THE IMPERISHABLE STORY.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 19012, 7 November 1923, Page 8

THE IMPERISHABLE STORY.

GALLIPOLI ADVENTURE. EXPERTS UNANIMOUS. THE SECOND VOLUME OF WINSTON CHURCHILL’S MEMOIRS. Copyright Eights of Production Acquired by the Otago Daily Times. 111. There never was the .slightest chance of the whole of the Fisher plan being carried into effect; hut his third paragraph about the- Crooks, Bulgarians, Servians, and Rumanians expressed exactly what everybody Wauled. It was the obvious supreme objective in this part of the world. The question was. How to procure it? This was the loot of the matter. It was in connection with this that Lord Fisher's fourth paragraph made its impression upon me. Here tor the first time was the suggestion of forcing the Dardanelles with the old battlechips. This series of weighty representations Lad the effect of making me nime. _ I thought I saw a great convergence of opinion in the direction of that attack upon the Dardanelles which I had always so greatly desired. The arguments in its favour were overwhelming. And now the highest authorities, political, naval, and military, were apparently ready to put their shoulders to the wheel. All' M* Lloyd George’s advo cacy and influence seemed about to be cast in the direction of Turkey and the Balkans. I knew from my talks with Mr Balfour that he too was profoundly impressed by the advantages which might be reaped bv successful action in this South-Eastern theatre. Lastly, the Foreign Office and Sir Edward Grey were, of course, keenly interested. Here was a great consensus of opinion. Her" it seemed at last was n sufficient impulse and unity for action. But was there a practicable scheme? This I determined to find out, and on January 3. with the agreement of Lord Fisher, and after a talk with Sir Henry Jackson, who was specially studying this theatre, and advising us thereupon, I telegraphed to Viceadmiral Carden, commanding at the Dardanelles, ns follows: Admiralty to Vice-admb-al Carden. January 3, 1915. From First Lord, — Do you consider the forcing of the Dardanelles by ships alone a practicable operation i . . . Importance of results would justify severe loss. Let me know jour views. All this was purely explanatory. I did Sot commit myself at this stage even to the general principle of an attack upon Turkey. All our affairs at this time were complicated with the plans which were under discussion for (ho advance of lire army along the coast and for the closing up of ZeeBrugge. I was still thinking a great deal of the northern theatre, of Borkum and of the Baltic. On January 5 the answer from Admiral 'Carden arrived. It was remarkable. Vice-admiral Carden lo First Lord. January 5, 1915 With reference telegram of 3rd instant. I do not consider Dardanelles can be rushed. They might be forced by extended operations with large number of ships. ADMIRALS ENTHUSIASTIC. At the War Council that afternoon the question of an attack on Turkey and a diversion in the Near East was one of the principal subjects discussed. Every one .seemed alive to nil its advantages, and Admiral Carden’s telegram, which I read out, was heard with extreme interest. Its significance lay in the fact that it offered a prospect of influencing the Eastern situation in a decisive manner without opening a new military commitment on a large scale; and, further, it afforded an effective means of helping the Grand Duke without wasting flio Dardanelles possibilities upon nothing more than a demonstration. On my return to the Admiraltv I found that tho idea of a gradual forcing of the Straits by extended operations was viewed with favour both by Admiral Oliver, the Chief of the Staff, and by Sir Henry Jackson. Sir Henry Jackson deprecated anv attempt to rush the Straits, hut he spoke of the considerable effects of the brief bombardment of November 3, and he was attracted by the idea of a step-by-step reduction of the fortresses, though troops would l>e needed to follow up and complete tho naval attack, and especially to occupy Constantinople. So here we had tho Chief of the .Staff, the admiral studying this particular theatre, and the admiral in command all apparently in general accord in principle. This coincidence of opinion in officers bo widely separated and so differently cir.cumstancod impressed me very much, and I therefore telegraphed on January 6 to Vice-admiral Carden as follows: First Lord to Admiral Carden. January 6. 