NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17317, 17 May 1918, Page 5

NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Bt Shbapnel,

) TI IE FACTORS OF VICTORY. I auses between battles on the vast scale involved in major engagements with millions of men in tho opposing aj-mies, aro necessarily prolonged when tho terms upon which tho lighting takes place are anything lilvo equal. When a great plan of action is pcrfectcdi, and the struggle entered upon, and when that plan is upset by a dccided and powerful check, the machinery is not only thrown out of gear, but has been badly damaged, both by wear and tear and by the destructive agencies of tho enemy machino which opposes the designs of tho attacking armies. To reorg.ini.so tho plan of operations and repair tho damage requires a vast amount of thought, calculation, and labour. Moreover, tho renewal of tho attack is made moro difficult by tho fact that tho army which has administered tho check is always left in tho better position and in a better state of organisation. Otherwise this army could not have brought tho opposing forces to a standstill, unless, in tho courso of action the attacking armies had to a dangerous degree exhausted their reserves of men and! material. Ilio delay of the German renewal of the offlensivo is therefore due either to exhaustion or to the failure of tho plan of operations, or to a combination of theso causes, and it seems safo to say that tho interaction of both factors has upset the German time-table, and spoiled tho great and long and carefully prepared plan of campaign. Probably this plan was being matured for over a year, and was in tho minds of the General Staff of the enemy before agents brought about the political confusion and military death of Russia. Tho Allies' strategy is simplo because Germany must continue to attack, as she cannot wait, timo being against her. Allies have simply to await all attacks. Iheir chief anxiety is to protect their main lino of communications along a narrow basal area. Tho forces and machinery of warfare being about equal on both sides, each must trust to consummate generalship and local tactical advantages along the lines that bear the stress and strain of action. Behind tho British is a constricted base area, which has the great disadvantage of being over twice as long as it is broad, l'urther, tho pressure of the enemy is being exerted along tho front of greatest length, and if this were badly pierccd and broken the Germans would bo enabled to pen up and destroy a greater or less part of tho Allied forces in a portion of tho constricted rear positions. As tho Germans came near to tho accomplishment of their designs in mileage, the bait remains very alluring to them, but, measured by events and achievements, with the consequent losses inflicted by the Allies, and with those yet to como, as long as tho Allies made no mistakes, tho distance to tho main objective of tho enemy—the coast and the important ports-is illimitable. With our armies as determined a s they are that tho Germans shall not pass, and with tho timo that is being allowed them to consider tho situation and increase their machinery of defence and reserves, it may bo said that tho horizon which the Germans aro seeking is now continually receding moro rapidly than it is being approached.

ACTIVITIES ON THE LINE.

Official reports to-day do not in what they describe give an indication that the Uermans are ready to attack any particular sector. Sir Douglas Haig's report contains little of moment. A German raid northward of Lens was repulsed, and on the Lys front, north-east of Robecq, the British made a successful raid. Enemy artillery was active at night time in the Somme and Ancre Vulleys, and in tho Lys salient on tho front, and on the southern ilank.. Night action by tho German gunners is indulged in to prevent supplies and reliefs being sent to tho front trendies, and is either an attempt to mislead the Allied ■fcield Staffs, or is really intended to keep tho lino weak on tho 6ector shelled in order to render an attack with infantry less costly. By shelling both arms of the Lens-Arras salient the Germans are making a pretence that the straightening out of tho line between the Lys' salient and the Albert front is one of tho cards which they intend to play. Their purpose is to keep tho Allied command guessing. The work of clearing the British from Lens and Arras is undoubtedly a very necessary operation to obtain a piano front facing the costal area between Amiens and Nieuport, but it is very doubtful, in view of tlio losses that the undertaking would involve, whether tho Germans really intend to make the effort. Increased activity south-westward of Morlancourt is part of the intended or pretended scheme for straightening out the German battle line. A French communique says thero is intermittent artillery bombardment on the Grivesnes sector, and that enemy assemblages and convoys in the region of Montdidier and along the Noyon-Guiscard road were dispersed. In this message there is information that is more significant. If convoys and concentrations are bcinf observed on that front, it is fairly ccrtain that tho enemy aro preparing to attack along that line. Heavy rains have fallen on the battlefields, and converted the Somme battlefield into a quagmire. As the country behind tho German lines is covered with shell holes filled with water, and streams have been diverted and drainage obstructed, the Germans must be employing a great deal of labour and energy in constructing lines of communication for heavy traffic. Only by employing huge numbers of men on tho roads and railways can they complete their arrangements to renew the offensive, and as Mr Philip Gibbs observes, tho delay can be understood. Conditions of tho weather and tho terrain are partially responsible for tho postponement. Ho believes that circumstances have postponed the development of tho German attacks, but have not prevented their probability! He says very decidedly that it is now too lato for tho Germans to separate tho British from the French. His reference to the "homogeneous army" under General Foch convoys his impression that unity of command has become of incalculable advantage to tho Allies.