THE CHURCHILL

Otago Daily Times, Issue 18801, 2 March 1923, Page 6

THE CHURCHILL

MEMOIRS.

THE NAVY AND THE WAR. THE MENACE BY AIM. “THE LIVE-BAIT SQUADRON'.” (Published under Special Arrangement*.) Vi.—lN THE NARROW SEAS. After describing the escape of the Gooben; the effect of military events upon our naval policy; the British naval victory in the Heligoland Bigh August 23', and other matters of great interest, Mr Churchill comes to the work of the Royal Naval Air .Force. Au unbroken drain of events drew the Admiralty again to the Belgian coast; and to explain this a digression is necessary. As the Germans overran Belgium and aJT the Channel iiorts were exposed, the danger of air attacks upon Great Britain became most serious and real. Zeppelins bad already cruised over Antwerp, and it was known that London was in range of the Zeppelin sheds at Dussoldorf and Cologne. To meet this danger there was nothing except the naval aeroplanes the Admiralty had been able to scrape and smuggle together. On September 5 Lord Kitchener asked me in Cabinet whether 1 would accept, on behalf of the Admiralty, the responsibility for the aerial defence of Great Britain, a 3 the War Office had no means of discharging it I thereupon undertook to do what was possible with the wholly inadequate resources which were available. There were neither anti-aircraft guns nor searchlights, and though a few improvisations had been made, nearly a _ycar must elapse before the efficient supplies necessary could be forthcoming. Meanwhile at any moment half a dozen Zeppelins might arrive to bomb London, or, what was more serious, Chatham, Woolwich, or Portsmouth. I rated the Zeppelin much lower as a weapon of war than almost anyone else. 1 believed that .this enormous bladder of combustible and explosive gas would prove to bo easily destructible. I was sure the fighting aeroplane, rising lightly laden from its own base, armed with incendiary bullets, would harry, rout, and burn these gaseous monsters. I had proclaimed this opinion to the House of Commons in 1913, using the often-quoted simile of the hornets. I did everything, therefore, in my pover in the years before the war to restrict expenditure upon airships and to concentrate our nanow and stinted resources upon aeroplanes. I confined the naval construction of airships to purely experimental limits, and in April, 1915, when the slew progress and inferior quality of our only , rigid experimental airship were manifest, I gave orders that it should be scrapped, the nlant broken up, and the labour and material devoted to increasing the output of aeroplanes. Had I had my way, no airships would have been built by Great Britain during the war (except the little •’Blimps” for teasing submarines). After I left the Admiralty this policy was reversed, and 40 millions of money were .squandered by successive Boards in building British Zeppelins, not one of which had any fighting service. Meanwhile the alternative policy of equipping the fleet with aerial observation by flying aeroplanes off warships or eff properly constructed carriers lagged pitifully, with the result that at the Battle of Jutland wc had no British airships and only one aeroplane in the air. The hornet theory, at one time so fiercely derided, was, of course, ultimately vindicated by the war. Zeppelins were clawed down in flames from tne sky over both land and sea by aeroplanes until they did not dare to come any more. The aeroplane was the moans by which the Zeppelin menace was destroyed, and it was virtually the only means, apart from weather and their own weakness, by which Zeppelins were ever destroyed. It was easy to order the necessary guns, searchlights, etc., and set on foot the organisation which should and employ them. But it was no use sitting down and waiting for a year while these preparations were completed. Only offensive action could help us. I decided immediately to strike, by bombing from aeroplanes, at the Zeppelin sheds w-herever these gigantic structures could be found in Germany, and secondly to prevent the erection of any new Zeppelin sheds in the conquered parts of Belgium and France. Hero again the policy was right. Our resources were, however, feeble and slender. Compared with the terrific developments at the end of the war they were pitiful. Still, they were all we ’had, and all that our knowledge of aviation afc that time could bestow. Doficioncics in material had to ho made good % daring. All honour to the naval airmen, the pioneers of the aerial offensive, who planned and executed in these early months the desperate flights over hostile territory in an element then scarcely known, which resulted in the raids on Dusseldorf ■ and Cologne on the Rhine, Friedrichshayen on Lake Constance, and Cuxhavcn in the Heligoland Bight. Altogether m the first 12 months of the war six Zeppelins were destroyed in the air or in their sheds by the offensive action of a handful of British naval airmen; and few were destroyed by any other agency except accident. In order to strike at the Zeppelin sheds in Germany and to prevent the erection of new ones in Belgium, it was necessary to start from as near the enemy s Vine as possible. Extracts from my own minutes, principally to Commodore bueter, the enterprising and energetic Director of the Air Division, give as good an account as any other. Septemb?r 19 i 4 . The largest possible force of naval aeroplanes should be stationed in Calais or Dunkirk. Reports have been received, and it is also extremely probable that the Germans will attempt to attack London and other places, by Zeppelin airships, of which it is said a considerable number exist. The close proximity of the French coast to England renders such an attack thoroughly feasible. The proper defence is a thorough and continuecf search of the country for Y 0 to 100 miles inland with a view to marking down any temporary airship bases, or airships replenishing before starting to attack. Should such airships be located they should be immediately attacked. Commander Samson, with Major Gerrard as second in command, will be entrusted with this duty, and the director of Air ' TMvision will take all steps to supply them with the necessary pilots, aeroplanes, and eqUipment ' September 5. 1914. (Extract.) . . • After all, the great defence against aerial menace is to attack the enemy’s aircraft as near as possible to their point of departure. . . . the principle is as follows: (a) V strong oversea force of aeroplanes to deny the French and Belgian coasts to the enemy's aircraft, and to attack all Zeppelins and air bases or temporary air bases which it may be sought to establish, and which are in reach . . . September 5, 1914, (Extract.) In order to discharge adequately the responsibilities which we have assumed for the aerial defence of England, it is necessary that we should maintain an aerial control over the area approximately 100 miles radius from Dunkirk. To do this, we must support the aeroplanes which are stationed on the French coast with sufficient armed motor cars and personnel to enable advanced aeroplane bases to be established 30, 40. and 50 miles in'and. . According to all accounts received, the Germans, in so far as they have penetrated this region, have done it simply by bluff. Small parties of Lhlacs, taking advantage of the terror inspired by their atrocities in Belgium, have made their wav freely about the country, and have imposed themselves upon the population. Wo require, in the first instance, 200 or 300 men, with 50 or 60 motor cars, who can support and defend our advanced aerial bases. I should propose to draw these bv suitable volunteers from the . Marine Brigade. They should be placed under the orders of Commander barnson, and should operate from Dunkirk. . . .

The needs and_ activities of Iho n .d aeroplanes in the neighbourhood of Dunkirk ltd directly to the development, of the armoured cur, ami the armoured car led directly to the birth of the Tank, which was in essence only an armoured car capable of crossing trenches. Almost immediately after the German inroad into Belgium I received accounts of the remarkSlo work .lone by a Belgian motor-car hastily equipped with armoui and » mS-hinc-gun. in shooting down and driving hack the numerous Uluatis with which the enemy were seeking to overrun the country Commander Samson was prompt to realise and seize the advantage of armoured cars for the purpose of protecting his aeroplane operations, and also on their own

account. In view of the reports received from him and other sources, 1 gave, during the latter part, of August and September, successive orders for the formation of armoured-car squadrons under the Admiralty, and as all this arose out. of the aeroplane squadron stationed at Dunkirk, the formation of the armoured-car squadrons was entrusted to Commodore Suetor. In this task this officer displayed groat energy, and in a very short time no leas than seven or eight squadrons were called into being, based on the purchase of all tho Rolls-Royce cars that were available and rapidly-improvised armour protection. Tho first few cars had scarcely begun to show their advantages in Commander Samson’s guerrilla from Dunkirk when the difficulty which ultimately led to the creation of the Tank manifested itself. The German cavalry sought to protect themselves against the attack of the armoured cars by digging trenches across the road. To meet this, I gave tho following directions September 25, 1214. It is most important that the motor transport and armed rnolor-cars should he provided to a certain extent with oars carrying tho means of bridging small outs in the road, and an arrangement of planks capable of bridging a 10 or 12-feet span quickly and easily should bo carried with every 10 or 12 machines. A proportion of tools should also bo supplied. Let mo have proposals at once.* Other conditions, however, swept down upon us very quickly, and by tho middle of October, after the events fo bo narrated in the next chapters, the trench lines on both sides reached the sea and became continuous over the whole front. Thus, at the moment when the new armoured-oar force was coming into effective existence at much expense and on a considerable scale, it was confronted with an obstacle and a military situation which rendered its employment practically imposiblc. Tho conclusion was forced naturally and obviously upon mo, and no doubt upon others, that if the armoured car on which so much money and labour had been spent could not move round tho enemy's trenches and operate against an open flank of his army, some method should be devised which would enable it to traverse and pass over tho trenches themselves. This subject will, however, be dealt with in its proper place. The air was the first cause that took us to Dunkirk. The armoured car was the child of the air; and the tank its grandchild.

This chapter, which began with good luck and success, must end, however, with misfortune. The original War Orders had ■been devised to meet the situation on the outbreak of hostilities. They placed the pieces on tho board in what wo believed to be tho best array, and left their future disposition to be modified by experience. Under these orders the Seventh Cruiser Squadron in the Third Fleet, consisting of the old cruisers of the Bacchante class (Bacchante, Euryalus, Oressy, Aboukir, Hogue), was based on the Note “in order to ensure tho presence of armoured ships in the southern approaches of the North Sea and eastern entrance to the Channel, and to support the First and Second Flotillas operating in that area from Harwich.” The object of these flotillas was “to keep the area south of the 54th parallel clear of enemy torpedo craft and minelayers.” Tho Cruiser Force was “to support them in the execution of these duties, nnd also, with tho flotillas, to keep a close watch over enemy war vessels and transports in order that their movement may bo reported at the earliest moment.” This patrol had accordingly been maintained day after day without incident of any kind Happening, and we had now been six weeks at war. In war all repetitions are perilous. You oan do many things with impunity if you do not keep on doing them over and over again.

