THE CHURCHILL MEMOIRS.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 18803, 5 March 1923, Page 6

THE CHURCHILL MEMOIRS.

JHE NAVY AND THE WAR. MARINES AS LINE TROOPS. SAVING THE BELGIAN FIELD ARMY. (Published under Special Arrangement.) VIII. —ANTWERP. (Continued.) ■ Lord Kitchener now threw himself into I the task of concentrating and organising a relieving army. Ho telegraphed at 9.49 a.m. ou October 3 asking the hreach Wat Minister to mako all preparations to send the proposed two divisions with cavalry and artillery complete as soon as possible, and to let him know how soon they could bo despatched. At 7.55 on the same afternoon the composition of the French contingent was received from the British Ambassador. 1 did not reach the city till utter 3 p.ra., and after consulting with Colonel Dallas 1 was visited by the Belgian Prime Minister. Monsieur de Broqueville was a man of exceptional vigour and clarity, both of mind and speech. He had been called to the holm of the Belgian State at the moment of the decision not to submit to wrongful aggression. He explained to me the situation with precision. General de Guise, the commander of the fortress, added his comments. The outer forts were falling one by one. Five or six shells from the enormous German howitzers were sufficient to smash them to their foundations, to destroy their defenders even in the deepest casemates, and to wreck the platforms of the funs. Now the forts of the inner line were eing similarly attacked, and there was no conceivable means of preventing their destruction one after another at the rate of about a fort a clay. The army was tired and dispirited through having been left so long entirely upon its own resources without ever a sign of the Allies for whom they had risked so much. Material of every kind—guns, ammunition, searchlights, telephones, entrenching materials—was scanty. The water supply of the city had been cut off. There were many German sympathisers an its population of 80,000. At any moment the front might bo broken in under the heavy artillery attack which was then in progress. But this was only half the danger. The life and honour of the Belgian nation did not depend on Antwerp, but on its army. To lose Antwerp was disastrous; to loso the army as well was fatal. The Scheldt was barred by a severe interpretation of neutrality. The only line of retreat was by a dangerous flank march parallel to the Dutch frontier and the sea coast. Two Belgian divisions and their cavalry division were staving off the Gormans from this only remaining lino of retreat. But the pressure was increasing, and the line of the Dcndre was no longer intact. If Ghent fell before the Belgian army made good its retreat nothing would be eared from the ruin.

I then exposed Lord Kitchener’s plan, tmd stated the numbers of the French and British troops already available for the assistance of the Belgian army. I emphasised the importance of holding the city and delaying the Germans as long as possible without compromising the retreat of the army. I pointed out that the issue of the battle for the seaward flank still hung in the balance, and that the main armies were drawing nearer to Belgium every day. I asked whether the relieving forces mentioned, if actually sent, would influence their decision. They replied that this was a new situation; that had this help been forthcorning earlier events might have taken a different course. Even now, if their lino of retreat wore safeguarded by the arrival of ./Allied troops in the neighbourhood of Ghent, they were prepared to continue the resistance. I thereupon drew up, with their approval and agreement, the following telegram to Lord Kitchener: bitwerp, October 3, 1914, 6.53 p.m. (received 9.45 p.m.). (Extract.) ‘‘Subject to confirmation on both sides, I have made following arrangenwnt with M. cle Broqueville, Prime Mini suer:— “Every preparation to bo made bv Belgian Government now for a resistance of at least 10 days, and every step taken with utmost energy. Within three davs wo are to state definitely whether we can launch big field operation for their relief or not, and when it will probably take effect. If wo cannot grve them a satisfactory assurance of substantial assistance within three days they are to be quite free to abandon defence if (hoy think fit. In this case, should they wish to clear out with field army, we (although not able to launch the big operation) are to help their field army to get away by sending covering troops to Ghent or other points on lino of retreat. Thus, any- . thing they will have lost in time by going on defending Antwerp with all their strength will be made up to them as far as possible by help on their way out. ‘‘Further, we will meanwhile help their local defence in all miner ways, such as guns, marines, naval brigades, etc. “I have put the terms high to avoid at all costs our undertaking anything wo could not perform, and also to avoid hurry in our saying what troops wc can spare for big operation. You will be able, as your telegram No. 7 (to Colonel Dallas) indicates, to do mnch better than this, and to give decided promise within three days, but the vital thing is that Belgian Government, and army should forthwith hurl themselves with revived energy into the defence. "Attack is being harshly pressed at this moment, and half-measures would bo useless, but Prime Minister informs me that they are confident they can hold out for three days, pretty sure they can hold out for six, end will try ten. . . . ‘‘Two thousand marines are arriving this evening. “I am remaining here till to-rnorrow. “I have read this telegram to Belgian Prime Minister, who says that we are in full agreement, subject to ratification by Council of Ministers which is now being held. “If yon clinch these propositions, pray give the following order to the Admiralty : Send at once both naval brigades, minus recruits, via Dunkirk, into Antwerp, with five days’ rations and 2,000,000 rounds of . ammunition, birt without tents or much impedimenta. “When can they arrive?”

