HAIG-LLOYD GEORGE SENSATION

Otago Daily Times, Issue 18760, 13 January 1923, Page 10

HAIG-LLOYD GEORGE SENSATION

SOLDIER AS HERO. POLITICIAN AS MEDDLER. It was the genius of Haig—not of Foch, who at first opposed Haig’s plan—that resulted in the final triumph of the war. Haig was, moreover, subjected to the greatest discouragement from the civil power at home. The War Cabinet sent him a warning and discourteous tele-

gram, which he disregarded. Mr Lloyd George dabbled in military operations, and in intervention did not know when to draw the lino. He praised Foch when ho should have praised'Haig. . The events of March, 1918, were duo to the War Cabinet’s failure to supply the requisite divisions. These are some of the sensational assertions made by Mr G. A. B. Dewar in “Sir Douglas Haig’s Command,” which was recently published (says the Daily Express). Mr Dewar -was assisted by 'Lieut.-colonel Boraston, who was Haig’s private secretary in France, and the work minutely reviews the whole period from December 19, 1915, to November 11, 1918. CRITICISM. Haig has (says the Daily Express) not baert immune from critics. He has been accused of questioning the orders of General Nivello and other soldiers with whom he was cooperating on the -western front. Captain Peter Wright, in his book . “At the Supreme War Council,” published laet year, said of him: The Commander-in-Chief was a knightly figure, with all the bearing and temper of a leader, but on a very low plane of ;n----telligenoe, as elderly cavalrymen eoraetimes are. He marvelled why Haig’s reputation survived such battles as the Somme and Passchendaelo, each of which cost us half a million casualties. Mr Dewar and Lieut.-colonel Boraston, or the other hand, show Haig as a great soldier. If Haig is the hero of this book, the "villain” is Mr Lloyd George. Among tho charges made against him are that he wrongly condemned the Allied strategy, than lie supported Nivellc. and that he was opposed to the unified command. Tho “myth” that it was Mr Lloyd George who put Food in command, having been first to rocogmao tho genius of the great soldier, is attacked. Instead of objecting to Foch, it is .dated, Haig wanted to work under him in the cause of victory. The authors have obviously had access to documents not available to many. To what extent Lord Haig is* answering his critics through them can only be conjectured. HIS OWN LINE. The most remarkable section of the work, entitled “Some Significant Events Hitherto Suppressed or Overlooked,” shows Haig taking his own line in the face of the opposition of French leaders in the field and tho War Cabinet at home. Hero are some of the "events” : July 3, 1916.—Battle of the Somme. Joffre insists on Haig attacking again at Thiepval. Haig absolutely refuses. Ho proceeds, instead, with his own plan. The rejected French plan must have meant very heavy British casualties, with in all probability a severe repulse.

