THE IMPERISHABLE STORY.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 19016, 12 November 1923, Page 8

THE IMPERISHABLE STORY.

Lord Kitchener’s Herculean Task. STRAIN TOO HEAVY. THE SECOND VOLUME OF WINSTON CHURCHILL’S MEMOIRS. Copyright. Eights of Production Acquired by the Otago Daily Times. VI. All these troops for Gallipoli were available for moving at this moment. the transport for their conveyance bv' sea could readily have keen procured. All, or .their equivalent, and more wore subsequently sent. Together they comprised an army of at least 150,090 men. This army could have been concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranean in --eadiness to intervene at any point selected some time before the end of March. If at any time in January it had been deliberately decided to use such an army, according to some good plan and with a resolute propose, in a great combined operation to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula, and thus open the passage fot the fleet, few will now doubt that a complete victory would have been gamed. On the other hand, apart from the 29th Division, all these troops had been raised or permanently embodied only since the outbreak of the war. To open a new campaign on a large scale was a most serious decision in view of their partially trained character and of the general shortage of munitions. Phis was the justification for the naval attack. It also within its limits presented a logical and consistent scheme of war. Either plan was defensible. But for what happened there can be no defence except human infirmity. To drift into a nev campaign piecemeal and without any definite decision or careful plan would have been scouted by everyone. Yet so obliquely were these issues presented, so baffling were the personal factors involved, that the Mar Council were drawn insensibly and irresistibly mto the. gulf. . , After a sketch of Lord Kitchener f, enormous labours and immense authority and prestige Mr Churchill continues: Lord Kitchener was torn between two perfectly clear-cut views of the war. both urged upon him with force and B/.V 1 ,°/ 1 ' with wealth of act and argument.. A the leading soldiers in the British army, all the august authority of the French High Command, asserted that the sole path to victory lay in sending every single man and and shell to the French front to kill Germans,” and break their lines in the West, All the oninion of the War Council, which certainly‘contained men who had established themselves as the leading figures of the public life ot their generation, was focussed upon the Southern and Eastern theatre as the scene for the campaign of 1915 Kitchener himself was strongly drawn in this direction by bis own Eastern interest and knowledge. He saw to the full the vision of what success in this Quarter would mean, but he also felt what vro did not feel—the fearful alternative pressure to which iho was continually subjected from the French front The problem was not insoluble. The task of reconciling these apparently opposed conceptions was not iro possible. A well-conceived and elaborated plan and programme ocml.l have been devised for action in the Near Fast in March, April, May. or even June, and for a subsequent great concentration and operation on the Western front in the autumn of 1915, or, better still, under far niqre fuvourable conditions in tire spring of 1916. Ihe successive development of policies in their proper sequence and each in da mte„ ritv vvas perfectly feasible if the great authorities concerned could have been won over. However, in the event Lnrd Kit chenor succumbed to conflicting forces and competing policies. TRIED TO DO EVERYTHING. Besides these trials and burdens, to which he was certainly not able to rise superior, stood the whole vast business of recruiting, organising, and equipping the new armies, and behind this again there now marched steadily into view a senes of problams con nected with the manufacture and purchase of munitions upon a scale never dreamed of by any human being up till this period These problems comprised the entire social and industrial life of the country, and touched the whole economic and financial system of the world. Add to this the daily exposition of all military business in Cabinet and in Council—a process most trying and burdensome to J<ord Kit chener, and one in which he felt himself at a disadvantage; add further, the continuous series of decisions upon executive matters covering the vast field of the war, including mipoitant operations and expeditions which were campaigns in themselves, and it will be realised that the strain that descended upon the King’s greatest subject was much more mortal than man could bear. It must, however, be stated that Boro Kitchener in no way sought, to lighten these terrific burdens. On the contrary, he resented promptly any attempt to interfere and even scrutinise his vast, domains or responsibility. He resisted tenaciously the efforts which were made from January onwards to remove the production of munitions of all kinds from his control as Secretary of State. Ho devolved on to subordinates as little as he could. He sought to manage the Great War by the same sort of personal control that he had used so much success in the command of the tiny Nile Expedition. He kept the General Staff, or what was left of it, in a condition of complete subservience and practical abeyance. He even reached out, as his Cabinet office justified, into political spheres in questions of Ireland, of temperance, and of industrial organisation. It is idle at this date to affect to disregard or conceal these facts. Indeed, the greatness of Lord Kitchener and his las l ing claims upon the respect and gratitude of succeeding generations of his fellowcountrymen, for whose cause and safety he fought with single-hearted purpose and a giant’s strength, will only be fortified by the fullest comprehension of his character and cf his difficulties. If this story and the facts and documents on which it rests constitute any reflection upon his military policy, I must also testify to the overwhelming weight of the burdens laid upon him, to his extraordinary patience and courage in all the difficulties and perplexities through which we were passing, and to his unvarying kindness and courtesy to me. FMr Churchill then relates how, at Lord Kitchener’s suggestion, he went to France to consult with Sir John French about the possibility cf his sparing one or two divisions to influence the political situation in the Balkans, and how Sir John French deferred to the Council’s wishes.] CONFLICTING OPINIONS. At the War Council of February 9 it was decided to offer the 29th Division (which was still in England) to Greece, together with a French division, if she would join the Allies. I thought that, this offer.

taken by itself and anart from any effects which might result from the naval attack on the Dardanelles, was wholly inadeouate I did not believe that Greece, and stifl less Bulgaria, would be influenced by the prospects of such very limited aid. Indeed! the exiguous dimensions cf the assistance were in themselves a confession of our weakness. This view was justified, and the offer was promptly declined by M. Venizelds. Meanwhile the preparations for the naval attack had been steadily moving forward I still adhered to the integnt” cf the naval plan. Knowing what I did of the military situation and of the'" state of our armies I did not underrate the serious nature of a decision to commit British troops to severe and indefinite fighting with the Turks on the Gallipoli Peninsula. I had of course, thought long and earnestly about what would follow if the naval attack succeeded and a British fleet entered the Marmora. I expected that if, and when the Turkish forts began to fall, the Greeks would join us, and that the whole of thenarmies would be at our disposal thenceforward. I hoped that the apparition of a British fleet off Constantinople and the flight or destruction of the Goeben and the Breslau would be lollowed by political reactions of a far-reaching character, os the result of which the Turkish Government would negotiate or withdraw to Asia. I trusted that good diplomacy following hotfoot on a great war event would induce Bulgaria to march on Adrianople. Lastly! I was sure that Russia, whatever her need elsewhere would not remain indifferent to the fate of Constantinople and that further reinforcements would be forthcoming from her. It was on these quasi-political factors that I counted in our own military- penury, for the means of exploiting and consolidating any success which might fall to the fleet. But, of course, if after all Lord Kitchener and the War Office saw their way to form a substantial British army- in the East, the prospects cf a groat and successful combination were vastly more hopeful. Amid the conflicting opinions, competing plans, and shifting exigencies of the situation! the desirability of concentrating the largest possible army in the Eastern Mediterranean with extreme promptitude, and placing at its head a supremo general, seemed to all of us at the Admiralty to be obvious. Therefore we at all times, in all discussions, supported everything that would promote and expedite this concentration.