THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 18455, 17 January 1922, Page 8

THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

THE FRENCH CHANGE OF GOVBRN- ' mentV By W. Henderson Phingle ; Professor of Economics. ' - The European crisis draws perceptibly, nearer. National policies being what they are, it is difficult, indeed, to see how it could have been long postponed. Except in England the war fever has not, gone down from the high-water” mark at which it stood during the last stages of the war. The .ultra-patriotic fervour of France; the extreme gravity of the financial position hv both France and Germany, the continued feebleness and lack of oonsikent purpose 'in British attempts to moderate between them, would sooner or later have led Europe over the brink. But the" events of the last tew days make it all too probable that the disasters, long foretold by economists and Unfortunately made light of by public opinion, are now not very far off. The resignation of M. Briand lias been followed by the acoessiqn to power of M. Poincare. The public, accustomed to see one French Prime' Minister after another vanish in quick succession from the stage, is likely: to miss the significance of the change. There are three points of oartbiial importance to be noticed. The first is that M. Briand has not fallen from power because of an adverse vote in the Chamber of Deputies. The telegrams distinctly state that. had his policy at Cannes been brought 10 tho test of a vote in the House lie would have obtained a sufficient majority to enable him'to return to Cannes and. complete his pact with Mr Lloyd George. His fall is not due to the failure of the Legislature to support him.. It is due to want ef support from the President, M. Millerand. The President took office, on the demission of M. Deschancl, on . the distinct understanding that he was to have a decisive voice in the control of foreign policy. -M. Briand has resigned because me no longer commanded the confidence of the President. M. Poincare ■ has accepted office because tho President and he are- in complete agreement regarding the terms to be insisted on by France in any treaty with Great Britain and because both ■of them are fundamentally opposed to the polioyj to which Mr Lloyd . George was able to wring a reluctant and tepid gssont from M. Briand, of summbning Germany and Russia with the other, Powers to a conference at Genoa , to settle .the'main lines of f international ‘economic re-cpiißtruc-tion. • : ■ ’

