THE INDEPENDENT AIR FORCE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17576, 18 March 1919, Page 6

THE INDEPENDENT AIR FORCE

MAGNIFICENT COURAGE AND DETERMINATION. SIR H. TEaaNOHAED'S EULOGT, (Fhom Odb Own Correspondent.) LONDON, January 3. Major-gonecd Sir H. M. Trenchard's despach on the work of tho Independent Force, R.A.F., covering the period from June 5, 1918, to tho signing of the armistice, is a record of great enterprise which met with substantial reward, as well as of remarkable bravery and of keen and efficient work performed by the staff and all its personnel. It was in October, 1917, that the raids on Germany were begun by a small force located near Nancy, and up to Juno 5 57 attacks were made on tho Rhine district, despite tho severe handicap imposed by the limited capaoity of some of the machines then in service. It was only after that that largo .bombers thoroughly equipped for. long-distance work became available in any number. With tho addition of further squadrons of heavy machines a moro ambitious programme was entered upon, but raids on Germany wore at all times highly difficult and dangerous. tt The toll of Independent Force machines 'missing" is 109, but no risks and no losses deterred our pilots and observers, whose cour ge and determination are described by General Trenchard (commanding the force) as "magnificent. I never saw. even when out losses were heaviest, any wavering in their determination to get well into Germany. Them were cases in which a squadron lost the greater part of its machines on a raid, but this in no wise damped the other squadrons' keeness to avenge their comrades and to attack tho same target again and at once. It is to this trait in the character of the British pilots that I attribute their success in bombing Germany." On June 5 General Trenchard took over from Sir D. Haig the tactx.d command of the force, and the administrative and complete control a week later. His first task was to push on and arrange for tho accommodation of a force of some 60 squadrons, which work was practically completed by November L Previously he had emphasised the necessity for equipping the' B.E.F. on the western front with sufficient aircraft to hold and boat the German aerial forces there; that the bombing of Germany was a luxury till this had been accomplished, but that once accomplished it became a necessity. He decided to attack as many as nossible pf the large industrial centres which could be reached by the machines at his disposal. The moral effect of this plan, the General considered, was very great, as no town felt safe, .and' it necessitated continued and thoroughi defensive measures on the part of the enemy to protect the many different localities over, which the I.A.F. was operating. Bombing by day as well as by night Was necessary, because if the former were excluded (although it meant higher casualties) at least four-fifths of the value of night bombing must be -wasted, owing to the fact that the enomv could then make his arrangements to work by day and lire at a distance by night, and take other similar defensive steps. OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE.

Decision had to be come to, when it was - impossible for squadrons , ' to reach their objectives well in the interior of Germany, what ..alternative objective should be attacked, and which attacks would have the greatest effect in hastening the end of the war. General Trenchard nut railways first in order of importance, and then blast furnaces. He know that the Germans were extremely short of roiling stock, and some of the main railways feeding the German army in the west passed close to the British front, and, they were fairly easy to find at night. 550 TONS OF BOMBS AND INCREAS- , , _ ING DISTANCES. Between June 6 and November 10 the I.A.F. dropped 550 tons of bombs—l6o tons by day and 390 tons by night—including 220 i tons on aerodromes. This percentage was due to the necessity of preventing the enemy's . bombing machines attacking our aerodromes and in order to destroy the large ■ number of enemy scouts on their aerodromes as it was not practicable to deal with them on equal terms in the air. In June the longest distance flown out and back by day was 272 miles, by night 240 miles; in July the distance by day remained the same, but was increased to 300 miles by ■ night; in August the day mileage was 330, and the night 342, the highest _ figures "mentioned. Photographic reconnaissance -by individual machines was done.at a great height, with nearly always successful results, and only one photographic machine was lost during the period reviewed. In September and October the day bombing equadrons had to fight pracKcsEy from the front lino to their objective, and. from there home again; several times they had to fight the whole way out and the whole way back. INTREPID AIRMEN. ; To Hie squadrons' keenness to avenge theif comrades and to attack the same forget again and at once, General Trenchard attributes their success in bombing Germany, "as even_ when a squadron lost tne greater part of its machines, the pilots, instead of taking it as a defeat for the force. _at once turned it into a victory by attacking the eame targete again with the utmost determination. They were imbued with the feelings that whatever their casualties were, if they could help to shorten the war by one day, and thus save many casualties in the army on the ground they were only doing their duty. I never saw, even when our losses were heaviest any wavering in their determination to get well into Germany. Long distance bombfmr work requires fine judgment on the leader's part to know if he perseveres to the objective, whether he will have sufficient fuel to oarry the formation home again safely This will be realised when it is pointed out that on several accasions the machines with only 5* hours' petrol were out for that time; in one case., a formation was out for 55 hours, and only just managed to clear the front-lme trenches on its homeward journey A miscalculation of five minutes would have lost the whole formation Ceiling was of more importance than speed for long-distance day bombing work. It was essential that squadrons should fly as high as, possible, and it soon became apparent that the two squadrons with the *00 horse-power B H.P. engines had not sufficient power, for this long-distance

