NOTES OH THE CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16589, 12 January 1916, Page 5

NOTES OH THE CABLES.

Br Shrapnel.

MR ASHMEAD BAIITLETTS CRITICISM. One would think, from hia unstinted condemnation of seemingly all that Sir lan Hamilton did at Gallipoli, that Mr Ashrnead Bartlett, if not a now Daniel come to judgment, is the only man, having been there, whose opinion should be accepted. The questions Mr Ashmead Bartlett asks and the statemente he has made condemn Sir lan Hamilton, not only for his methods of attacking, but for making an attack. As regards the latter fact, it is to be presumed that the British military authorities did not 6end Sir lan Hamilton to Gallipoli to twirl his thumbs. Sir lan Hamilton was not sent out to Gallipoli to report whether the operations were feasible. He was sent, like many another British officer has been sent, to do tho impossible with insufficient forces. He simply attempted what he was expected to do, and failed; but as to whose fault it was that the final attack was unsuccessful, that has yet to be settled'. Sir lan Hamilton being chief in command, has the right to say, and should know what acts or conditions assisted in rendering his plans useless. Mr Ashmead Bartlett inferentially condemns the publishing of Sir lan Hamilton's report, and proceeds to pile Ossa on Pelion in adding controversial fuel to the publicity. Mr Ashmead Bartlett seems to be keen to jump again into the limelight with his opinions, and that after saying he would have preferred to read Sir lan Hamilton's unabridged story. As a journalist, Mr Ashmead Bartlett has a perfect right to analyse and criticise in the press of Britain any work that is of public and national interest, but the question in the minds of some of his readers is, "Is he qualified to judge the work of a man who is known to hold a high placo as an exponent of the technicalities in tho theory and practice of war?" Sir lan Hamilton's life since his boyhood days has been spent in the study of his profession. Ho has seen much active service, and was an attache with the Russians during the Russo-Japanese war. He should', therefore, be better qualified than Mr Ashmead Bartlett to judge what was possible at Gallipoli In his references to the bungling at Suvla Bay, Mr Ashmead Bartlett, referring to the fibre of the troops and the nature of tho country, is on good ground in his criticism, but when he says: "Apart from all other considerations, it had not been sufficiently established that possession even of the Anafarta Hills and Eojachemin Tepe would have forced tho Narrows or cleared the road to Constantinople," he is on debatable ground. How could Sir lan Hamilton, except by taking those hills, find any road to tho Narrows? The operation was a flanking movement against the powerful fortress of Achi Baba and the plateau behind it, and it was unquestionably a much better plan of reaching the Narrows than that of reaching them from Cape Helles. Critics sometimes are guilty of the faults they see in others. It is difficult to criticise without laying one's self open to tho fire of others. Take the argument in the second paragraph reported in the cables: — " Tho Sari Bair operation failed because it was an operation which should never have been undertaken under such conditions and in such country. It was sheer nonsense to represent tho strategic plan as having almost succeeded. The Anzac troops had suffered 12,000 casualties without attaining their objective. A few Ghurkas reached the summit of Chunuk Bair and Kojachemin Tepe, which was only tho lower slope leading to Sari Bair; but the losses were so terrible that, even supposing the troops had reached the top, it would have been utterly impossible to maintain themselves." The losses sustained by the Anzac troops were for the most part due to the fact that their flank was left "in the air" by the failure of tho Suvla Bay troops to reach their objectives, and the Anzac troops were peppered with shrapnel from Mount Turchen Keni, and tho ridges above Kuchuk Anafarta, both of which tho troops under General Stopford failed to reach. It is known that those troops were halted, and 11 precious hours of darkness were lost in that halt, which gave the Turks time to rush up a largo body of troops, hold the ridges and slopes with a few, and concentrate their fire and repeated attacks upon Sari Bair until most of the Sari Bair troops were wiped out. The losses of the Anzac troops would have been comparatively light had tho Suvla Bay troops taken the ridges of Turchen Keni and those near Kuchuk Anafarta before the Turkish reinforcements came up. Probably many other arguments of Mr Ashmead Bartlett could be likewise confuted. There seems to be a modicum of vitriol in his criticisms, as far as they are reported, since they seem to bo hotly directed against Sir lan Hamilton.