1515. Your view is agreed with by high authorities here. Please telegraph in detail what you think could bo done by extended operations, what force would be needed, and how you consider it should be used. On January 11 arrived the detailed Carden plan. It was in its details largely the work of a very able officer of Marines—Captain Godfrey (who was one of the vice-admiral’s staff) —and of the gunnery experts of the Inflexible. This plan produced a great impression upon everyone who saw it. It was to me in its details novel proposition. I sent a copy of the plan at once to the Prime Minister and some others, and it was freely discussed among those who were informed. Both the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff seemed favourable to it. No one at any time threw the slightest doubt upon its technical soundness. No one. for instance, of the four or five great naval authorities each with his technical staff who were privy said; ‘’This is absurd. Ships cannot fight forts,” or criticised its details. On the contrary, they all treated it as an extremely interesting and hopeful proposal, and there grow up in the secret circles of the Admiralty a perfectly clear opinion favourable to the operation. It was then that the War Staff made a suggestion ■which certainly greatly affected the issue. The Queen Elizabeth, the first in the order of the five fast battleships armed with ISin guns, was now ready. It had been decided to send her to fire her gunnery trials and calibration exercises in the safe, calm waters of the Mediterranean. She was actually under orders to proceed thither. The staff now proposed that she should test her enormous guns against tho Dardanelles, and pointed out that she could lire at ranges far outside (hose of the Turkish forts. This had not occurred to me before. But tho moment it was mentioned its importance was apparent. We all felt ourselves in the presence of a new fact. Moreover, the Queen Elizabeth came into the argument with a cumulative effect. Vice-admiral Carden had never dreamed of having her. Our previous discussions and his detailed plan had ignored any help that she might give. OBJECTIVE—CONSTANTINOPLE. Mr Churchill, after dealing in some detail with the technical gunnery questions involved, proceeds:— I now called for definite plans and orders to bo worked out by the staff, and I outlined the fleet (hat was evidently available for the operation. Secretary, First Sea Lord. Chief of Staff. January 12. 1. The forcing of the Dardanelles as proposed, and the arrival of a squadron strong enough to defeat the Turkish • fleet in tho Sea of Marmora, would bo a victory of first importance, and change to our advantage the 'whole situation of the war in the East. 2. It would appear possible to provide the force required by Admiral Carden ■without weakening the margins necessary in home waters, as follows;—Ocean, Swiftsure, and Triumph (already in or assigned to this theatre'', i, Vengeance, Canopus (from the Atlantic). ■ Albion (from the Cape). Caesar and Prince George (from Gibraltar). 'Victorious, Mars, Magnificent, Hannibal (already ordered to be dismantled at home). Queen Elizabeth (detailed for gunnery preparation at Gibraltar). Inflexible (ordered to Mediterranean to relieve Indefatigable). <- Indefatigable (already on the spot). Thus, no capital ship would be ordered , from homo waters, except four already " ordered to be dismantled. 3. The above takes no account of four ' French battleships on the spot, and six Others refiorted available. . . .

4. Operations could begin on February 1, by long-range fire from Queen Elizabeth on forts at the entrance. It is not necessary to develop (he full attack until the effect of the first stage of the operation has become apparent. All arrangements should bo secretly concerted for carrying th© plan through the seaplanes and ancillary craft being provided. Admiral Carden to command. . . . Definite plans should be worked out accordingly. w.s.c. Lord Fisher approved this minute, and himself at a later date (February 9) added to the proposed fleet the two quasi-Dread-nought battleships, the Lord Nelson and the Agamemnon. This was a great reinforcement, and involved a diminution to that extent in the margin of the Grand Fleet. On January 13 I brought the project before the War Council. I circulated Admiral Carden’s telegram 24 hours beforehand to its principal members, including, of course the Prime Minister and Lord Kitchener. Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson were both present. Neither made any remark, and I certainly thought that they agreed. The decision of the council was unanimous, and was recorded in the following curious form : That the Admiralty should consider promptly the possibility of effective action in the Adriatic at Cattaro or elsewhere —with a view (inter alia) of bringing pressure on Italy. That the Admiralty should also prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective.