NOTES ON THE CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16577, 28 December 1915, Page 6

NOTES ON THE CABLES.

By Shbapnel. ! ■ IS A GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE INTENDED? Tho references to a projected German offonsiva on the western front have of lato been so frequent in one form or tho other that they cannot be disregarded. Most of the reports, it is true, have oomo by way of Amsterdam, and Genova, and any information that filters through Holland and Switzerland is. generally treated with suspicion. No ono knows whether or not tho reports aro the outcome of disinterested observation. The Germans have reduced the principles of humbug to almost an exact =cionce, and it is difficult to determine how far they aro carrying on tho trick of bluff. Several times during tho past five months wo have heard of tho closing of tho Dutch and Swiss borders; but no one has yet obtained clear knowledge as to why these borders were closed. With regard to tho Dutch border, what takes place along the Aix-la-Chapello railwa}'s is soon knov/n by tho Hollanders, and as, moreover, Holland is overrun with secret agents of the Entente Powers, many things tho Germans do will bo intended to impress and deceive observers. What reasons are there for expecting the Germans to take a fresh offensive on tho western front? In the first place, there are the persistent reports that tho Germans aro making preparations for such an offensive, and to-day there is tho report from Paris that- von Mackensen is in charge of the operations in Alsace. Some time ago it was rumoured that he was to control the Turkish forces' operating in Gallipoli. Perhaps, however, sirco the withdrawal of the troops from Suvla Bay and Anzac, those operations are considered to be too insignificant to call for the attentions of such an able commander. If Marshal-von Maokensen is really being omployed in Alsace, the inference is that he has been put in command there either to drive the French out of Alsace or to break through the Belfort Gap and turn tho right flank of the French forces. If the latter purpose is his intention, then the Germans must be preparing for a serious offensive in France. Such an aim on tho part of the German General Staff would be indicative of a desperate frame of mind. Marshal von Mackensen is an able general but ho has not yet met forces on equal terms. He had the Russians at a great disadvantage all the time in the matter of artillery, munitions, end men. The campaign against Serbia is nothing of which he should be proud. It made no demands upon genius to carry out that conquest, fserbia was a sadly weakened Power when the Germans Istruck her, and it required all the might of Bulgaria's fresh and overwhelming forces to make their task easy. Marshal von Mackensen will find that tho overwhelming of the French is a more difficult problem. It must be apparent to the Germans that they have not tho slightest possible chance of obtaining success in Franco. Consequently that is not what they believe attainable. They know that in order to achieve victory in Franco they would have to increase thcil* forces by at least another million men, and to do that they would have considerably to weaken their eastern front. It is possible that tho Germans may suppose that Russia cannot by any possible means be able to enlarge and restore her present front for another three months. Apart from that supposition, tho Germans may bo relying on the Russians not being aware of the weakening of th 9 enemy lines before them to any serious extent. A second reason for supposing that tho Germans are about to take the 1 offensive is that such a step might prevent the British and French from sending reinforcements to the Balkans. The successcs the Germans have gained in the Balkans and the consolidation of those successes arc now of more value in their eyes than the conquests in France and Russia are. It would take a volume to give the reasons for such an assertion, but those who have a fair acquaintance with the history of the Napoleonic wars know that when Napoleon and Alexander I of Russia arranged the terms of the peace of Tilsit they agreed to carve up Turkey, but when Alexander asked for the possession of Constantinople Napoleon blazed out: "Constantinople! Never! That would be the mastery of the world." In all their policy in this war and in thenstrategy tho Germans-have shown that they are not employing an immaculate genius of their own, but that they are mere copyists of Napoleon's strategy and of hia schemes in regard to an Asiatic Empire. The Kaiser, in pretending to be a believer in Mohammed, is simply copying what Napoleon pretended when he was in Egypt. All through his life, after his first succcsses in Italy and his overthrow of the French Directory, Napoleon's chief and greatest dream was the conquest of Egypt and Asiatic Turkey, both for their military value and as a moans for the destruction of the British power in the East. That is precisely tho dream of the Kaiser and his bureaucrats, and therefore any offensive in the west or attempt at an offensive will merely be to throw dust in the eyes of Britain and her Allies. The offensive may be a big one, but if it is made it will be a case of a great diversion and a hope of great luck. THE SALONIKA SITUATION. The Austro-Germans and Bulgarians are taking a long time to begin their offensive against the Anglo-French at Salonika. It is difficult to eay what is wrong with them, cxcept that at present tho Greeks object to the Bulgarians sotting foot in their territory. It is possible that the ■Germans aro attempting to arrango with the Greek Government a plan of operations that will wean the Greeks from their suspicions of tho Bulgarians. When M. Skouloudis, the Greek Premier, said that treaties are at a discount in tho Balkans he may have had the Bulgarians and Germans in his mind, and was thus in a roundabout way giving the Allies a useful hint. If arrangements with Greece are not a stumbling block in the way of the enemy, then there is no reason ; why they should not advance upon Salonika except that they are afraid to attack without overwhelming forces. Since every day that passes increases the strength of the Anglo-French forces, the Austro-Germans arc either waiting for heavier guns and greater forces before they attack, or else they intend simply to hem in tho Allies with defensive works, while they rush munitions through'to Turkey for tho purpose of arming a million or more Turks for the purpose of attacking Egypt and-driving tho British out of Mesopotamia. Unless the British deploy eastward to Kavala and westward to Vodena, tho Austro-Germans and Bulgarians will have tho great advantage in an attack on Salonika of carrying out a converging movement from Ghevgheli, Monaetir, and Seres. In spite of such a favourable method of operating, tho enemy generals must realise that tho movement will bo costly unless they employ a great number of heavy guns. Moreover, the fear that the attempt to drive tho Anglo-French out of Salonika will take a long time is another consideration. If tiro task should take too long and prove too costly it would destroy tho Austro-Gcr-man influence in Rumania and Greece, give the Russians more time to prepare, and make tho invasion of Bulgaria an easier task for Russia to undertake. On the other hand, if it is the enemy's plan to contain • tho Anglo-French at Salonika, and thus immobilise them, every day that passes will make it more difficult for the Allies to tnko the offensive, for tho country to tho north of Macedonia lend 3 itself to tho formation of strong defensive lines. All that tho Allies can thus hope to do is to hold up a large army in front of them while the Russians land heavy forces on the shores of the Black Sea.