MR CHURCHILL'S RESIGNATION

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16543, 17 November 1915, Page 5

MR CHURCHILL'S RESIGNATION

STATEMENT IN THE COMMONS. DARDANELLES ENTERPRISE ELABORATELY CONSIDERED. LONDON, November 15. In the House of Commons Mr Churchill said he did not receive that clear guidance or firm support .from Lord Fisher which might have been expected.. If he had disapproved of the Dardanelles operations he should have spoken, out in the War Council. [ Mr Churchill claimed that the Darda- ' nelles enterprise was profoundly, maturely, and elaborately considered. The j admiral on the spot said that the Dardanelles could not be rushed, but might be reduced gradually by bombardment, and Sir H. Jackson confirmed this view. Lord Fisher in January deprecated reducing the margin of naval strength in Home waters, but he never criticised the , method of attack at the Dardanelles, and the first stage of the operations was successful beyond all expectations. The. slower march of all the movements was taken with Lord Fisher's written assent. ■ Mr Churchill, who wae speaking from a corner behind the Treasury bench, said the fact that he took no place on the front Opposition Bench did not imply any criticism of those who did. He earnestly hoped to see Sir E. Carson constantly in attendance. In the public interest, someone with complete secret' information and independent of the Government should be available as a .pritic on the front Opposition Bench, and) it was, he thought, Sir E. Carson's war station. He was unable to conceive any reason why the story of the Falklands battle should not be published. Regarding the destruction of the Bacchante cruisers (Cressy, Aboukir, and Hogue), it was not true that he had overruled the naval authorities and that the disaster was due to him. He had no objection to the publication of the papers, but he did not press this if it would injure any officers now serving. THE ANTWERP EXPEDITION. •• Mr ChuTchill continued : The project of sending an army to Antwerp originated with Lord Kitchener and the French Go- . vernment. He was ndt consulted until j large bodies of troops were actually moving. He summoned a conference at Lord Kitchener's house on October 2, when Sir E. Grey and Lord Fisher were also present. He then learned of the project to send a relieving army, also that, after the preparations to aid Antwerp were far advanced, the Belgian Government telegraphed its decision to evacuate the city and abandon its defence. They were all extremely distressed to learn this, as it seemed as though everything would be thrown away for the sake of three or four days' continued resistance.' He accord- , ingly offered, and did' not regret it one bit, to proceed to Antwerp immediately and tell the Belgian Government what, they had done, and to see in what way the defence could be prolonged. His col-' leagues accepted the offer, and he crossed the Channel immediately. Having consulted the Belgian Government and the British staff officers in Antwerp, he made a telegraphic proposal that the Belgians should continue their resistance to the utmost limit and power, and that the British and French Governments should say definitely within three days whether they were able to send relief. Britain was also to encourage the- defenders of Antwerp by sending naval guns and at naval brigade. His proposal was accepted, and he was told that a relieving army would be sent and everything possible done to maintain the defence. It wag a great mistake to regard Lord Kitchener's effort to relieve Antwerp as only Tesulting in misfortune. History would determine that it had resulted greatly to the advantage of the Allies in causing the great battle of the Yser instead of a battle further south. (Received Nov. 16, at 5.15 p.m.) Mr Churchill said it was true that the operations were taken too late, but that was not his fault. On September 6 he directed the attention of Mr Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and Sir E. Grey to' the dangerous situation that was developing at Antwerp, and the grave consequences to the Admiralty interests. He suggested that Territorial divisions should be sent to stimulate the defence, and made other proposals, but no action was taken until the situation of October 2 supervened. He took the responsibility of sending a naval brigade, despite its want, of training; but the situation was desperate, and they weie the only men available. Mr Churchill said he would not have it said that the Dardanelles campaign was a civilian plan, foisted by a political amateur upon reluctant officers. (Received Nov. 16, ut 7.5 p.m.) Mr Churchill said he regarded it as a legitimate w-ar gamble. TJie prize was of inestimable value, which there was a reasonable chance of winning. On that basis he accepted full responsibility. (RUSSIA'S REQUEST. Russia in November asked the Foreign Office whether action against Turkey was possible to relievo the pressure in the Caucasus. In consequence he began to

