THE CHURCHILL MEMOIRS.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 18802, 3 March 1923, Page 8

THE CHURCHILL MEMOIRS.

THE NAVY AND THE WAR. CRITICAL DAYS. (Published under Special Arrangements.) VII.—ANTWERP. From the moment when the German hopes of destroying the French armies by a general battle and thus of ending tho "war at a single stroke had definitely failed, all tho secondary and incidental objectives which hitherto they had rightly discarded became of immense consequence. As passion declined, material things resumed their values. Tho struggle of armies and nations having failed _ to reach a. decision, places recovered their significanre and geography rather than psychology- began to rule the line'- of war. Paris now unattainable, the Channel ports —Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne—still naked, and lastly Antwerp, all reappeared in the field of values like submerged rocks when the tidal wave recedes. The second phase of the war now opened. ’Pile French, having heaved the Germans back from the Marne to the Aisne, and finding themselves’ unable to drive them farther by frontal attacks, continually reached out their left hand in the hopes of outflanking their opponents. The race for the soa began. Where would the grappling armies strike blue water? At what point on the coast? Which would turn the other’s flank? Would it be north or south of Dunkirk? Or of Gravelincs or Calais or Boulogne? Nay, southward still, was Abbeyvillo even safe? All'was committed to the shock of an evermoving battle. But as the highest goal, the one safe, inexpugnable bank for the Allies, the most advanced, the most daring, the most precious—worth all the rest, guarding all the rest, gleamed Antwerp, could Antwerp but hold out. In order to save Antwerp two things were necessary; first, effective defence of the fortress line; and second, free, uninterrupted communication with the sea. The first was tolerably well provided for by the Belgian army, which could easily be reinforced by British territorial troops. But the second essential, the free communication with the sea, was a large matter, and in it were involved our rchit*Dns with tho Dutch. The Foreign Secretary did not, however, feel able to put. a serious issue to the Dutcfy Government. Neither did Lord Kitchener ■wish to use the British Territorial Divisions in the manner proposed, and, while adhering to my own opinion, I certainly do not Hame him. He would not send any Territorials into Antwerp, nor was anything effective done by the Allies for the city during the whole of September. From tho moment that they had extricated and re-formed their armies after the failure at the Marne—i.e., about the middle of September—the capture of tho city became most urgently necessary to the Germans. The Belgian and Gorman troops 1 remained in contact along the fortress line without any serious siege or assaulting operations developing until the 28th of that month. On that date tho Germans suddenly opened fire upon the forts of the Antwerp exterior lines wiih 17-inch howitzers, hurling projectiles of over a ton. Almost immediately the Belgian Govern ment gave signs of justified alarm. British intelligence reports indicated that the Germans were seriously undertaking the siege of Antwerp, ■ that their operations were not intended as a demonstration to keep tho Belgian troops occupied or to protect the lines of communication. Information had come from Brussels that the Emperor had ordered the capture of the town, that this might cost thousands of lives but that the order must be obeyed. Large bodies of German reserve troops were also reported assembling near Liege. In view of all these reports »t was evident, that tho role of our smalT British force of marines, armoured cars, ’ aeroplanes, etc., operating from Dunkirk, was exhausted. They had _no longer to deal with Uhlan patrols or raiding parties of the enemy. Large hostile forces were approaching the coastal area, and the imposture .whereby we had remained in occupation of Lille and Tournal could be sustained no longer. . , , . ~ Lord Kitchener was disquieted by the opening of the bombardment upon the Antwerp forts. He immediately sent (on Sep- , tember 29) a Staff officer. Colonel Dallas, into 'the city to report direct to him on the situation. The Belgian Field Army was about 80,039 strong, in addition to which there were some 70,C0G fortress troops. Four divisions of the Belgian Armv were defending the southern portion of the outer perimeter of the Antwerp defences, with the sth Division in reserve, and one weak division was at Termonde. A cavalry division of about 3600 sabres was south-west of Termonde, guarding communications between Antwerp and the coast. Ghent was hold by some volunteers. On, the night of October 1 Sir F. Villiers reported: —“On ’Southern section of the outer line of forts German attacks continued to-day, and in tho afternoon the enemy’s troops disabled forts Wavre, St. ' Catherine, and adjoining works, and occupied Belgian trenches at this point. Ihe Belgian trows were, however, still holding put on the Belgian side of the River Nelhe. ...Lord Kitchener now showed himself strongly disposed to sustain the defence or effect the relief of Antwerp, and to use the regular forces he still had iu England for this purpose, provided the French would cooperate effectively. Early in the afternoon of October 2 he moved Sir Edward Grey to send the following telegram to the Bntisn Ambassador at Bordeaux: ’ (Extract.)

The French Government should be informed that military advisers here consider that, in view of the superior forces Germany has in the field there, the despatch of a French territorial division with the additions proposed in tpn days time, together with tthc force we are prepared to send, would not be able effectively'to force the Germans to raise the siege of Antwerp. , , Unless something more can be done, they do not advise the despatch of the force. We are sending some heavy artillery with personnel to assist Bel-' gians. ... , We can send some first-line troops, but not sufficient by themselves to raise the siege of Antwerp, and w e cannot semi them to co-operate with any but French regulars. If General Joffre can bring about a decisively favourable action in France in two or three days, the relief of Antwerp liiay be made the outcome of that; hut, if not, unless he now sends some regular troops’, the loss of Antwerp must be con-

templatod. I Up to this point I hjvd not been brought nto the affair in any way. I read, of ■ourso, all the telegram* almost as soon as .iliey were received or despatched by Kitchener, and followed the situation constantly. I warmly approved the efforts •which Lord Kitchener was making to provide or obtain succour for Antwerp, and T chared to the full his anxieties. I saw trim every day. But I had no personal responsibility, nor was I directly concerned. My impression at this time was that the situation at Antwerp was serious, but not immediately critical; that the place would certainly Hold out for a more : and that meanwhile Lord Kitchener’s exertions or the influence of the main battle in France would bring relief. So much was ’ this the case that I proposed to be absent from the Admiralty for about 18 hours on October 2-3. . , I bad planned to visit General Pans on October 3 and to make sure that the marines and other details were safely withdrawn into Dunkirk. At 11 o’clock on the night of the 2nd I was some 20 miles out of London on my way to Dover when the special train in which I was travelling suddenly stopned, and without explar.aticm returned to Victoria Station. I was told on Arrival I was to go immediately to Lord Kitchener’s bouse in Carlton Gardens. Here I found, shortly before midnight, besides Lord Kitchener. Sir Edward Grev, the First Sea. Dord, anci Sir William Tyrrell, of the Foreign Office. They showed me the following telegram from our Minister, Sir Villiers, sent from Antwerp at 8.20 p.m.. and' received in London at 10 p.m. on October 2; — The Government has decided to leave to-morrow for Os tend, acting on advice unanimously given by Superior Council of War in presence of the King, ’flic, King, with field army, will withdraw, cornmene- ■ ing with advanced guard, io-morrow iu iba direction of Ghent to protect constdine, and eventually it is honed to cooperate with the Allied armies. The '"'Qiieon will also leave. It is said that town will hold out for five or six days, but it seems most unlikely that when the Court and Govern- ■ ment are gone resistance will be so much .prolonged. b ’.Decision taken very suddenly this afternoon is result of increasingly critical situation. I have seen both Prime Min- ' and Minister foe Foreign Affairs.

who maintain that no other coiirre was possible, in view of danger that the King’s Government and field army will

bo caught here. I saw tliat my collooguea had received this nows, which they had already been discussing for half an lionr, with consternation. The rapidity with which the situation had degenerated was utterly unexpected. That the great fortress and city of Antwerp , with its triple line of forts and ii> nndatioTiß, defended by the whole Belgian Field Army (a force certainly equal in numbers fo all the German troops in that neighbourhood),- should collapse in perhaps 48 hours seemed to all of us, uof only terrible, but incomprehensible. That l.nis should happen while preparations were in progress both in Franco and ‘in England for the relief or succour of the ' city, while considerable forces of fresh and good troops undoubtedly stood available on both aides ■of the Channel, and before even General Jeff re had boon able to reply to Lord Kitchener’s telegram, was too hard to hear. We looked at each other in bewilderment and distress. What could have happened in the lust few hours to make the Belgians despair? Our last. Telegram from Colonel Dallas., received that afternoon, had said; ‘‘Silnation unchanged during night, and Gentians have not made further progress. Great slaughter of Gormans reported, and corresponding encouragement of Belgians, who are about to undertake counter-attack in neighbourhood of Fort. Ste. Catherine.” And how a message at 10 p.m. announced immediate evacuation and impending fall.' Those who in years to‘come look back upon the first convulsions of this frightful epoch will find it easy, with after knowledge and garnered experience, to pass sagacious judgments on all that was done or left undone. There is always a strong case for doing nothing, especially for doing, nothing yourself. But to the small group of Ministers who met tlvat midnight in I/ord Kitchener’s house, the duty of making sure that Antwerp was. not cast away without, good cause while the means of saving it might well be at hand was clear. I urged strongly that we should not give in without a struggle: and wo decided nwitei-Mv upon the following telegram to Sir F. Villiers;— October 3, 1914. 12.45 a.m. The importance of Antwerp being held justifies a further effort till the course of ihc main battle in France is determined. • We are trying to send you help from the main army, and would add reinforcements from here if this were possible. MeanWhile, a brigade of marines will reach you to-morrow to sustain the defence. We urge you to make one further struggle Iq, hold out. Even a few days may make the difference. We hope Government will find it possible to remain and field army to continue operations. On the other hand, the danger of urging the Belgian Government to hold out against its considered judgment without a full knowledge of the local situation was present in every mind, and, even if the forces for the relieving army were to come into view, there was much to be arranged and decided before precise dales and definite assurances could be given. We were confronted with the hard choice of having either to take decisions of far-reaching importance in the utmost haste and with imperfect information, or, on the other hand, tamely to let Antwerp fall.

In these circumstances, it tvas a natural decision that someone in authortiy who knew the whole situation should travel swiftly into the city and there ascertain what could he done on cither side. As I was already due at Dunkirk the next morning, tho task was confided to Lord Kitchener expressed a decided wish that I should go; tho First Sea Lord consented to accept sole responsibility in my absence. It was then about half-past one in the morning. I at once 1o Victoria Station, got into my train, which was waiting, and started again for Dover. A few minutes before I left Lord Kitchener received tho answer to Lis telegram of the 2nd from the British Ambassador in Bordeaux. Sir Francis Bertie said that before ho could carry out the instructions sent him from Antwerp, he had received n letterfrom the French Foreign Minister slating that with tho shortest cDlav possible two complete Territorial Divisions, complete with artillery and cavalry, would be sent to Ostend for the relief of (he fortress. The French Foreign Minister declared that the Territorials wore good troops, better in some respects than, some ,of the Regulars, and that they were sending two divisions, complete with artillery arid cavalry, instead of one.

Meanwhile a telegram was also sent (1.15 a.m., October 3) by Sir Edward Grey to the Belgian Government saying that I would arrive on the morning of the 3rd. On this the Belgian. Council of War. siuing at dawn on the 3rd, suspended the order for tho evacuation of tho city.