It was not part cf my duty to deal with tho routine movements of the fleet and its squadrons, but only to exercise a general supervision. I kept mv eyes nnd ears open for overy indication that would be useful, and I had many and various sources of information. On September 17, during my visit to the Grand Fleet, I heard an expression used by an officer which instantly arrested my attention. He spoke of the live-bait squadron.” I demanded what was meant, and was told that tho expression referred to these old cruisers patrolling the narrow waters in apparently unbroken peace. I thereupon reviewed the whole position in this area, I discussed it, with Commodore Tyrwhitt nnd with Commodore Keyes. The next morning I addressed tho following minute to tho First Sea Lord: —

18.9.14. The force available for operations in the narrow seas should be capable of minor action without, the need of bringing down the Grand Fleet. To this end it should have effective support either by two or three battle-cruisers or battleships of the Second Fled working from Sheerness. ’J his is tho most, efficiently air and destroyer patrolled anchorage we possess. T hey can lie behind the boonrq and can always bo at sea when we intend to make a raid. Battle-cruisers are much to ho preferred. Tho Bacchantes ought not to continue on this beat. The risk to such ships is not justified by any services they can render. The narrow seas, being tho nearest point to tho enemy, should bo kept by a small number of good modern ships. The Bacchantes should go to the western entrance of the Channel and set Bothell's battleships—and later Womyss’s cruisers —free for convoy and other duties. Tho first four Arethusas should join the flotillas of the narrow seas. I see no sufficient reason to exchange those flotillas now that they know their work with the northern ones. As the “M” boats are delivered the-" should be formed into a separate halfflotilla and go north to work with the Grand Fleet. The King Alfred should pay off and 6o thoroughly repaired.

Prince Louis immediately agreed and gave directions to the Chief of the Staff to make the necessary redistribution of forces. With this 1 was content, and I dismissed the matter from my mind, being sure that the orders given would be complied with at the earliest moment. Before they could take effect, disaster occurred. The rough weather of the 19th and 20th made it necessary for the cruisers to forego the protection of the destroyers, but they nevertheless were allowed to continue their patrol. On the morning of the 21st the three cruisers steamed slowly northward without zig-zagging and at under 10 knots, :rs no doubt they had often done before. Meanwhile, a single German submarine, becoming more venturesome every day, was prowling southward down the Dutch coast. At 6.50 a.m., shortly after daylight, the Aboukir was struck by a torpedo. In 23 minutes this old vessel capsized. Some of her boats were smashed by the explosion, and hundreds of men were swimming in the water or clinging to wreckage. Both her consorts had hurried with chivalrous simplicity to the aid of the sinking ship. Both oame to a dead standstill within a few hundred yards of her and lowered all their boaus to rescue (ho survivors. In this posture they, in their turn, were both sunk, first the Hogue and then the Cressy, by the same submarine. Out of over 20CO men on board these three ships only 800 were saved, and more than 1400 perished. The ships themselves were of no great value; they were among the oldest cruisers of the Third Fleet, and contributed in no appreciable way to our vital margins. But, like all Third Fleet ships, they were almost entirely maimed by reservists, most of whom were married men, and they carried also young cadets from Osborne posted for safety to ships which-it was thought would not bo engaged in the great battles. This cruel loss of life, although small compared with what the Army was enduring, constituted the first serious forfeit exacted from the Navy in the war. It greatly stimulated and encouraged the enterprise of the Gorman submarines. The commander of the fatal boat (Lieutenant Weddigcn) was exuitingly proclaimed as a national hero. Certainly the destruction with his own lingo:* of 1400 persons was an episode of a peculiar character in human history. But, as will bo scon, he did not live long to enjoy his sombre fame. A storm of criticism was directed at the Admiralty, and naturally if, was focussed on me. “Here was an instance of the disaster which followed from the interference of a civilian Minister in naval operations, and the over-riding of the judgment of skilful and experienced admirals.” The writer! of a .small but venomous brochure which was industriously circulated in influential circles in London did not hesitate to make this charge in the most direct form, and it was repeated in countless innuendoes throughout the British press. I did not, however, think it. possible to make any explanation or reply.

* The first d.sign of tlio tank made at my request bv Admiral Bacon in September, 1914, carried a’ bridge on its back which it, could plane in position by a pair of projecting arms. After passing over tho bridge tin- car picked it np again’ exactly as a child would use. a skipping-rope. tUr 'lTiomafi Gibson Bowles.