COST OF THE NAVY.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 18851, 2 May 1923, Page 5

COST OF THE NAVY.

‘‘TAKING GRAVE RISKS.”

MR L. S. AM'ERY’S STATEMENT.

THE IRREDUCIBLE MINIMUM,

(From Our Own Correspondent.) LONDON, March 17. “Wo have in more than one direction accepted risks which we can only contempplato with serious misgiving.” This pronouncement was made by the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr L. S. Amery) in dealing with the Navy Estimates in the House this week. The not saving on the navy as compared with last year is to bo nearly £7,000,000, but compared with the pre-Washington year of 1921 it is to be £25,500,000. That, said Mr Amery, is a great act of faith and a taking of grave risks. “There is a limit,” he added, “to the risk we can afford to run in order to promote peace,'-and he averred bluntly that there was no possibility of further reduction in the coming years. Those estimates, he continued, marked what but for the Washington Treaty would probably have Teen the lowest point reached by the Navy Estimates in our generation. They included the first steps in a policy of replacing by modern capital ships of unlimited power and dimensions a battle fleet which was rapidly becoming obsolescent, in face of the vast new building programme of America and Japan. The progress of that policy of replacement would, in spite of every administrative economy and of every saving due to a fall in prices,, have very soon forced up our Estimates by another £15,000,000 or £20,000,000. At it was they had in barely 18 months brought down the gross Navy Estimates from £92, £OO,OOO to under £61,500,000, a reduction of over 33 1-3 per cent.; and the not Estimates had been reduced from £83,400,000 to £58,000,000, a proportionate reduction of 30 per cent., and an actual reduction of nearly £25,500,000. REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL. To achieve so drastic a retrenchment they had had to reduce the personnel of the fleet by nearly 20,000 officers and men and the personnel of the dockyards by another 10,000 men. Ihey had rendered impotent for fighting purposes and handed over to the shipbreakers 17 splendid capital ships. They had cut down every reserve of ammunition, of fuel, of stores to the very minimum compatible with safety. They had postponed and spread out over long periods necessary expenditure which from a purely naval no'int of view ought to be incurred without delay. But it was only by these means that they had been able to ensure the striking reductions mentioned. The Estimates represented a very substantial contribution to the relief of that burden of taxation under which indusry was slowly plodding its way back to recovery. They represented also a no less substantial contribution to the cause of world peace. But from the point of view of the Board of Admiralty they represented a grave responsibility, which they had not assumed without anxious deliberation. or without most earnest balancing of nil the broad considerations of national and, indeed, of world welfare, which had outweighed the purely technical and professional arguments for a larger measure of insurance

COMPARISON WITH UNITED STATES,

The main principle by which the limitation of naval armaments was made effective was that of equality in battle strength between tho United States and the British Empire, with a corresponding ratio of approximately three-fifths for the battle strength of Japan. That general principle of limitation was one which could be accepted as consistent with the maintenance of the one-Powcp standard —the standard

which, for this country, represented tho absolute and irreducible minimum of its security. In capital ships there were 22 completed and two just laid down, on the completion of which four years hence four capital ships would be scrapped. The United States had IS capital ships completed, two of which were destined to bo shortly displaced by two ships of tho West Virginia class, now under construction. To arrive at a triie comparison, between the fighting value pf these fleets it was essential to keep in mind

the immense difference in fighting power between pre-Jutland and post-Jutland ships. Until our two 35,000-ton battlships were completed we would have only one partially post-Jutland ship, the Hood, as against three on the port of the United States and two •on the part of Japan, whilst of ships of over 30,000 tons we would have only one, as compared with 10 in the case of the United States and six in the case of Japan. In cruisers and light cruisers this country had 45 completed—so, if,the dominion navies

were included—as against 20 on the part of tho United States and four building. In aircraft-carriers this country had five buiit and two being reconstructed. The United States had one completed and two being reconstructed. Great Britain had 183 destroyers and flotilla leaders built and five building—2ol including tho dominions—as compared .with 316 of the United States. In submarines, we had 57 built, or 67 including the dominions, and four building, as compared with 99 built and,29 . building 1 of the United States. While