February 27, 1917.—The British War Cabinet announces its decision to subordinate Haig to Nivelle. At this time Nivello is proving himself completely wrong (about) . . . the retreat of tho Germans to the Hindenburg lino. A fortnight after the retreat is general, and even Nivelle, who has hitherto ridiculed tho idea, finds he has been quite wrong. April 9, 1917. —The Canadian Corps capture Vimy Ridge. Mr Lloyd George appears to claim it was a result of tho subordination of Haig to Nivelle. Ho omits to mention that Nivelle strongly opposed Haig’s decision to capture the ridge. May 4-5, 1917.—The fact that the British Government had approved of the proposal for the Flanders offensive (Passchendaele) was mentioned in tho British Commandor-in-Chicf’s despatch of December 25, 1917, but was struck out by the authorities at home. March 21, 1918.—The German attack comes as no surprise, for it has been predicted with almost perfect accuracy by the British Intelligence Department at G.H.Q. But this prediction must not be confused — as it often has been—with tho prediction furnished by the Supreme War Council at Versailles. The latter was wrong as regards date, place, and force and disposition of divisions employed in the attack. STIFF OPPOSITION. March 29-30, 1918.—The dominating strategy of this critical period is Haig’s, and its tuling, principle is, first and foremost,. to prevent the separation of the two Allied armies. July 11. 1918.—Haig takes all responsibility on himself. August 8, 1918. —The battle of Amiens begins. Described by Ludcndorff as the blackletter day of the Germane in tho war. This is the first of the great and decisive series of British operations, all of which were conceived and worked out by British leadership. This truth has been slurred over or euppressed by those who, combining folly and falsehood, choose to represent that until the British Commander-in-Chief and his colleagues were taken over and inspired by French genius they were strategically inopt. August 12, 1918.—Foch asks Haig to attack at once the Germans at the Roye Chaulous position. But Haig, having visited this section and examined the conditions, is convinced that the German opposition here has stiffened; that we could not ogain sui prise the enemy in this orea; and that by attacking afresh south of the Somm,e we should incur heavy casualties and receive a severe set-back. Further reconnaissances on August 13, ordered by him, prove the strength of the German position. He tells Foch this, but sketches out an alternative and far more promising and scientific plan of striking north of Anus. ' FRENCH AID. A keen discussion follows. Foch continues to insist on Haig attacking tho RoyeChaulne® position. Haig finally declines to do so. Fooh then agrees to Haig's plan, and promises French aid south of the British front. August 21, 1918. —Haig’s plan of attack is put to the test. The battle of Bapaume starts, and proves a magnificent success. It leads on to tire battle 'of the Sharpe, which breaks tho Diooourt-Quoant switch-line, the First Army duly coming into action, os planned by Haig and his colleagues some time before. August 81, 1918. —French and British leaders, now after Haig's decision hos been proved absolutely right, are at hearty accord; Foch eager for renewed and continuous pressure by the British on the retreating German Army, and Haig resolved' to carry out the whole of his brilliant and massive scheme of operations. CABINET PEARS. Tho British War Cabinet, however, uneasy about casualties, conveys to Haig n warning and discourteous telegram in cipher. Ho puts this aside, and proceeds with hie operations, which result in tho breaking of tho Hindenburg Lino and the hasty retreat of the now, demoralised German Army on the entire Allied front. September 3, 1918.—Foch issues his Directive 3537 embodying Haig’s proposal that tho whole Allied' advance should be of a converging or concentric character, tho attacks hitherto resolved on being, in Haig’s view, on eccentric lines wanting in co-ordination and cohesion. Tho wholo plan for an Allied advance thus takes a grand and scientific form. “It is amarhig;” states the- authors, “that the vast macs of ihe public throughout the British Empire have not yet heard cf any of these events in the war. The discussion between the military leaders at Sarcus in August, 1918, was one of the most momentous episodes in the history of Europe. And had not Haig there insisted on hie own plan of breaking tho German Army—a plan supremely skilful and deeply thought out by him and his staff—the Allied cause would have suffered grievously indeed,” The eventful meeting at Sarcus is thus described; —‘Haig preferred science to the

sledge-hammer. Foch did not concur. He was bent on tbe Fourth British Army continuing and pressing the attack forthwith south of the Somme. No secret shall here ho imade of the fact- that the argument was keen and controversial.” In the end “Foch accepted in its entirety the British Commandor-in-Chiel's plan.’’ “The amazing error’' (that it was Fooh's not Haig’s plan that prevailed) “has more or less thriven ever since. . . It should have been ended by the Prime Minister in 1919 when the Commander-in-Chief and his army commanders were the subject of a vote in Parliament. To attribute the credit for these battles to Foch is not really to honour Foch.” "ON WRONG LINES. Among the references to Mr Lloyd George are the following: “Mr Lloyd George believed wo were fighting on wrong lines altogether. On November 13, 1917, in a speech at Paris, he condemned our strategy, past and present, all round. We hod wasted our strength, and had thrown away the opportunity of ■-oally damaging the enemy by caving- Serbia. ' The Prime Minister did not, in intervention. know where to draw the !i-v>. lie knew next to nothing about luilit*:" operations. Yet he dabbled in them,

tho generals, British and French, and evi. dently expected them to be glib in their replies. In subordinating the British Army to Nivolle he was really intervening in military plans. He spurred on Nivello to a headstrong course which ended in disaster. “On August 6, 1919, in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister made a speech in relation to generalship in the war. After having alluded to Haig as one who hod ‘subordinated’ himself to the demands of the country and ‘accepted’ the command of Marshal Fooh, he went on to speak of the winning of the war by Foch; and, glancing through the speech, we notice it is illumined by such words as ‘genius,’ ‘vision,’ ‘brilliancy,’ ‘skill.’ ” “We were saved by the genius of Marshal Foch,” said Mr Lloyd George. f| “We were saved by the genius, of Haig, is the insistent cry of Mr Dewar.