FUTURE ARMAMENTS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17576, 18 March 1919, Page 8

FUTURE ARMAMENTS

; GREAT BRITAIN'S. NAVY. A striking article by Mr Roosevelt in the Kansas City Star (of December 17) repudiates the idea that America wants a navy as big as the British, and describes the reported intention of Washington to build a navy in rivalry to Great Britain s as "political bluff." Mr Roosevelt says: It was announced from tlie peace ship that President Wilson was going to work for a reduction of naval armaments and for_ a form of naval agreement which, if it existed four years agd would have meant Germany's victory and the subjugation not only of Germany's foes but of all neutrals like qurselves. At. the lt me time -' - over here representatives of tho Administration are demanding a navy bigger than that of Great Britain. Ihe only possible interpretation of. these.' facts is that the Administration proposes to threaten Great. Britain with having to get in a neck-to-neck competition with America to build the. greatest navy in the world, and to do this as a bluff <=ok, k , for Great Britain's adherence to Mr Wilsons exceedingly nebulous ideas'. Under these conditions the .American people should ; with commonsense look at what their own needs 'are, and at what the needs of their Allies are. Sooner or later any programme will have to* be tested by its results and even if the United States started to emulate Great Britain's navy the enthusiasm to do so would vanish when it appeared that there was no earthly interest of ours to be served by the action. _ In winning the present war very many instrumentalities have been necessary. On the 'whole, the four most important in'their ordeiv have-been: (1) the French-army, (2) the British navy, ,(3) the British army, (4) the Italian army. Our,own gallant army and navy did exceedingly well, but came m so late that the part they ,played, taking the four and a-half years as a whole, does' not entitle them to rank with the instrumentalities given above. Great Britain is* an island separated from the huge military commonwealths of Europe by very narrow, seas, and separated from her, own greatest colonies by all the greatest oceans. To her, ■■ supremacy in tho navy is a riiatter of life" and death. America ought to have a firstclass navy, but if she did not have a ship .she_ might yet secure herself from any invasion. But Great Britain's Empire would not last one week, and sho would not make herself safe at Home one week if her navy lost its suprftmacv... Incidentally, to, savingherself, the British navy rendered incalculable service to us during tho last four and α-half years, and for tho last 30 years has been a shield to the United States. NO MENAGE TO THE, WOJtLD. j Great Britain is not a military power ' in. tho sense that any of the nations of Continental Europe, or, indeed, Asia are military powers. She had almost as much dimoulty m developing her. army in this war as we had in developing our armv ' Her army is no more of a threat to oth-r peoples) than ours is. Therefore, we Americans find ourselves, as ragnrds tho British navy, m this position:'that it i s of vital-consequence lo Great Britain to have the greatest navy in the world; it is emphatically not of any consequence to us to have as b% a navy as Great Britain, for we arc >not m< the slightest danger from breat Britain, and in all ordinary circumstances the British navy can be counted upon as a.help to the- United States, and neVer as a menace. In such circumstance's to set ourselves to work to build a navv in rivalry -with Great .Britain's, and, 'above all, to do this as political bluff, is worse than silly. Our own navy should be amole to protect our own. coasts, and to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. There are in Europe ari! Asia, several great military common-" wealths, each one of which will, in all prob ability, .always possess a far more formidable army than ours, even though, as I earnestly hope, we adopt some development of universal military training on the lines of, the Swiss system. Therefore/it is of the highest consequence that our navy should be second to that of Great Britain. The analogy with the case of the French armv is complete; The French army would not have been able to hold the German army and be the chief factor in Germany's military overthrow. The British navy could not have averted Germany's complete vic,tory.- Great Britain is separated bv narrow seas from the military "Powers of Continental Europe. We are separated from them by the width of the ocean. In the'circumstances it is sheer impertinence for either American or English statesmen to tell the French—or for that matter_ Italy—what ought to be done in' abolishing' armaments, or abandoning universal service, or anything. of the land Tho interest of France and Italy jr. the matter is vital; the interest of England and America is partly secondary. If we have well-thought-out arguments' to put before the French, put them before them; bud treat France as having the vital interest in the matter, and therefore the final say, so far as. we_ are concerned, and when Franc? is determined what the needs of the future demand, so far as her military preparedness is concerned, and when Italy hns made a similar determination, and our other Allies likewise, back them un. Tt is .not the business of America to tell Great Britain what she should do with her navy. It is not the business either of America or England to toll Franco she should do with her army. The plain American common sense of the situation is that we should recognise our immense debt to the British navy and the '".French army, and • stand by Britain in .whsvt she decides her vital needs demand, so fnr as her navy is ooncerned, and stand by Franco in the position she takes as to what the situation demands, as far as her axmv is r-onqfrned.