THE OTAGO DAILY TIMES MONDAY, JULY 17, 1916. GERMAN POLICY BEFORE THE WAR.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16748, 17 July 1916, Page 4

THE OTAGO DAILY TIMES MONDAY, JULY 17, 1916. GERMAN POLICY BEFORE THE WAR.

Fon a/ revelation of the secrets of German policy prior to the war we shall undoubtedly havo to wait until long after tho termination of hostilities, if indeed we may expect evento get it. Certain it is that while the war is in progress there will bo no disclosures of tho inner workings of German policy to which any value may be attached. Prince von Bulow, whose book on German policy has now been published, has not given away any secrets in letting it be known that Germany adopted a plan of dissimulation with Great Britain until it was believed by her that her fleet was strong enough to enable her, as he himself puts it, to " venture upon a war with Great Britain in high spirits." As a matter of fact, however, it is a meie pretence, employed to cover a disastrous blunder in German diplomacy, that the German Empire entered "in high spirits" upon tlio present war with Great Britain. The hopo was that Great Britain would maintain her neutrality—partly, no doubt, because it was anticipated that civil disorders in Ireland would put it out of the question for Great Britain to participate in the Continental conflict, and partly, perhaps, as Mr Austin Harrison has suggested, because it was assumed that a Liberal Government in the United, Kingdom would be disinclined to enter upon a first - class war. If the war lords in Germany had been apprehensive of the intervention of Great Britain, they might have hesitated before they arrived at the fateful decision which has resulted in Europe being drenched in blood and in two other continents* being visited with the horrors of warfare. Yet if Mr -Robert Donald, editor of the Daily Chronicle, who has probably not written without authority on the subject, has furnished an accurate versiok of the course of A'liglo-Ger-man negotiations in 1912, the intentions of Great Britain were clearly enough indicated tq Germany. Mr Donald's communication, which appeared in a Swiss paper, throws a fresh light upon those negotiations and is rendered of special interest just now by reason of the fact that the Duke of Buccleugh last week in the House of Lords asked Viscount Haldane to explain his past conduct in "deceiving Great Britain regarding the German danger." The policy of Germany in 1912 was to weaken, if possible, the "entente" between Great Britain, France; and, Russia. In these circumstances an intimation was conveyed from her to Great Britain that it would be very acceptable to the authorities in Berlin if a responsible representative of the British Government were sent there to discuss the question of the relations between the two countries. Mr Donald suggests that Lord lialdane was selected as the plenipotentiary both because He was Minister of War at the time and also because he is a great German scholar, and was, therefore, better able than any of his colleagues to appreciate the German mentality and to read the German atmosphere. Lord Haldane has, since that visit, been one of the bitterly abused statesmen of Great Britain. It has been alleged against him that he should have warned the British Government that the intention of Germany was to plunge Europe into war. It has also been charged against him, to some extent on the basis of his own ill-advised, statement that Germany was his " spiritual home," that he allowed himself to be deceived by the statesmen of that country concerning the policy they were prepared to adopt. These two lines of criticism are in a certain measure mutually destructive, and it may be that neither of them is wholly justified by the incidents of the mission.

According to Mr Donald, Lord Haldane discussed the question of British and German relations with tho Kaiser, the Imperial Chancellor, and Admiral von Tirpitz, and in these interviews maclc it perfectly clear that no discussion could take place about Anglo-Gorman relations except on the basis that the British entente with France and Russia had to remain undisturbed. The object which the British Government had in view was to preserve in the most complete form tho entente with those two countries, and at the same time to lessen the tension between Germany and them and improve British relations with Gerplanv. Lord Haldane endeavoured —and the attempt was renewed by the British and German Foreign Offices after his return to England—to arrive at a formula which would determine the attitude of Great Britain toward its allies and Germany in the of a European war in which Germany was not the aggressor. Lord Ilaldane made it quite clear, and Sir Edward Grey's statements and suggested formula? confirm it, that Great Britain would not stand aside and see France crushed, and that she would regard the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany as a cause for war This was'to bo her attitude in the event of Germany not being the aggressor. In the case of Germ my being the attacking party the pHioy of Britain was perfectly plain—she would support her allies. Mr Donald states further that Lord Haldane indicated to Germany that if she continued her " big navy" policy, which was obviously required for" the purpose of attack and not /defence, Groat Britain would lay down two keels to one-, and that tho action which Great Britain would take in the case of a European war was made perfectly plain to Germany.