stronger in light cruisers and aircraft, this country was markedly inferior in destroyers and submarines. The total personnel provided for in these Estimates, excluding coastguards, was 99,500; tho corresponding figure in the United States was 116.400. The American Navy. Estimates for the coming year amounted, at current rate of exchange, to £68,350,000; our corresponding Estimates amounted to £50,600,000. ASSURANCE TO PARENTS. Dealing with tho “cuts” in personnel, Mr Amery pointed out that of 12,258 men discharged, all except 800 had abplied voluntarily, which suggested that the terms of compensation were considered fair and even generous. He believed he could give to the service and to parents the assurance that they had now reached the limit of reductions, and thlit they need not fear tho recurrence of another such period, and, further, that care had been taken in the present ease, as regarded officers and men, that there should be no possibility of creating blocks of promotion in the future. He could say with confidence that the prospects of those now entering the navy were, in all respects, as good as they had been in the

past. The transfer of tho coastguards to the Board of Trade and the Customs had resulted in a considerable economy of personnel. In place of tho 2925 coastguards who had been maintained under, the Admiralty, there would now be 352 for coast wireless duties, 955 for tho life-saving service, under the Board of Trade, and 450 for the preventive service under tho Customs, a total saving of some 1200 men. As regarded the dockyard personnel, they' had, with the last heavy cut of some 10,000 men, come to the end of the period of unsettlement and discouragement, inevitably consequent upon a period of reduction. DEFENCE OF THE PACIFIC. Tho temporary reinforcement, of the Mediterranean Fleet was only the first step in the gradual return to a more normal distribution of the navy after the abnormal concentration in home waters that was imposed on us by the German menace. The main task of the navy was not to act as

coastguard to the United Kingdom, but Jjo keep open everywhere the sea whoso frWfe dom was our very life-breath. The naijp must be free to go anywhere; but it wjpf; not free to do so to-day, because it hail neither the supplies of oil nor the docking or repairing facilities required to give it tho necessary' mobility. Wo could neither send a battle fleet to the Far .East nor maintain it there. It was to remedy that defect that the Admiralty was gradually building up its chain of oil reserves at strategical centres, and r wero beginning the creation at Singapore of a naval base capable of dealing with thq requirements of a fleet of modern capital ships. At present there was no dock on British territory in the Far East capable of taking a capital ship. The ultimate coat of equipping Singapore would lie £11,000,000, but it would be spread over a number of years,

and only £200,0M was required in tho present Estimates for preparatory work. There was no suggestion in this development of any difficulty ir. our relations with Japan. On the contrary, if there were even apprehension of such difficulties the Government would not be dealing in such . leisurely fashion with an indispensable pre-requisite of strategic preparation. We had often in the past, in appealing to the dominions to co-operate more effectively in the general naval defence of the Empire, reminded them that their destiny might bo settled by an action in the North Sea. It was equally necessary for her to remember that our destiny might in the future depend upon what happened in tho most distant seas.

' A SACRED TRADITION. Tho Government was pledged to economy, and tho Estimates fully honoured that pledge. They wore pledged to maintain peace if they could. Their endeavour had been in the naval policy on which those Estimates were baaed to go to the utmost lengths in promoting the mutual casing off of naval armaments, and of the suspicions which those armaments were apt to engender, without creating an oven greater danger to our peace and to our very existence

by leaving ourselves defenceless at sea.. AVhat the navy meant to us had been summed up more impartially than he could do by the late MV Pago in one of his letteis; “The British Grand Fleet; in fact, is a subject that stands alone in power and value. Since over and over again it nas saved these islands when nothing else could have saved them, and since during this war in particular it has saved the world from German conquest . . . _it lies in their reverence and their gratitude and their abiding convictions as a necessary and perpetual shield so long as Great Britain shall endure. It is not only a fact with a great and saving history, it is .: sacred tradition and an article of faith.”

Mr Philip Snowden (Labour) wanted still more economies so that more money could bo devoted to social reform; but Commander Bollairs described British poli'y ■as one of “trust and scrap,” while that of other Powers was one of “wait and see.”

Mr Ncwbold, the Communist member, made one of his characteristic specclies which invariably amuse the House. He agreed with the recessityof defending the sea routes by. which food was brought for the workers, and in the event of fine country “going revolutionary,” the Communists would not hesitate to defend it with a Red Army and a Red Navy.—(Laughter.) They would not yield the country once it became their ow r n, but they objected to defending, somebody olso’s country. An amendment, moved by Mr Snowden, calling for an international naval conference, was defeated by 240 to 153.