WAR AND PEACE.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17884, 15 March 1920, Page 8

WAR AND PEACE.

SOME CONTRADICTORY CONCLUSIONS Br Conbtant Reader. "And ye shall know the Truth and the Truth shall make you free." Ihe arjpljcation of those words to the war and all tlrnt relates thereto is very evident to-day. liiear import is emphasised in Dr Moffoit s more recent translation of the New Testament: "You will understand tho truth, and the truth will set you free." The war on tho Aliies' sido was a war for freedom, but the world can never realise that freedom until the truth about the war is actually made known. This is the meaning of Lord Lore burn's significant book, "How the War Came." Lord Loreburn is better known as Sir Robert Reid, Chancellor in the Campbell-Banncrman and Asquith Governments from 1905 to 1912. Ho had also filkd tho positions of Solicitor-general and Attorney-general. A distinguished lawyer and an experienced Parliamentarian of Liberal proclivities, ha brings to tho task of the examination of the origin of the war all his legal acumen and keen ontical faculty, 110 relies throughout for his evidence upon tho "Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to tho Outbreak of tho European War." published in 1915, containing the British White Book or Paper, the French Yellow Book, tho Russian Orange Book, the Belgian Grey Book, the Serbian Blue Book, the German White Book, and the AustroUungnrian Red Book. Students of world politics who lack either timo or inclination —or both —to consult the original docctments "will welcome this book, written, nays the author, "in the hope that it may help towards the avoidance of war in future by showing how we carno to be suddenly brought into the Great War of 1914. _ His motive declared, Lord Loreburn follows this up by saying:—

While the war lasted no criticism of what had gone before or even of what was passing at the timo would hjws met with puhfio approval, except such as might be necessary' to prevent blunders being made, or t§ prevent blunderers being sheltered by secrecy.. But it is to be deplored that outspoken and effective discussion after'the .war is ended should have been prejudiced in advance by the courae things have taken. . . . It > s a ® difficult to catch up _ an erroneous point of view, when once it has got a start, aB it ■ is to overtake an actual falsehood. Tho : point of view presented in these pages is that , of a liberal who - has always ' thought tho infusion of ■ Imperialism a source of danger, and who bsueves that the tragedy of war would not havo oomf» upon us if the Mcni&ters of 1914 had been true to our traditional principles: and out- ' ■ spoken in regard to what they were doing. Lord Loreburn waxes indignant against the secrecy, which, in his opinion, allowed the world to drift into wa.r. 1 U® most serious thing of all," he writes, "is that ever since the war began the expression of honest and reasonable critioism and the publication of accurate news has been made 'very difficult by the. stupid'and' ill-conceived pressure of the censorship. Facts have been suppressed 6r ignored and untrue oon. elusions have been fostered in the supposed interests of the nation." He a-dds_ with vehemence: "Unless the people of this country ape prepared to examine these things and take them into their own hands, the same methods of secrecy, tho same restlessness and irresolution in policy, the same blindness alike to foreign conditions and to our own true interests that preceded this war may herald us into another." . , ' .. Lord Loreburn insists that for generations the fixed policy of Great Britain was one of non-intervention in the "wars and quarrels of Europe, and that the British Government's initial error lay in a secret departure from that polioy without seeking tho approval of tho people before making tho change. He takes the view that under cover of the Entente with Franco, Sir Edward GrdV slipped into a new policy, but without either amy or treaty or warrant of parliamentary approval," the_ only explanation being "that the Toreign Office did not realise what, they,were doing. On this point, Lord Loreburn is definite in his denunciation: ,

Whatever lessons are to be learned for the future from this dreadful passage in our history can be derived only from an accurate' estimate of what Ministers did. Their original fault lay in departing from the old policy* in secret, and m allowing our entente with France to develop imperceptibly till at last it wastransformed into the equivalent of an alliance, -without the needful" security and advantages that an open alliance would bring with it. On that followed the grave mistake of concealing from themselves and others the true character of what was being done, and imparting to;"Pariiament only their own sanguine conclusion that they had lcept free from ments without imparting also , the facts which would have awakened apprehension. Their duty was to warn Parliament of the danger and prepare to meet it. -They did neither, but drifted on. Tlie final mistake was that when', on 'the crisis arising, a decision one way or the other might, and, so far as can be judged, would have averted the Continental war altogether. Ministers could not make up their mjinds or take a firm resolution in time.

