NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17273, 27 March 1918, Page 6

NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Bx Shrapnel

THE GERMAN STRATEGY. Sinco the Gormana have begun their offonsivo against tho British, it ibeoomcs necessary to analyse the purpose which is actuating tho German military authorities. In tho first place tho foroo of circumstances may bo found iii tlw> oomlitions within Germany and in tho fact tluit Amcrica must not bo allowed timo to gather her groat strength in Franco wliilo, now that Russia is out of tho -war, Germany conceives thero i 8 a chanco of defeating the Anglo-French anrmios in detail. If tie Germans' hoixi ia to defeat tlicse armiea in detail, the offensive •will be continued against the British becauso as they aro tho stronger, it would, in tho event of their defeat, bo an easior matter to crush tho French. On the assumption that Germany has determined on an effort to destroy the British foroea in Franco by breaking up all their organisations by rapid advances, then Paris is not tho immediato objective, and it is probable, as M. Marcel Hutin says, that if tho Germans roach their objectives in the present battle, they will make tho next great attack on tho Belgians and British in Flanders.

If tho Germans have reached tho line from Pcronn© to Ham, and, since Pargny is mentioned, it is probable that they have, it can not bo said that, in view of tho maguitudo of tho battle, their losses, even if they aro over 200,000, aro excessivo. In two days they advanced 14- miles if they crossed tho Somme Canal. It is believed that their programme was to do 20 miles on the thirdl day, presumably after the advanco commenced, not after the beginning of the offensive by the preliminary bombardments which took place. To exeouto the last stago according to the programme, it would bo necessary far the Germans so to thin out the British lines and reserves that the resistance would be so feeblo as to bo practically no bar to tho time-table speed set out in tho strategical plans of the German General Staff. Since, however, tho withdrawal of the British is steady and tho defence is determined, it is apparent that the third day of the offensive has proved that the Germans have miscalculated. From the end of the second day, it is tho mounting up of their losses that will decide whether thoir offensive has been but a Pyrrhio victory. As the advance from La Fere, St. Qu-en-tin, and Roisel is a strong one, and points either towards Paris or to the project of a douolo turning movement against tho British and French, tho Germans have set out with one or other of three plans in view—one being to taiko Paris, another to roll up the British, and! tho third to roll up the French to the east and force tham to abandon the right bank of tho Mouse. Paris, is, of course, a great lure because its capture would tremendously raise the morale of the German people, and the prospects of loot and prestige would groatly elate them. As Paris is near and the destruction of the British is difficult, and. therefore, in a sense a distant objective, either Paris or tho rolling up of the French is the purpose of the German offensive. If the Germans com© to the conclusion that Paris is not attainable, then they may strike at the French along the Aisne, in tho Champagne, or in Lorraine, or they may undertako any two of those projects simultaneously. If they turn on the British, then it is the German intention to save the situation in the East, where the slowness of - the British progress must in a measure have dleoided the enemy to make a throw tor victory on tho west front. On tho assumption that tho purpose of tho Germans is to carry out a doublo turning movement, involving the destruction of the British power in France, it would be , necessary for them to employ over 2,000,000 troops and tiro greater part of their total supplies of guns and munitions.

Indeed, as the forces even then would be about equal, and as the Germans would have to maintain a .continuous attack in order to annihilate tho British, they would have to employ at least another million men on account of tho advantago the defence has in tho infliction of losses. That would use up two-thirds of the available German forces, and in order to hold the French, the Austrians would be called upon to supply a very large number of men. Whilo tho Channel and the fleet would bo the base of tho British, the task of tho Germans would, as long as the fleet holds control of the North and' British Seas, bo well nigh impossible. The German losses ■would be so great and the time consumed so long that the destruction of the British forces may, as the situation stands, be left out of consideration. Neither can the Germans attempt to roll up and envelop the French while tho British armies remain a highly organised and powerful factor on the northern plains of France. As Germany is after peace because she wants to exploit Russia, Poland, Rumania, Serbia, and Tur key and to wring from those lands tho cost of the war, she must have peace while she is in possession. For that reason Paris may bo said to be her objective. If the Germans can reach Paris with the loss of half a million men, they will consider that the objective reached is cheap at tho price. The probable losses have already been worked out by the German Staff, and in view of the value of the" objective and the ground covered, the German casualties cannot be saidl to bo excossivc. The Germans will endeavour to reach the environs of Paris at all costs, and if their losses have exceeded the estimate, they will bring up their long-range guns and threaten to destroy Paris piecemeal if peaco negotiations are not entered upon. That may bo regarded as their real objective, and the use of the super-gun, of which so much has been heard this week, is to create the terror of frightfulness in a preliminary sort of way.