BERLIN THE OBJECTIVE. The 27th Group was established in England _under the command of Colonel E. H. Mulock D.5.0., for the purpose of bombing Berlin and other centres This group .only received the machines capable of carrying o«t this work at the end of October and.though all ranks worked day and night in order to get the machinde ready for the attack on Berlin they were only completed three days before the 2gn° ing of the armistice. •. • b

THRILLING EXPERIENCES On July 31 No. 99 Squadron, under CaD torn Taylor went to attack MaSz, SoSh of feaarbrucken they encountered 40 Wfo scouts, and fierce fighting ensued, „ » result of which four of our machines were shot down. The remaining five of the for* mafaon reached Saarhrucken, dropped their bombs on the station, and on the return were again attacked by largo numberTS hostile scouts, with the result that three more were lost. Immediately after their fr*' 1W SquadroiC led by K A. Maokay and Captain Home-Hay, went to attack the factories and sidings at Saar left, at 8 o'clock. One pilot shut off Ws engine at SCOOft and glided in on the tar? get from the north-west, following the river Hβ was at once picked up !md £ eld beams of Jfce. searchlights, and an intense anti-aircraft barrage was pnt up The machine continually changed its course, but could not shake off the searchlights and the. pilot was completely blinded bv the At .this moment the second machine glided in, with its engnio almost stopped underneath the first machine, got immediately over the works, below the tops of the factory chimneys, and released its bombs right into the works. The searchlights at once turned on to this machine, freeing the first one from the clare. This machine then turned, and made straight for the works as low as the second machine amonjr the chimneys, and released its bombs The lights were turned almost horizontally to the ground, ami the anti-aircraft guns were firing .right across the works and factories almost horizontally. But in spite of this our two machines remnined at a low altitude, and svjept the factories, works, guns, and searchlights with machine-gun fire! They returned in a heavy thunderstorm. On the night of _ September 16-17 sewn Handley-Page machines were missing. Five of these, detailed for Cologne and" Mannheim, were probably unable to return in the face of a strong south-westerly wind, which increased after the machines had left the ground. The missing machines un« donbtedly attacked various objectives before they had to land. On September 25 r7o. 110 Squadron, led by Captains A. Lindley and A. C. M. Groom, rlroppod over a ton and a-half of bombs on Frankfurt. TVy were opposed by a larjre mnr/ber of hostile machines, and destroyed two of them. Four

of our machines did not retain, and, in addition, one observer was killed and one observer and one pilot were -wounded. This was the first long-distance raid carried out by this squadron. The average time taken by each machine of No. 55 Squadron in an attack on Frankfurt was five hours and a-half, but all 12 machines reached their objective and returned safoly, only just clearing- the trenches on the return, as the petrol had completely run out. Most of the bombs dropped by these machines burst in the town oast of the goods station, and only ono observer was killed. Captains B. J. billy and D. R. G. Maokay were in command.

t General Trenohard gives numerous other instances of magnificent work carried out by tho I.A.F. in the space of these five months.