ANTI-ZEPPELINS.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16577, 28 December 1915, Page 6

ANTI-ZEPPELINS.

LONDON'S DEFENCE. THE SIGHT-SEEING COCKNEY. (From Ouh Own Cohiiespondent.i LONDON, October 22. Since tho last Zeppelin raid there has been a shower ot questions in the House of Commons demanding to know who was responsible for tho defence of London against aircraft, and what steps aro being taken. Tho worn-out query, Why didn't our aeroplanes got on to them? was revived, and Mr Balfour gave tho answer which has long been obvious to persons who know anything of the natural history of the bat. the ground beetle, and the dragon fly. " The degree to which it is desirable to use aeroplanes for night defences against Zeppelins," he said, "is a very difficult question. But under no circumstances do the authorities, consider that an adequate defence against night attacks by Zeppelins can be provided by aeroplanes. As regards the action of aeroplanes on tho 13th, the weather conditions in London rendered it impossible for any large number to go up." Mr Balioar denied that the night was clear, and, in view of the experience gained by the night patrol of the air—balloons, airships, and aeroplanes,—he ought to know. He says there were no clouds high overhead ; the stars could be seen, but it was not clear down near the ground. As for our gun defences, he says that the guns' crews work for 24 hours every other day, , and arc paid 4s 2d per day, finding their own food and lodging. The searchlight crcws work from dark to daylight every ! other night, two crews dividing the night, and are paid 2s Id per day, finding their own food and lodging. The officers go through a short course at a gunnery school, and men from the guns are now being sent to Chatham Gunnery School to be trained. Arrangements are also being made for men to be sent for tra ning to the British Army in .France. Experienced naval ratings _ are attached to the gun and searchlight stations, and the question of employing artillery officers who have been wounded and incapacitated for the field campaign is being considered. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RAIDS. As for the more persona! side of the question as it affects the public, Sir John Simon said plainly that the curiosity of the public overcame any fear of injury, and this really made the difficulties of protecting them greater than would otherwise be the case A lot had been said about giving the public warning of coming raids. " Let mo say at once," declared the Home Secretary, "that my anxiety in it is not that London will become panic-stricken. Nothing is more remarkable, nothing is more worthy of praise, than the consistent coolness with which the population of the metropolis has taken the visits of these aerial strangers when they happen ",o drop in. That is not really the difficulty. It must not be supposed that when the authorities first have reason to think that there may be a Zeppelin attack they are in a position to assert that there is going to be a raid in the London area. The first news is news of the presage of these Zeppelins, it may be across the North Sea, or across what I believe some people used to call the German Ocean.—(Laughter.! It has constantly happened that Zeppelins have been out for a nocturnal airing of that sort, and have never got inland at all, and it has constantly happened that they do touch some portion of the coast of this land, they have wandered about in a perfectly aimless way and dropped iheso destructive bombs on various agricultural areas, or sometimes, whether by accident or design, on perfectly innocent people in various provincial towns and villages. EARLY PRECAUTIONS. "If you are going to give warnings to the public, you must face this, that nine times out of 10—i just choose a round •figure—l do not know whether I shali express it rightly when I say the public will be disappointed.—(Laughter.) As soon as it is known that there may be an attempt, and long before it is known with any certainty mat London is going to be the objective, steps are taken in order, that all possible observation shall be kept by those whoso duty it is to keep that observation on the different areas of the coast. If they reach the coast, steps are at once taken so as to control the railway traffic '.n the area affected in order to reduce 1 to a minimum the risk of trains acting as guides to this place or that. Arrangements are made in advance to do this in such areas as are material to the purpose for checkmating the invader. It may be that at a later stage some better and more • ertain judgment can be formed as to whether the London area is likely to be reached. This sometimes happens and sometimes it does not. At a suitable moment the special constables are warned. _ The system by which we secure the services of doctors in London at different suitable points is also put in motion. You cannot tell what portion of the London area is likely to be attacked, for the best of all reasons, that the Zeppelin itself has not the remotest idea, and we have strong reason for believing that it has not only no idea in advance !. ut a very hazy idea after the event. It is better not to make a preliminary announcement at large to the public, for instance, by the ringing of church bells or the sounding of a hooter. I cannot imagine a oetter guide for a Zeppelin wandering about the flats in Essex or about Epping Forest than suddenly hearing the unanimous chorus of all the church bells and steam whistles of the metropolis.—(" Hear, hear.") " I said that it was not panic which disturbs us. After all,- if you do tell the men and the women and children of the metropolis that it may be that in ther ouise of an hour or two hours' time we shall be honoured with a visit from a Zeppelin, what is it exactly which the men, women, and children are expected to do? If those who conduct these invasions were careful to do no damage to civilian life, if they really were prepared and were able to take precautions not to strike private property, it would be a very reasonable tiling to secure that everybody went home. But our own experience goes to show that the Zeppelin does not pay the slightest attention to things of that sort. Supposing you tell the population of London that there might be a Zeppelin coming, I cannot help suspecting that what most of them would do would bo to go out into the streets and have a look at it. It is an instance of the coolness and courage and of the contempt with which the Londoner regards these dastardly outrages. But that does not assist to protect lives of Londoners. THE DANGERS OF WARNINGS. " A very substantial proportion of the casualties, both fatal and otherwise, have occurred in tho streets, and you will observe that all these attacks occur at night, and at a time when the larger part of the population would naturally be under cover. That goes to show that the probable consequence of telling everybody that there may be a Zeppelin to-night would not reduce the number of people suffering injury. I thought at one time that it might be desirable that we should arrange with the theatres that in certain events they should bo warned of this possibility. But it is questionable what the effect would be on a theatre audience. I heard of a case the other night—it was a kinema—where there was some such intimation given, and afterwards one or two persons present bitterly complained that having paid their money they wanted their money's worth. A great many more people thought tho alternative attraction was too good to be' missed, and promptly went into the streets. If there is an immediate risk of a Zeppelin attack in the London area we stop the trains, and the result would be that if you were able to warn our peaceful population, a large proportion of them would assemble at the termini of the railway stations. The trains could not run out, and you would have a groat collection of people under another route, which, if the enemy naid any regard to ordinary military considerations, would bo a more suitable object for his attention than a theatre or music-hall. Our experience is that, on the whojo, it is better not to attempt to warn people of the suggested approach of tho Zeppelins. Tho publie mmt therefore understand that they must, really take their own risk if they chooso to go to places whore a number of people are assembled together at night, and they wil 1_ be able to estimate the extent of that, risk, and I have no doubt that I they will act in this matter reasonably and fnirlv. This is a matter in which the man in the street is very naturally and closely concerned. There aro some areas and towns in. England where the alternative policy has been tried, but in one such area the number of false alarms that have been given has produced a very great deal of consternation and disappointment., and thetotal result, to say the least of it, is extremely doubtful from tho point of view of promoting public security and safety. Nobody can feel moro keenly than tho Government do the seriousness of the individual traged'es which have been created by these horrible attacks, but just as it is the determination of our people to carry this war to a victorious conclusion, so this is, after all, an incident, though a very grave incident, which we at home have got to bear, and which is small in comparison with the daily and nightly risks run by our heroes in the fields of battie." j —'Cheers).