BULGARIA LONESOME AND AFRAID. Tho Parisian piper Lo Temps is of the opinion that the attack against Salonika will not oome off. Yesterday's cables said that the enemy's forces wero advancing from Doiran. and Ghcvgeli. It is quite possible for Bulgarians and Austro-Germans to advance a small distance from those towns and yet not oome within rango of tho guns of the Allies. Doiran is five miles from tho Anglo-French trenches at Kilindir, and between the two towns hills intervene. The same may be said of Ghcvgeli, which is 10 miles from the lines outside Karasuli, and the railway between these two towns has been destroyed. Le Temps says the number of AustroGermans has been over-estimated. That is not unlikely. The numbers given wero four divisions. Tt is probable that the Germans would have been in greater numbers, but, after conquering Serbia, three difficulties cropped un: (1) Tho Bulgarian people and part of tho army beganvto be restive, and many Germans wore sent to different points to police the country. (2) In order to overawe Rumania, a groat number of Austro-Germans wero concentrated at Rnstchnk. (3) According to the Petrograd communiques, von Mackcnsen and several divisions have been withdrawn to meet the Russian offensive. Soon after the subjugation of Serbia it was apparent that the Bulgarian Government would have joyfully made peace with tlio Allies; but the Germans, acting in conjunction with tho shifty King of Bulgaria. are tho real rulers of the country, and they have suppressed all the Bulgarian army officers who showed the faintest signs of disaffection ant! pro-Russian leanings. The civilian population ifl afraid of the German officers and their co-adjutors amongst the Bulgarians. One serious defeat near Salonika would produce seething discontent throughout the greater part of Bulgaria, and might,, indeed, turn the feeling into open hostility and create a revolution Tho condition of tho Bulgarian armed strength has been more than once described, and it is questionable whether Bulgaria cculd stand for three months against attacks powerfully made by the Allies. Salonika is safe, both on account of its natural defensive positions and on account nf the inherent, weakness of Bulgaria and the disinclination of the Bulgarians to meet the well-armed forces of the Allies. They will get the surprise of their lives when they do. Now is the time for tho Allies ;,o lay Bulgaria prostrate, as she kid Serbia. By at once attacking Bulgaria the Allies ?ou!d destroy all the projected enterprises if the Turks and Germans. The most economical defence of the British positions at Sue:: and in Mesopotamia lies in a great offensive against. Bulgaria from Salonika nnd tho various jositions and the port of Kavala. to the ?a-st, near the Bulgarian border. The longer he Allies delay tho more time will the German officers have to organise the deences of Bulgaria and make arrangements o bring in large Turkish forces, in spite >1 the hostility of the inhabitants. .

KUT-EL-AMARA VICTORY. The good news of the day is that of a British-Indian victory at Kut-el-Amara, on 1 the Tigris. The Turks were engaged in an attempt to surround Genera] Townahend's forces at Kut The enemy formed a eemi- ■£ circle round the British, who held the ' town, which, being in a large bend of the river, was easily defended by the troops and the gunboats on the river. The Turks tried to rest their left Sank on tho river - to the south of the town, bat the troops \ and the gunboats prevented that. The s enemy forces on the right bank did not seriously affect the position. However, the reinforoements whioh relieved General Townshend marched up both sides of the river, and the weak forces on the south side were easily defeated. On the north side the left flank of the Turkish forocs being attacked in the rear, in front, and by / tho boats on the river, was roiled tip, and a general attacte followed, whioh ended in a rout of tho Turks. Whether General Townshend will again advance upon Bagdad depends on the state of the ground, since heavy rains have fallen, and especially upon Iho strength of the reinforcements whioh have arrived. A 8 - paid before, it will bo found that tho Tnroo- i Germans will probably give more attention ? j to repelling thi3 advance than they will to ' attacking the Suez Canal, whioh is easy to defend with comparatively small land forces, assisted by cruisers and torpedo -f boats. General Nixon has been in ill- -t health for some time, and his recall waa * to be expected.