NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17292, 18 April 1918, Page 5

NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

By Sheapnel

OUR RETREAT AND GERMAN TACTICS.

As far us positions aro concerned, tiic nows to-day ia not so 500 a. Following tho announcement of the loss of A'ouve .hgiiso on the northern axm of the new Genna.il salient, have conxo further Adviccs admitting the capture of Bailleul and Wytsohaete by the enemy, and on tho heights north of the ; lino from Neuve Egliso to tho back of Bailleul tho British lino has been bent bade. ora l things are very apparent in tho German tactics: Tho weight of numbers, the use of a great number of trench mortars and machine guns in tho front line, the great concentration of artillery, and the advantage that is taken of low visibility to overwhelm tho British with numbers sent forward under the cover of friendly mists and fogs, which at this time of tho year are prevalent in tho low-lying regions of 1< landers and Northern France. This great uso of trcnch mortals in connection with an advance is a novelty, which seems to have proved effective in shifting the British on tho old Somme battlefield and in tho struggle south and south-west of Yores. Tho uso of those mortars is to keep down the nflo firo of tho British when in intrenched positions, while the German masses are surging forward. Tho number of machine guns whicK the Gel-mans bring forward are used to catch the British when they leave their earthwork positions and to prevent counter-attacks. Tho tactics of the Germans havo evidently been carefully worked out and practised and, their successcs are apparently duo not so much to their numbers as to the manner in which they are using the mechanical adjuncts m tho struggle. Attached to tho German General Staff Headquarters on the west front is a largo staff of experienced meteorologists, whose advice is sought when an attaok is being planned. These weather experts can give a fairly accurate estimate ot what the weather will be from day to day, and as it has 'been frequently menhoned that tho Germans have attacked under tho cover of a mist, it is nlain that after all dispositions for an attack/havo been mado, the storm troops aro moved forward as close as possible to tho British lines whenever it is announced that a oalm day will allow tho mist or . fog to persist for a whole day or a considerable part of the morning. It appears as though the Germans havo stolen a march upon tho Allies in tho development of the application of mechanical devices for attack. It is unfortunato that tho British military authorities havo been compelled by the conditions of tho military industries in America to provide tho American forces with Lewis guns and have been unablo to greatly increase tho number of machine gunners in every battalion in Franco. It is extremely probable that tho difficulty of holding tho lines against the German mass atis due mostly to tho shortage of machino guns. Of the magnificent oourago of our troops thore is no question. They have performed prodigies of valour under tho greatest of disabilities. Those who have road General von Arnhems despatches dealing with the defects in tho German army during the Spmmo victories of tho Allies, will remember how ho .put stress upon tho necessity of having a greater number of machino guns distributed along tho line. His advico has been followed both as to tho number of thoso guns and also in regard to their improvement in the matter of weight.

OUR STRATEGY. The loss of Baillcul, Messines, and the Wyischacto crcst jeopardise tho British position in what is now tho newly-creatcd Ypres salient. Tho salient and tho awkward position of tho British forces /north and east of Ypres have been caused by tho German advance along the ArmentieresBailleul road to Meteren. The capture of the crests at Messines and Wytscliaeto robs tho British of observation between the ridges and tho Lys, thus giving the Germans freedom of movement for thoir guns to tho south and eastward of Ypres, which will soon bo subjected to a very intense bombardment. On tho surface, conditions in Flanders cast of tho Yser look unfavourable, and the British may soon bo compelled to withdraw from tho terrain north and oast of tho Yser. At Moteren and Merris tho Germans arc about four miles from the railway which supplies Ypres, and when they movo forward their heavy field guns' they will bo able to render a long section of that railway useless. Colonel Ropington is right when he says that tho British position is not strategically brilliant, but except at Messines and Wytschaeto the British havo tho advantago of infantry positions. To tho German High Command eo much is at stako that at all costs it must carry out tho present offensive to ends which it has purposed to reach; but owing tq the losses that have been inflicted upon the German forces it will bo satisfied with a partial accomplishment of its designs. No doubt it is already regretting its initiation of the campaign to reach the coast, but this must go on until so mo point of importanco lias been readied which will afford an excuse for breaking off tho attempt either to reach Calais or envelop and destroy the British and Belgian forces. Tho withdrawal of tho Allies from Flanders to tho Dunkirk-Arras line, which would involve the evacuation of Ypres, Flanders, and a small portion of tho northern corner of France, would satisfy tho German High Command and would not greatly harm tho Allies, as long as tho Germans are made to pay a sufficiently heavy prico for their small territorial gains. Since Russia deserted tho Allies so al> jectcdly, the strategy of tho Allies has had to bo modilied. It is not now a question of gaining territory back from tho Germans. That opportunity has passed temporarily. For thiat temporary period tho Allies aro compelled to alnuidtm aggressiveness and fall lxick upon attrition? Our strategy is now to pursue a wax of exhaustion, and, looked at front wliatcvcr point one can view t.ho situation, it appears that tho Germans are playing our game, and thai the offensive has boon imposed upon them. Certainly wo aro thrcatmcd i n tho north un'fch retirement, and tho Gorman advance north of La Bassoo is weakening our positions at Lens and Arras, but it is to be remembered that tho Allies have tho reserve power to reply by means of a oountcroft'ensive, but aro husbanding their forces until the Gorman effort is worn out. In tho meantime it is their policy to stand on tho defensive until assured that tho time is at hand to strike a decisive blow. They can afford to give ground and play their fish for a considerable time, b;caust> thei cannot be defeated by the strength that Germany just now has in «k> field on tho west, front, and, whilo they can replace their losses, Germany cannot do so. Tho Allies know that tho fato of Germany if she pursues the offensive is exhaustion.