REASONS FOR CONFIDENCE. There really is nothing in tho situation to cause serious alarm, though the struggle, while it lasts, is of course a critical one. It is better that tho Germans should attack than that the British should attack tkem if a decision is to be reached this year, because the German military authorities for roasons of their own desire it. Their losses on all fronts cannot be less than 250,000 and, provided that tho Allied forces maintain an unbroken front, the enemy's losses, if they continue on tho present scale, will soon be a million, but that is not tho only factor that will bring the present heavy struggle to an end: Fifty German divisions have been already broken and disorganised out of 480, guns are being worn out, communications lengthened, and! ammunition is being used up at a tremendous rate. In tho initial stage of the battle the Gentians, as was expected, took advantage of the low degTee of visibility to mass their guns and troops against tho first lino of tho British defences; but tho weather has now cleared and the British airmen can proceed to work to bomb tho congested lines of communication, the new depots and concentrations, and the more distant railway junctions. All of this will tend to thrown the plans of the Germans into confusion, and to delay their progress, thus giving the British time to organise now lines of defence and erect now lines of barbed wire. Moreover, tho French may intervene to launch an attack, or the British may begin a counter-attack which, i: it is successful, will throw tho Germans into consternation. All that is nccessary is to make the lighting so costly that the Germans will have to pause and consider whether it is not better now that they believe they have impressed the Allies with their might and invincibility to send out tho peace "feelers" which they have up their sleeve, and which at tho first sign of flagging in their armies, they will issue to a world which, they hope, will have been horrified at tho slaughter. With greater advantages and better conditions for victory against tho Italians, the rushing tactics of tho enemy were held up after a time on a weak lino of defence even after tho Italians had lost over a-third of their iguns, audi after their lines had been pierced—a calamity which has not occurred on the west front. There are therefore by analogy—though it is not a strong form of argument—good -grounds for believing the German attacks will soon bo held up by the British. But tho situations aro not exactly parallel. The British are not disconcerted, tho tactics of tho Germans aro those which aro imposed upon them by the dogged persistence of tho British in the war and their , tenacity in the line of battle, and the British have plenty of guns and good country in which to fight and continue tho predetermined tactics of thair strategy. It ,is diSienlt to

imagine that tho Germans ax© going to come out of this struggle stronger in any way than when they entered it, and it can bo soon that they havo yet to meet greater difficulties and sustain greater losses than they can afford, if the war is to bo a prolonged struggle, and, it is also apparent that at tho present rate of losses, the.v will ho unable to continue tho struggle indefinitely. Whilo they grow weaker, and even though tho Allies' losses may be greater than their supply of new men, yet, the AJlies' source of supply being greater than that of Germany, tho disparity of the reiativo strengths of the belligerents must ma-Ice itself dangerously felt on tho German side—and that without counting on tho latent man-power 6till in America. Tho possibility of a gross blunder on tho part of tho Allied generals or of an external factor or circumstance, such as the defection of Russia, is not anticipated in this estimate.

With all tho Allies acting in unison, there is no chance of Germany securing a victory as long aa tho British Fleet maintains watch and ward in tho North Sea, and as long as tho Admiralty has tho means of keeping down tho submarine menace and securing now ships. One of the causes of tho German ofFensivo was the necessity of preventing mon from being withdrawn from Franco for the purpose of "speeding up" shipbuilding in Great Britain, bcoauso Germany recognises that if Britain carries out her shipbuilding programmo, one of the greatest plans of the German strategists— one upon which they were staking their all, namely, the starvation of Britain—will have failed them.

THE ENEMY'S PATH AND PROGRESS.

The object of tho Germans would acem to be to work down tho-valleys of the Somme and the Oiso towards Compiegne, and thence onward to the north of Paris. The enemy's succcsses so far, calculated in mileage, aro: From Marooing to Bapaume, 15 miles o£ country cleared westward of a line from Marcoing to Ilavrincourt, from , east of Epehy and a point westward of Le Catelet, on tho Eoouso, to a point south-west of Bapaumo, 17 miles; and from St. Quontin to Ncsle, 17 miles. Southward of Bapaume tho northern advanec has been increased. Though the progress has slowed down very considerably, it may be said that this is not so much due to tho resistance as it is to tho fact that tho Germans require time to improve their communications and bring up their heavy artillery, ammunition, and other supplies. Tho advantage to the Allies is that the respite will give them time to bring up their reserves and fresh supplies of guns and munitions, audi to organise their resistanco in more substantial manner. If tho progress of the Germans between the Somme and tho Oise is checked, thoy -will probably change front with a half-left turn and attempt to drive the Fronch from tho heights above tho Aisne.