direct the attention of Admiral Lord Fisher and other naval officers to the possibility of action in Turkish waters. He sent a minute on November 30 to Lord Kitchener, offering facilitiee for the transportation of 40,000 men , and was informed that there was no army available;' Early discussions 'showed that the prevailing opinion was that en?en if a force were available it could not be used in attacking the Gallipoli Peninsula.. As the necessity for action in the Eastern Mediterranean was constantly pressed upon the Admiralty, Mr Churchill said he telegraphed gn January 3 to Admiral Carden and asked him if he considered the forcing of the Dardanelles by ships alone was ai practicable operation. Admiral Carden replied that the Dardanelles could not be rushed, and suggested a sustained bombardment. ' Admiral Carden, in a detailed telegram on January 11, stated his requirements, and the Admiralty War Staff examined the plan. Admiral Sir H. B. Jackson expressed his full concurrence, and "advised attacks upon the outer forts as early as possible. Lord Fisher never expressed any opinion against the operations at this statge. Lord Fisher's memorandum did not question the feasibility of the operation, but deprecated reducing the margin in the Home waters. The first operations produced AN ELECTRICAL SHOCK in the Balkans. When the joint military and naval operations were decided upon, Lord Fisher. regretted the delay and refused to order the resumption of a purely naval attack. ' The period between March 18 and April 15 was one of the; least pleasant experiences in his (Mr Churchill's) .life. He did not regret Lord Fisher's return to the Admiralty, because he produced a new design of ships which swelled the .tide, of deliveries. *Lord Kitchener was responsible for the military operations at Gallipoli, which should have been carried through with the utmost vigour and fury. Throughout the summer the army stood WITHIN A FEW MILES of a great victory. . An advance like that at Neuve Chapelle w,ould have decided the whole situation.

He did not intend to be drawn into any further controversy, whatever might be said in reply. He had left his documents with the Attorney-general. When Lord Fisher resigned he himself offered to resign, but Mr Asquith asked him to continue. We had no reason to be discouraged with the progress of the war. We were passing through a bad time, and it would probably be worse before it was better. It was not necessary to win the war by pushing back the Germans from the territory they now held. While the German line was extended far beyond its frontiers, and military success apparently attended the German arms, Germany might still be defeated more fatally in the second or third year than if the Allies entered Berlin in the first year. The shortage of munitions governed the campaign in 1915; the campaign in 1916 ought to be settled against Germany by the shortage of men. (Received Nov. 16, at 10.5 p.m.) Mr Churchill said that when Admiral Carden was stricken with illness he (Mr Churchill) sent a personal secret telegram to Admiral de Robeck, asking whether he approved of the Admiralty's and Admiral Carden's decision to press the on March 17, and also to say whether in his independent judgment immediate operations were wise or practicable; if not, he should not hesitate to say so; if he agreed with them he should execute them without delay. Admiral de Robeck replied, fully concurring with the Admiralty plans, .and added : " I will attack on the 18th."

Mr Churchill declared that if, in the weeks elapsing between the naval and the militaiy operations, we had known what we now know, he could not conceive anyone would have hesitated to face *the loss of prestige involved by breaking off the Dardanelles attack. He wished to make it clear that he

ENCOURAGED THE WAR OFFICE to the utmost to prosecute the military enterprise, and counselled the Government all through the - yeaT to take Constantinople either by naval or military operations, and to take it quickly while time remained. But the situation was now entirely changed. THE PREMIER'S TRIBUTE.

Mr Asquith said Mr Churchill had dealt with a delicate situation with loyalty and discretion. He had said some things which he (Mr Asquith) would Tather he had not said, and omitted things which would be said hereafter. He had always found Mr Churchill a wise counsellor, a brilliant colleague, and a faithful friend. 9 NOT AN APOLOGETIC SPEECH. A HURRICANE OF APPLAUSE. LONDON, November 15. (Received Nov. 16, at 6.25 p.m.) The House of Commons was crowded. There was no _ demonstration on Mr Churchill's entry, but an encouraging cheer when he rose, and when he ■ concluded there was a hurricane of applause. A number of members on both sides of the House went up and warmly shook hands with him. There was nothing apologetic about the speech, and the references to Lord Fisher were spoken in firm tones of condemnation. GERMAN NEWSPAPER SPECULATIONS. ' AMSTERDAM, November 15. (Received Nov. 16, at 9.40 p.m.) German newspapers ask whether Mr Churchill is to be the only victim. 1 Some .regard his retirement as only temporary.