control of the whole of Lemnos, but the Admiralty did not reply, and left him chafing in ignorance, and never realising that actual plans were non-existent. Sir lan Hamilton arrived on March 17. General D’Amade, the French commander, favoured not touching the Dardanelles, but marching on Constantinople. However, operations against Asia Minor were banned from London. On the loss on March 18 of the warships Irresistible, Ocean, and Bouvet, he pointed out the impossibility of the battleships forcing the straits till the mines were cleared, and that this was impossible till the guns had been overcome, which meant that troops would have to seize the peninsula. The admirals and generals held a conference ong March 22, and decided that combined? action must be postponed till the plana were perfected.—A. and N.Z. Cable. (Received March 31, at 8.3 p.m.) ; Lord Wemyss, outlining the preparations for the combined expedition, says: “My heart, goes out to the ancient Israelites who had to make bricks without, straw. If you could imagine what the fatuous authorities seem to expect of us out here! Good God I have nothing Ho complains of amateur strategists and warriors, but states that with the return ;of Sir lan Hamilton on April 10, the plans matured more rapidly. The dairy of April 23 says. “The scheme is audaciously bold. I think we have done all that" is possible to help towards success, but the Home authorities seem to think it is a picnic party for all the help they have given. Had we troops to pour in after the first bombardment, the whole thing would have been finished in a very short time.” Describing the landing, Admiral Wemyss highly praasea Commander Unwin, the originator and organiser of the River Clyde exploit, the heroism of which was without parallel. The celerity and silence of the Anzacs quitting the transports at Gaba Tepe is unstintedly commended. “No higher testimony to the efficiency and discipline of these untried troops is possible.” Admiral Wemyss throws light on an incident which occurred during the night ‘of April 25. General Birdwood was urgently summoned ashore, whence he sent a letter saying that the divisional generals did not think it possible to maintain their positions. If the troops had to be re-embarked the sooner the better. Admiral Wemyss realised that such a step would be disastrous, so he went ashore and urged General Birdwood, with Sir lan Hamilton’s approval, to hold on at all costs till dawn, when the isolated positions could be linked up. Next morning the line was established in a strong position.—A. and N.Z. Cable