HOW BALKAN POLICY FAILED

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16589, 12 January 1916, Page 8

HOW BALKAN POLICY FAILED

In Australia the' war is looked upon with tho directness and clearness characteristic of the Australian (writes the Sydney Sun's special representative in London, under date November 12). But hqre there have been so many generations of Compromisers that mental vigour and precision are not readily applied. What public men wish Australians to be told is the story of their difficulties. Certainly these have been great. There have been the conflicting interests of the Allies, the delicacy of neutrals, and the smouldering fires of civil strife at home. In the early days we had to submit to French control in tho field, for France was tho military nation, we the sea power. We had to succour Russia in her blackest hours, when tho bottom micht easily have fallen from tho Entente. .Wchave had to finance all Allies. France alone hae had four hundred million pounds, mostly in munitions, coal, and goods. We arc financing Italy, and have had to agree to respect her ambitions in the Mediterranean—ambitions I liave heard described as "making tho Adriatic a sort of Italian pool." Above' all, there have been tho difficulties of raising and equipping new armies of millions of men, and of securing co-ordination iu their use in tno various fields. But no explanations of past failures can be accepted until assurance is given that past mistakes will not bo repeated. And this is just what wo are not yet getting. Tho best instance I can give is that of the Balkans. Soon after Italy declared war against Austria, definite plans were formulated for Rumanian and Bulgarian intervention. I can say definitely that Bulgaria and Rumania were prepared to enter the war against Turkey, and Greece would undoubtedly have followed their lead. Bulgaria was to have Adrianople and the Saros seaboard. Ferdinand was to lead tho Allied armies against Constantinople, a;id was to remain in control there until the fato of tho city was decided by mutual agreement after the war. Ho was immensely flattered by tho prosnect, and thought his chances good of becoming a real Czar. Rumania was to have Translvvania and Bessarabia. Details were fully worked out, plans were prepared. a beginning was made with the concentration of ammunition. But nt the last moment Russia declared she could make no such substantial concc<?«ion« to Rumania, and tho whole projcct, was waived. Russia now bitterly repents her decision, and has already had to give part of her Brsearabian territories to her "neighbour. The case is striking, because it illustrates the absolute, necessity of a great supreme War Council of all tho Allies! which in such matters could bind all to a single-minded, firm policy. Y';t we' have no assurances that the same mistake will not bo made again, and we have only idle talk amongst the leaders of some Allies' War Council hastily projected for some unknown distant date.