Lord Loreburn charges the crime of allowing the world to drift into war against secret diplomacy and judges the diplomats of all tho belligerent nations guilty of complicity in that offence. _ Briefly summarised his arguemnt consists in this: that m the early months of 1914 there was no nation either desirous of or prepared for war, and that right up to the moment of actual hostilities the diplomats were confident of their ability to avert the international conflict. And in their over-confidence they permitted affairs to drift past the point ■ at which recovery was possible. This heavy arraignment is set forth in the following words.— 1 Certainly it is true that in and before 1914 the Foreign Offices of the various European States had continued -to exclude almost entirely gyery, popular or parliamentary influence/ from control over foreign affairs by keeping knowledge, which is power, in their own possession. They were so profoundly convinced of their own supreme ability as to regard any interference from ; outside almost in the light of desecration. Recent ext perience lias taught the -nations to think very differently of diplomats, and they cannot be allowed to throw dust in the eyes of the public any longer. Not a single one of the men'who had real power was wisft enough and strong enough to . arrest the military demon that was about to bring upon us all the most awful catastrophe in human history. - And after this war had commenced, though very many of them. from motives either of fear or of humanity, desired to see it ended, ■they had so committed themselves to one another or were so distrustful of each other's private intentions for the future that, they' could not _ close the conflict for tlw origin of which they had been themselves responsible. Meanwhile th® guiltless people were distroyed. Lord Loreburn contends—supporting his contention bv the official documents in the eas" —that when Austria delivered her ultimatum to Serbia the diplomats were confident that, should the ultimatum provoko hostilities, the fighting area, could be localised. Russia at, once invited Great Britain to announce her " solidarity" with Franco and Russia in- the war which 'might be forced upon, them. This Sir Edward Grey declined to do although such a declaration. at that point in the: negotiations would, it is suggested, have deterred Germany against taking overt action. Germany interpreted Sir Edward Grey's hesitancy as 'pointing to Great Britain's neutrality; but Sir Edward Grey _ knew that in the eve.nt of war Great Britain was in honour bound to fight with France, as was Francp bound to espouse the cause of Russia. The chapter on ".How The Continent Came Into War" is highly informative. It concludes in the following fashion

Now our own Cabinet- might nrot fairlv have said to the French Government at the outset: "You expect us to help you, but this is no quarrel of yours; you are being brought into it because of your Treaty with Russia, If you like; to give Russia a free hand, well and good, but in tlwt event we will not gfyo Russia a free hand to control our nolicy ns well: and unless you can restrain' Russia from mobilising till we agree that the necesa'ty for doing so is corw, we f-'J not join you ■ in arms. We do not intend to bo embroiled by your Allv. to whom we am under no sort of obligation." We did repeatedly say to Russia, Be moderate, nray do not mobilise: but we had no Treaty with hrr. Surely we had a right to say this. If wo had taken un that attitude, Russia would not have thought

the delay of a day or two jn mobilising of such vital importance as to forfeit the Alliance with Great Britain in order to inobiliso on 31flt July, and that day or two would have saved the situation, for it would have given the short time that was noeded to settle the whole controversy between Austria and Russia. But our Government could not say it, because they did not make up their minds till after the war had been declared whether or not they would in any event support France in arias. They waited on without any policy, aiwl they had no policy because they lxad proceeded for a long time on their own views without taking Parliament into their confidence.

There is something cynical and repulsive in the attempt to exculpate Germany on the ground that she would not have begun the war had she known that Great Britain would be among her enemies. An ordinary malefactor might as well say that ho would not havo broken tile law if he had known thdt a policeman was within call. It may bo true, all the mine, in both cases. But that is no excuse for Germany. The truth seems to bo that the Kaiser was tempted by the assurances of his military advisers that they were fully prepared and their adversaries unprepiired, and that Great Britain would not interfere in arms. And he

could not resist tho temptation. There are other chapters in Lord Lorebum's book that invito careful attention from the student in search of tho truth, such, for instance, as the' one setting forth how Great Britain came into the war after it had broken out "'between Germany and Russia; the chapter on Belgium, and tho answer to the question, "Was the war inevitable?" Lord Love burn concludes by suggesting some remedies, in. connection "with which he writes: —

Tho object of every sano man must be to attain security, so far as it is possible, against the recurrence of a, tragedy such as this war lias proved: For this purpose two things are needed above all others. In the first placo we must place tho management of our own Foreign Affairs under strict and effective Parliamentary control. Tho British Empire at all events ought not to be again plunged at a few hours' notico into a war arising put of a train of policy, however well intended, pursue*! behind a. vaiL _ In the second place-we must do everything in, our power to procure continuous and concerted action among different States in order to forestall differences and to remove them if they arise by means of that concerted action. This is what people have in mind when they speak .about, #, League of Nations. ' >

"The elder von Moltlcc said, when pressed by his nephew to writo a true account of 1870-1 —to tTieir future financial advantage— 'It can't bo dono yet. Too many 'highly placcd personages would suffer in their reputations.' " This is quoted by the writer of the introduction to a translation of a German, official account of "The Battle of the Yser and of Ypres in the autumn, 1914," to emphasise the fact that the whole truth concerning the early stages of the Great War has not yet been revealed and may not be for years to come. Yet tho publication in English of this German monograph under the title "Ypres, 1914," confirms the impression, already received, that by all the recognised rules of the war game Germany should have scoured a crushing victory over the Allies before the ' end of 1914. Lord French in his book "1914" commits himself -to the statement ' that during the two days—October 31 and November 1 —"no more than a, thin and straggling line of tired ; out British soldiers stood between tho Empire and its practical ruin as an independent first-class Power." This German account, while accentuating the peril in which the British Army and the Nation actually stood, reveals tho astounding fact that tho German High Command were . ignorant of the extent of that peril. "Tho fact seems to be that the Germans cannot understand defeat in war except on the premise that the victor had superiority of numbers." And this German account, while primarily written to explain tho German, lack of succeffs, "bears convincing testimony to the fighting powers of the British Army, the determination of leaders, the extraordinary effectiveness of the fire of its artillery and of its cavalry and infantry, and the skil.l of its engineers." No better exercise in the imagination cdn be devised than to recall the mystery and secrecy of those first months of the war, while refreshing the memory by re-perusing such books as Lord Ernest Hamilton's "First Seven Divisions" and Major Corbett Smith's "The Retreat from Mons" and "The Marne and After," and then make a! careful study of this official German account of "Ypres, 1914." 1 Much has been written about the Dardanelles campaign. Mr John Masefield has done poetical justice to that forlorn hope; Major Gillam has pictured the part played by the British regiments, while Major Fred Waite has recorded the exploits of the' Anzacs, and then? are many other individual accounts. These are all more or less popular histories, but in "The Dardanelles"—a' volume in the series "Campaigns and their Lessons"—Major-general Sir 0. E. Caldwell sets out. to deal with the broad strategical aspect of an operation which, while only an incident in the worldwide disturbance, is capable of treatment as an isolated campaign. _ General .Caldwell conceives it as unsatisfactory that the material upon which he. has had to rely emanates entirely from. Allied sources. Failing the necessary .information from Turkish and German nnthoritiop. he roenrds his work as unsatisfactory. Nevertheless as "a study of certain phases of the campaign, rather than as a formal record of its course," the book, which is amply furnished with.maps, is of great value. For the nonce, from a strategical point of view "The Dardanelles" may be said to hold the field. • Dr "Charles Sarolea s "Europe and _ the League of Nations" illustrates the rapidity with which events move in tho world. to-day'--aud the folly of reprinting in volume form articles originally prepared for periodical publication. It is obvious that articles contributed every week _to tho columns of "Everyman," and dealing with current topics, have an interest almost entirely evanescent. Dr Sarolea holds strong opinions and expresses himself . vigorously, but his book cannot be said to be abreast of the time.