GENOA AND THE FUTURE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 18539, 27 April 1922, Page 3

GENOA AND THE FUTURE

TO THE EDITO*. vSik,— T am greatly distressed to hear that mam- excellent citizens arc hesitating to subscribe to the Russian Famine Relief Funds on account of the treaty between Russia and Germany, which was apparently signed at Genoa a few days ago. May T take the liberty of pointing out a few facts? Whatever the nature of that treat may be. no arrangement between these two countries can do anything to relieve Russia’s present distress. What Russia needs, in order to save the population of the Lower Volga Basin from utter extinction. is food. Germany has no food to give her. Even supposing, -what is exceedingly improbable, that German capitalists have immediate sums available for investment in Russia, this would not increase by a single loaf the existing stocks of food in Russia, It is true that Germany and C'zecho-Slovakia and a few of the less unfortunate States on the ivussian border are doing what little they can to make food available for their despairing and desperate neighbours. But the capacity of Germany to enable Russia to tide over the present crisis cannot be affected by any treaty. The Treaty of Genoa may. by diverting German moneys to other purposes, make German assistance somewhat less. It cannot possibly make it more.

Further, as far as our information about the new treaty goes, its objects are purely political. Some people seem to think that, if a State makes a treaty with Germany, that State necessarily becomes our enemy. But such persons forget two things. They forget that legally German- is no longer an enemy Power. The Treaty of Versailles. signed by Mr Lloyd George and Mr Massey in Jane, 1919. brought warlike operations to an end and introduced a state of peace. But they forget also that it is utterly impracticable for Great Britain or even for the Allies to debar Germany from_ entering into treaties unless these treaties definitely conflict with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Germany is a sovereign State. The onlv difference- between it and any other sovereign State is that its treaty obligations are both more onerous in their terms and more definite in their incidence. To imagine that the Allies can. or ought to, prevent Germany from making a political treaty with Russia is to treat Germany as if it had no political independence—a view of international policy pregnant with disaster to the future of the world.

Of course, everyone must realise that the present peace is in reality no peace. Either we have to go on cultivating the war spirit, in which event, we shall certainly soon have another war, a war which will destroy what of Europe is left, or we must cultivate the peace spirit and so help to build up and reconstruct society on sane and permanent lines. The Treaty of Versailles holds out no promise of peace. Mr Lloyd George knows that, and because he knows it, he has taken a foremost part in summoning the Genoa Conference. Unfortunately, since America, for reasons which are not -in the least discreditable to it, refuses to enter into conference with European Powers in Europe. Great Britain has been thrown more closely into the company of Franco than is greatly relished by either country. And France has done its best to make any decisions come to at Genoa quite negatory and valueless. Firstly, by the Cannes resolutions France practically forbade the Conference of Genoa to discuss any part of the Treaty of Versailles, or, in particular, (he reparation clauses of the treaty and the subsequent decisions of the Reparations Commission. Then, as if this were not enough to place an effective limit on the usefulness of the conference. France got rid of Briand and put Poincare into his place. That is to say, she placed a Clever opportunist for a, determined Imperialist, whoso sole ambition is to surround Germany by a ring of watchful enemies and so carry out, in fact, the policy wrongly attributed to Edward VII. M. Poincare next refused to go to Genoa, and instead of sending an accredited representative with full power to act, he took care to send_ only a delegate with precise and detailed instructions, which he cannot exceed in any particular without reference to the Champs D’Elysee. Now, when representatives of the States have assembled at Genoa, the Allies have apparently come, determined not to recognise the other States as on a footing of equality with them, but to act as a coherent group that will negotiate separately, at least on the major questions, form its own decisions, and by its superior strength impose them on the conference. Little wonder if, in such circumstances, Russia and Germany, excluded from participation in the discussion of vital issues, come to - a separate agreement! 'Little wonder, also, that the neutrals support Germany and Russia! Little wonder - that the greatest neutral of all, suspecting how thick the atmosphere at Genoa would be, deliberately stayed away. And, lastly, little wonder tliat Mr Lloyd George, with a gesture that is perhaps as likely to be too late as was tile gesture of President Wilson in sending for the George Washington in March, 1919, has threatened to toll the world who is responsible for blocking the path of the conference! Taking the existing situation, I submit that no Allied Power can hold the finger of scorn to Russia and • Germany over the Genoa Treaty. Very few people seem to realise that the world has moved far Lorn 1914. The Germany of 1922 is not the Germany of 1914. Nor is the Russia of 1922 the Russia of 1914. Russia, reduced in economic and political strength by the loss of the Ukraine and_ other territories on the west, and by tile no less formidable aggression of Japan on the east, will not be a first-class Power for many a long day to come. Nor has the now Germany, no longer -imperialist, but. genuinely democratic, any desire to conquer the world, but, if dragooned, insulted, hemmed in, and kept permanently out of the family of nations, will Germany be a danger to the world’s peace. At present Germany is faced with the impossible demands for reparations. These demands it can for a little attempt to carry out either by exporting enormous quantities of goods to the Allies or by developing its trade with Russia. The Allies refuse to receive the goods. How, then, can Germany pay the indemnities demanded of her but by finding fresh markets in Russia and the United States? But the argument for relieving the Russian people is not grounded on the removal of petty phantoms or on paltry political considerations. By helping the Russians we shall, it is true, be laying up for our country a store of political goodwill, which may, in the chances and changes of international politics, stand us in good stead sometime in the future. The main reason why wo should help Russia is very simple. Many of our public men have given up the practice of Christianity at least in international relationships. But the people are not willing so lightly to abandon the first principles of etliical religion. In spite of the calculated sophistries of their so-called leaders, they still are awed by the majestic authorivy of One who said. “Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least, of these, ye did it, not to Me” 1--I am, etc.. W. Henderson Pringle. The University of Otago, April 2b.