While waiting for {he reply that after ; noon, anrl also the next morning:, I went out and examined the front: a leafy enclosed country, absolutely flat; a crescent of peering German kite balloons; a continuous bombardment- scarcely anything in the nature of an infantry attack; wearied and disheartened defenders. It was extremely difficult to get a clear view and so understand what kind of fighting was actually going on. Wo were, however, at, length able to reach the actual inundations beyond which the enemy was posted. Entrenching here was impossible for either side, owing to the water met with at a foot’s depth. The Belgian pickets crouched behind bushes. There was at that moment; no rifle fire, but many shells traversed the air overhead on their way to the Belgian linos. Although the artillery fire of the Germans at Antwerp w’as at no time comparable to the great bombardments afterwards witnessed on the Western Front, it was certainly severe. The Belgian trenches were broad and shallow. and gave hardly any protection in their worn-out and in many cases inexperienced troons. As we walked hack from the edge of these inundations along a stone-paved high road, it was a formidable sight to see on either hand the heavy shells bursting in salvoes of threes and fours, with dense black smoko near, or actually inside, these scanty shelters in which the supporting troops were kneeling in fairlv close order. Fvery prominent building—chateau, tower, or windmill—was constantly under fire; shrapnel burst along the roadway, and half a mile to the left a wooded enclosure was speckled with white puffs. Two or three days at least Would be retfuired to make sound breastworks or properly-constructed and drained trenches or rifle pits. Till then it must 1,0 •mainly an affair of hedges and of houses; and the ineffective t.ronches were nerely shell traps. The marines did not arrive until the morning of the 4th, and went immediately into the line. When I visited them the same evening they were already engaged with the Germans in the outskirts of Bier re. Hers, for the first time, I saw German soldiers creeping forward from house to honse. or darting across the street. The marines fired with a machine-gun from a balcony. The flashes of the rifles and the streams of flame pulsating from the mouth of the machine-gun lit up a warlike scene amid crashing reverberations and the whistle of the bullotf

Twenty minutes in a motor car, and we were back in the warmth and light of one of the best hotels in Europe, with its per-fectly-appointed tables and attentive servants nil proceeding as usual! The reply of the British Government reached mo on the morning of the 4th, and I sent it at once to Monsieur de Broqueville: laird Kitchener to First Lord: — Am arranging Expeditionary Force for relief of Antwerp as follows: British Force: 7th Division, 18,000 men, 63 guns, under General Capper. Cavalry Division, 4000 men, 12 guns, under General Byng, to arrive at Zeobruggo 6th and 7th October. Naval detachment 8000 men already there, under General Aston, also naval and military heavy guns and detachments already sent. Headquarters Staff will be subsequently notified. French Force; Territorial Division, 15.000 men, proper complement of guns and two squadrons. General Roy. to arrive Oslend 6th to 9th October. Fusilier Marins Brigade, 8000 men. under Rear-Admiral Ronare’h. Grand total. 53,000 men. Numbers are approximately correct. Also one from Prince Louis, 10.30 a.m.: The Naval Brigades will embark at Dover at 4 p.tn. for Dunkirk, where they should arrive between 7 and 8 o'clock. Provisions and ammunition as indicated in your telegram. The matter had now passed into the region ot pure action. Could Antwerp resist the enemy’s attack long enough to enable the French and British relieving force to oome to their aid? Secondly, if tliis succeeded, could none or ten Allied divisions at Antwerp and Ghent hold the Germans in chock until the le.it wing of the main armies, advancing daily from the. south, could join hands with them? In that case the Allied lines in the west might be drawn through Antwerp, Ghent, and Lille. All this turned on a few days, and oven on a few hours.

Judged by the. mi mb or of troops available on both sides, the chances of the Allies appeared good. On paper they were nearly twice as strong as the enemy. But the Belgian Army had boon loft without aid or comfort too long. The daily destruction of their trusted forts, the harsh and unceasing bombardment of a vastly superior artillery, their apprehensions lor their lino of retreat, the cruel lueses and bnffotings they had suffered since the beginning of the war, had destroyed their confidence and exhausted their strength. The prime and vital need) was to maintain the defence of Antwerp against the unceasing artillery attack to which its whole southern front was exposed. The position behind the river was capable of being made a. strong one- It was, potentially stronger in many respects than the line of the Yser, along which a fortnight later this same Belgian Army, in spite of further losses and discouragements, was to make a most stubborn and glorious defence. But despondency in the face of an apparently irresistible artillery, and the sense of isolation, struck a deadly chill. Meanwhile, however, Help was hurrying forward. 'lho marines wore already iu the line. Armoured trains with naval guns and British bluejackets came info action on the “morning of the 4th. The two Naval Brigades reached Dunkirk that night, and wore due to enter Antwerp on the evening of the sth. At the special request of the Belgian Staff they wore to be interspersed with Belgian divisions to impart the encouragement and assurance that succour was at hand. The British 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division, carried daringly tacioss the water by Prince Louis in the teeth of submarines, began to disembark at OsLetid and Zeebrugge from the morning of the 6th onward. The French division was embarking at Havre. Admiral Ronarc’h and his 8930 Fusiliers Marins were already entrained for Dunkirk. If only Antwerp could hold out. . . . Meanwhile, also, it must be remembered. Sir John French was secretly withdrawing the British Army from the Aisnc and moving round behind the French front to the neighbourhood of St. Omer with the intention of striking at Lille and heating in the German right. Every day (hat large German forces were detained in front of Antwerp helped and covered the dotrainmont and deployment of his army and increased its chances of success. But every day became graver the peril to the Belgian Army of lieing cut off if, after all, the Germans should be victors in the main battle. The anxieties and uncertainties of this tremendous situation had to bo supported by the Belgian chiefs m addition to those of the actual German attack battering on the crumbling Antwerp front and its exhausted defenders. That they were borne with constancy and coolness, that the defence was nrolongcd for five momentous days, and that, although the Antwerp front was broken in before effective help could arrive, [he Belgian Field Army was safelv extricated, was a memorable achievement. The attitude of the King and Queen through these tense and tragic days was magnificent. The impress'on of the grave, calm soldier King presiding at Council, sustaining his troops and commanders, preserving an unconquerable majesty amid the ruin of his kingdom, will never pass from my mind. Meanwhile Lord Kitchener and Prime Louis continued to give the necessary orders from London.