The second point to be noted is that M Poincare is not content only to be Prim* Minister. He has as'sumod the dual dffico* of Prime Minister and Minister of Fqreigi Affairs. Being in complete agreement witl M. Millerand regarding the immediate ob joctives of foreign policy, he is. determiner not to have his aims thwarted or his in sistenoe on Germany being forced to pa; the last pound -of fleshy by appointing t< the. Foreign Office a chief on whose com plete collaboration it might not'be possibb to rely. For good or evil, therefore, Franci has now achieved a unity of command in th< management of foreign affairs, which ehi was riot aide to obtain even in the palm; days of Clemenceau. Whether this unit; of command will lead to the disasters of I Petain or the successes of a Fooh, the even alone can reveal. But few competent ob ; servers oan watch the situation without gravi misgivings.* . A third- point is this. M. Poincare ha; already intimated to Mr Lloyd George tha he-will not attend the Genoa Conference ' This means—it is, indeed; the inevitable do "duction from my second point—that Franc will not be represented at Genoa by a first rate statesman of acknowledged power ant .prestige, ' In other words, M. Poincare’; first official act is to oold-sboulder the con ference and _to prevent it from being, wha manifestly it ought to be and what M: Lloyd George intended it should be, an in struinent 'for getting .rid of -some of th< worst errors of the Versailles Treaty ant for laying at least the foundations of - 1 stable economic order in distracted Europe A conference in which Franco is repre seated by a eeoond-rate politician, withou power to act except after continuous refer ence to Paris, will necessarily be futile i To all intents and purposes M. Poincari has already washed his hands of the con ference. Unless in ' all points France gets her own way, Europe is not to bo allowec even to discuss the question of its re habilitation. , Obviously Mr Lloyd Georgs cannot attend a conference on these, terms The confejpnce is over before it is begun. .That in itself is a, disaster. But I dc not wish to say anything about the probable result of the failure of the nations ■ to oomt together for' a friendly discussion, of wayi and means of setting Europe on its feei again. _ It is just possible that M. Poinoarc will withdraw his. veto if he ds able to wrosi from Great Britain, a treaty more favourablt to France than that to which M. Briaric was on the point of affixing- bis signature It is possible because the experience of the last /few years has shown us that Britisl policy has no fixed objective,' but fluctuates from ■ month to month, one might almost say from Jay to ; day, with no regard to anything except immediate political exigencies. The British Prime Minister is like a chess player who allows his opponent bo dictate nis moves instead of dictating the moves his opponent must take. The proposed - pact. with France is the outcome of the forrfing. tactics adopted by 'France at 'tlie Washington Conference. The French saw that without a vast expenditure of money on , first-class battleships they could threaten 'Britain’s commercial position by the , construction of a vast fleet of submarines. This was'an excellent tactical way of forcing Britain to the position —a position she was loth to adopt—qf being the sole guarantor of France against' future Gorman / aggression. In order to placate the French, < Mr'Lloyd George indicated his willingness to negotiate a treaty. But, partly because he is a patriotic British statesman, and partly because of the near approach of the British general election, he has insisted on three cardinal points. In the first place, the treaty was -to bo an open treaty, an ‘‘open Covenant openly arrived at,” to use language wo were all' familiar with with, three 'years ago. The terms of the proposed pact wore, therefore, known to the world. This open diplomacy, does not, however, suit the tastes of the present ’ guides of French policy. _ The Petit Journal? a newspaper which carries I immense weight in France arid with the opinions of which M. Poincare/ is substantially in agreement, has already loudly proclaimed its preference for a treaty negotiated in> the secrecy of the Chancellories and not in the open air of •Cannes. The" probability is, therefore, that the .French Foreign Office, under its new director, will endeavour to get Mr Lloyd George’s signature to a treaty, privately settled, which will then be presented to the British land 1 ” French peoples as a “fait accompli.” Whether-it will able to attain -thia end depends on the resoluteness with "whioh the British Parliament insists on full and ample knowledge of the progress of negotiations. Secondly, Mr Lloyd- George was willing to agree to a pact limited to ton years’ duration. He could not go further and retain even the semblance of support for the League of Nations, seeing that by the covenant, of the league all treaties must bo brought up for revision every ten years. But a treaty so limited makes very little' appeal to M. Poincare. Germany cannot bo powerful—it is to no nation’s interests that she shall be powerful—within the next ten years The policy which has been described as the policy of “permanently sitting upon Germany” demands a treaty of much longer duration. The people who support it forget, however, that Germany may prove to be not a soft cushion but a porcupine. In any event, it is a policy to which Britain cannot assent, not only because it is hostile to the League of' Natiorfs, but because it runs counter to vital British interests. The last condition which Mr LloydGeorge imported into the proposed pact discussed • with M. Briand was that the dominions were not tV> ho bound without their own consent. .This proviso raises vast constitutional issues. A few months ago I was privately, though riot publicly, criticised because I asserted that an alliance with France would tend to disrupt the British Empire. But I take this proviso to be a significant warning that my assertion was' correct. However, I do not want to dwell on this point. I would simply point, out the security of the dominions is fatally compromised by such a clause being imported, as it is for the first tiriio in history, into a treaty of first-class importance, affecting tjfio whole British Empire. Again I must ask, what is meant by the assent of the dominions? Will' the consent and- approval of Mr Massey, for example, he sufficient to bind New Zealand? Or must the pact he ratified by the New Zealand House qf Assembly? If the assent of Mr Massey is sufficient, then we have a fundamentally;'new principle, incorporated into the political system of this dominion. If, on the, other hand, the House of Assembly must ratify the treaty, then we have this anomalous~position, that the assent of a.dominion Parliament is necessary for the execution of a treaty, while the assent of the British Parliament is unnecessary. This inevitably involves a further breach in the unity, of the political systems of the Empire.