SURVEY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. Most of us who are closely following tin political and strategical developments of tin war are prono to be dumbfounded by tin immense complexity of the situation Everybody is looking for a gleam of blu< in the much-clouded atmosphere. Th< many public references to the submarint campaign and the amount of discussion 01 the subject in the House of Commons ar< generally accepted as indicating the gravit; of the situation which the German sub marine policy has brought about. Up t< the middle of February, and even a littli later, there was hope that the inevitable shortage of the staple products of the land which becomes more and more acute unti harvest time arrives, would produce in Ger many almost insufferable conditions amongs the civilians, and that those oonditiom would affect the German armies. Th< sweeping political and military conquest o Russia, and, it may now be 6aid, also o Rumania, by the Germans has altered thi viewpoint of all students of the war. Ger many will assuredly be able to obtain fron Russia and Rumania enough cereals, mea fats, hides, coals, metals, and mineral oil to make her almost independent of suppliei from the outsido world. Rubber, cotton and perhaps wool to a limited extent ar< what she will lack; but substitutes for then can bo, and havp been, found. It is there fore tolerably certain that Germany- wil now feel more comfortable than she ha: been sinco the check on the Marno and tin inauguration of the British naval blockade That feeling will be imparted to the peopli of Germany and to the armies at the front and the authorities will not fail to mak< the most of their achievements in the bet terment of the conditions, in order to infusi into the peopjle and armies the idea tha the Government direction of affairs is 6( infallible that Germany must conquer ii the end. If the work of the British Navy is lef' Dut of consideration the success of one side or the other depends upon the stamina an< energy of the civil elements of the warrinf nations—upon the intelligence of theii statesmen, —of which determination anc lommon sense are necessary qualities, ant to which. must be added their direction o diplomacy and propaganda work; and lastly, upon the supply of men, money, anc materials for all purposes. Of the powei inherent in the possession of the last-men tioned things there can be no question o: the superiority of the Allies. As for th< ibility to achieve and endure, it must noi be forgotten that long and careful prepara ;ion and specific education for war o: i wholo nation have given Germany greal advantages. Against that may be balancec ;he temperamental doggedness of the Anglo saxon race and the brilliancy and gallantrj if the French, together with their love anc ievotion to their country. The main difficulty with which Greal Britain is faced is the building of ships ir sufficient numbers to counter the inroad: m her mercantile marine made by the Ger nan submarine. When, with the help oi American shipyards and that of neutra ;hipbuilding, the supply of fehips meets all pressing demands, the Empire and the Allies may confidently believe that a greai ;tep has been, made towards victory. A actor so inimical to success as the shortage >f tonnage being removed, there remains >nly the question of man-power, and closely ronnected with this are the action and rection involved in the situation on the >attlo fronts. The Allies wish to maintain ,lie position known in chcss terminology is "check" until America has a coUple of nillion men in France; but as the Germans enow that the continuance of that phase )f warfare ultimately spells certain defeat n France, the first "movo" on the military i ess board has been imposed on the Gcrnaits.

Germany must make a bid for improvement in her position because a greatly protracted war was not what she wanted, and was not what her people were led to expect. By crushing in detail four of the Allies and heavily plundering their countries, 6he has boen aiblo to sustain the hopes and tho will of her own people and those of her Allies. She is now "up against" tho combined strength of tho richest, the strongest, and the most intelligent of her foes, and tho problem now is, Will she bo able to faoe the prolongation of the present titanic struggle, even as partial as it is? If she wants peaco quickly and victory is necessary to secure that peace, she has been forced to undertake a terrible and doubtful task on the west front. If what she gains from Russia gives her a fresh leaso of power to resist without mro"- internal stress, she will fight on t' --«t to hold her position in Russia '-o south-oast. As her outlook politico !1\ : nd economically has improved, it is her policy to fight containing battles in France of greater or less ma,gnitude, while she is preparing to out-general tho Allies in the East.