MR CHURCHILL DEFENDS IT

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16946, 7 March 1917, Page 5

MR CHURCHILL DEFENDS IT

Australian and N.Z. Cable Association. LONDON, March 5. (Received March 6, at 6 p.m-) Brigadier-general H. Page Croft urged the War Office to look ahead. It would be a tragedy if the offensive failed owing to lack of men.

Mr W. M. R. Pringle moved a reducw °£i, vote b y £100 aHe urged tQ e War Office to make the utmost possible use of the existing figures* He described the balonika expedition as a wasteful one, involving an unwarranted call upon shipping-

Mr Winston Churchill said the Salonika expedition was closely associated with the tonnage a,nd man-power problems. We might have provided an army early in the war capable of decisive results in the Balkans, but .when Bulgaria entered Germany obtained a route to Constantinople because it was impossible for us to cany thither an army of sufficient size. It should have been recognised that the hour for successful intervention in the Balkans had passed. When the expedition s history was told it woidd be found full of unsuspected tangles and complications, but it must be remembered that the expedition was still there. It involved obligations of honour, apart from military considerations. We needed an increase in the army in the Balkans simultaneously with our tonnage steadily decreasing'. Ine problem was one of the greatest complexity, and gravity. The Entente Powers must consider M. Venizelos's claims which an honourable Government could not brush aside. Mr Churchill advocated a secret session, enabling the frank discussion of such matters. India's assistance, coupled with the extent to which India was yet able to supplement our man-power, were important points. Ihe policy of the India Office had the effect of largely shielding India from the sorrows of war. India's enormous manhood had been practically untouched. (Received March 6, at 9.55 p.m) Mr Churchill continued: If the Secretary of India a year ago had endeavoured to raise half the divisions which he (Mr Churchill) then advocated it would have released probably 80,000 British soldiers in Egypt and Salonika for the west front and Mesopotamia. He complained of the inadequate use of African man-power, and pointed out'that although great masses of British cavalry were maintained in France only one- squadron had found an opportunity for tactical use in 1915. Mr Churchill said he hoped the Government would not commit the armies to a vast policy of attrition unless it was absolutely certain that we could pursue the policy to an effective conclusion. It would be foolish not to prepare for a 1918 campaign, and .unless it was possible to strike a decisive and final blow it would be better to patiently develop our superior resources until that was possible. We had no right to count upon events turning immediately and decisively in our favour We ought tc use

THE WHOLE WORLD'S MAN-POWER that of every race and every clime, for lighting and behind our lines. We must use the highest forms of machinery, it would be fatal to withdraw skilled workmen from factories for the trenches We could make certain of 1918; there was still time for that.

Mr J. I. Macpherson, Under-Secretary fot the War Office, replying to Mr Ohurchill, said, the Salonika expedition involved lngh policy, and he could not reply to the questions, which should not have been raised except in a secret session. A strong case was made for a secret session when the Government was pressed to disclose its high policy. (Received March 6, at. 10.5 p.m.) Mr Macpherson said he hoped for a laree increase of men from all parts of the Jimpire.

Mr Bonar Law said it was impossible to dicslose the Government's intentions regarding Salonika or discuss the merits of the expedition. The policy must not be dictated by British brains alone; thoy must act m concert with their allies. If the expedition were abandoned Greece would be thrown onen; the whole of the Balkans would pass into the enemy's hands, .and our Balkan supporters be placed at the mercy of our enemies. We knew how they would be treated He was unwilling to consent to a secret session unless there was a strong demand for it. The Government could" not frankly discuss the Salonika question, even in a secret session. He personally recognised the disadvantages of the expedition." The Government was fully aware of all the circumstances. Ho was sorrv that he cou d not say more. There had been difficulties becanse those of our allies who were particularly interested in Greece and the Balkans had not always taken ' the same view regarding the policy, but now there was

A COMMON POLICY, who*e main object was to ensure that we should not run the former risk of being attacked from behind even the German advance. He thought that was a tr rea t step.—(Cheers.) No threats had been°used to induce Rumania to enter. He did not think, because Rumania's entry had proved so disastrous and had resulted in Rumanian suffering, which the Entente would have dono anything to prevent that there was any reason to condemn the Entente.