THE OTAGO DAILY TIMES WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7, 1920. THE AMRITSAR INCIDENT.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17903, 7 April 1920, Page 4

THE OTAGO DAILY TIMES WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7, 1920. THE AMRITSAR INCIDENT.

The cabled statement that the reports prepared by both a majority and a minority of the Disorders Inquiry Commission, which, under the presidency of Lord Hunter, has been investigating the causes of serious disturbances in India about 12 nonths ago, are condemnatory of t'le action taken by Brigadier-general Dyer to suppress the riots at Amritsar is not surprising. A painful sensation was caused at Home when news was received there, several months after the event, of the drastic measures which General Dyer considered it necessary to take in order, as he believed, to prevent a mutiny. Amazing as it may seem, the India Office itself was without complete information until late in the year of the extent of the casualties that were inflicted upon the natives by General D7er in the discharge of whai

ho 'looked on"—to quote his own words—"as a duty, a very horrible duty." And there can bo no doubt that an apparent lack of frankness concerning an exceedingly unfortunate, incident tended to increase the linfavourableness of the impression that was created when the public learnt tho story of tho massacre that occurred. "Massacre " is, it is to be regretted, not too strong a word to use, oven when tho circumstance is not ignored that a dangerous state of feeling had been aroused among tho native population, and that many acts of extreme violence and many murders and outrages had boon committed. When General Dyer, who was in command of the 45th Brigade at Jullundur, arrived at Amritsar, ho concluded, from what tho civil authorities told him, that the position was one of rebellion, and he regarded tho people as rebels. Hβ issued one proclamation warning people against doing damage to property and perpetrating acts of violence, and another proclamation warning them that if they assembled together they v/ere liable to bo dispersed by force of arms. On tho same day lie received definite news of a meoting at Jallianwala Bagh, and he immediately inarched off with a striking force consisting of 25' British rifles, 25 Indian rifles, 40 Gurkhas armed with kukris, and two armoured cars. Some pickets dropped off en route at' their assigned posts. When ho arrived on tho scene where a. meeting was being held in an enclosed square, General Dyer deployed his men on the right and left. Within 30 seconds he. ordered fire to be opened. Ho estimated at the time of firing that tho crowd numbered SOOfl persons. Looking on the crowd as rebels, ho "considered it was his duty to fire, and fire well." As a matter of fact, the firing went on until the ammunition, consisting of 1650 rounds, was exhausted, and some 400 or 500 natives were killed, those wounded being probably three times as many as the fiilled. General Dyer Insisted in his evidence before the Hunter Commission that ib was "a merciful thing" he had performed, and that it had "done a lot of good." "What he did was right," he said, "and they ought to be thankful for it." It would be foolish to assert positively that the danger of another Indian mutiny was not averted by "the whiff* of grapeshot"— or its modern equivalent—which General Dyer employed. But, whatever the opinion of military authorities on the subject may be, the weight of civilian , judgment must certainly be that the killing, under General Dyer's instruc; tions, of such a large number of Indians,' who may have been wholly ignorant of the terms of his proclamations, arid .whom, in any case, it was, General Dyer admits, possible to disperse without recourse to firing, was a blunder of the first magnitude—an uncalled for act which must excite bitter memories and inflamed feelings.