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NOTES ON THE CABLES.

By Shhapnkl. THE ALLIES'. STRATEGICAL POLICY. There is very little" fresh news from the western front, but the High Commissioner reports that a heavy artillery, duel is in progress all along the front. 1 This heavy bombardment was apparently initiated by the Germans, as it is said that. tlie artillery of the Allies energetically replied by shelling the German trenches. A surprises attack in the Vosges was made by the' Germans, and was thoroughly repulsed. The policy of the Allies in the western theatre' is to maintain a heavy pressure all along the lino, and thereby attempt to confuse the German General Staff as to the point which will be 1 attacked by strong forces. By means of aerial reconnaissances the Allies are " endeavouring to find ' out where the German forces are disposed in the greatest strength. When reliable information has been received ffyom various sources and properly analysed, General Joffre will rapidly make his arrangements for launching another heavy attack. The. allied generals have undoubtedly decided ■when and where they will strike the decisive blow which is to drive the enemy from France and Belgium; but the time is not yet., , i'

In the meantiiiie the immobility that characterises the operations in the west is the great obstacle to the accomplishment of anything in the form of a drive of any sensational magnitude. There is at present small chance of cutting off of 'bodies of the enemy iby enveloping' movements such na took place in South Africa, and such as have taken place, and are still likely to take place, in the eastern theatre. This is owing to the fact . that the present lines are so long that the enemy ; has not had time to settle down after the breach in the first lines of his defence. To make up for the lack of opportunities that are afforded by rapid movements over large areas, the, Allies have adopted the plan of harassing the enemy into making costly counter-attacks. By this means it is hoped that they will exhaust the German reserve strength. This method of warfare leads to a.uniform drain on the forces of both sides, but the advantage to the Allies is that while they have great reserves to draw upon and can both repair their wastage and increase their forces when necessary, the Germans are constantly eating up their reserves.. The rate of life expenditure on both fronts is impairing the resources of the Germans, great as those resources admittedly are. With the Allies' forces • increasing on both the eastern and western fronts at a greater ratio than those of the enemy, and with the number of engagements and the stress of the pressure gradually increasing, it can easily be deduced that Germany's great military strength is now on the downward'grade. Every battle and every counter-attack now rings periodically, as each occurs, the death knell .of the military polyp which has spread its tentacles over Europe arid its secret evil influence and power throughout the world.

While the Allies are -; energetically sapping the Germans' strength in the present autumn campaign, Russia is slowly,' lput surely,'recovering- her giant strength; and has promised that, despite the hard blows she has received, she will allow the flank of the enemy that is exposed to her no respite from her blows. As long as Russia can keep up that active policy it is beyond the powers of endurance" of the Central Powers' to keep up the strug-gle for any length of time on the present fronts. These fronts are too great for Germany to keep supplied with men and materiaLi Consequently, she must shorten her fronts within a very limited period of time. The question is, which front will she shorten first ? The answer is : That front on which the greatest destruction is taking place, and assuredly the great axtillery resources of the Allies oh the weet, together with. the increasing strength of the British army, axe going to try to make Germany, reduce her front in Belgium, and France. Unfortunately for her, when she makes the first" move her armies will be rushed by the victorious British and French forces, and they will endeavour by following closely to prevent the, Germans from again resting until they ate aoross the" Rhine. Disaster awaits the G-erman forces as soon' as they begin to retreat,"' and,* consequently, they must hold tin and be destroyed peacemeal while-they attempt to build .up defences behind their present lines, so thatthey may retreat by 'stages arid avoid the sudden destruction of their forces by death and capture. That system of retreat may present a catastrophe of great magnitude on the fields of battle, but the corollary to that, policy is that, in the end,: Germany will be left with her power for home defence so debilitated or attenuated that the armies of the Allies will meet ,with -little resistance when once , across h£r borders. That ia where the grand strategy of the Germans is at fault. . Orte'of'-their greatest acts of Jolly was their great" advance into Russia. Those victories, : so often acclaimed in have brought about 'the discomfiture of Germany soonej? than was -to be expected. Of course,

the elirrun&tioriof Russia was a goal worth seeking after, but it was a'.gamlbler's throw for -supreme victory, that could only have beep devised aid' hoped for by a nation of extreme egotists. If it were not for the political effect it 'would have had in the Bal-; kiins, it might have been better for to have enticed the Germans further into her .country. • POINTS THAT MAY BE NEXT / ATTACKED,

Many of those who are closely following the stages of the war are wondering where, in particular, General Joffre will deliver his next stroke. No one can say. It may not (be clear even to the general himself. His policy is a definite one, , but that policy has to make his opportunities for attack. He knows exactly where he' would, like to drive a wedge successfully, but he also knows that the enemy's staff understands the werking of his mind,, and thai there are certain advantageous places. :that are equally well known to the master military brains on both sides. There are, however, several .points where strategical advances may be made, and it is General Joffre's policy to pervent a concentration by the Germane at any one where they may take the- offensive at their own will, but to compel .them to act according to his will. He will endeavour to cause the Germans to concentrate where ho does not intend to ■ attack, and then launch an offensive somewhere else, and he has now sufficient forces to attack at more than one point. His next offensive bo on the extreme northern flank, or it may be on the extreme southern one; .but' the latter is not likely to be made in great strength. The region north of Rheims, near Berry-au-Bac, offere a useful point, though it may be somewhat difficult to gain. Once gained, it would be a. position of great advantage for turning the German positions on the Aisne and in the Champagne. Another place is the St. Mihiel salient, which may be attacked either from Les Eparges or from Point-a-Mousson. Etain, north-west of Verdun, offere good results, but it would be dangerous to attempt an advance there while the Germans hold : St. MihieL There are several other places where the French could, make advances, such as Roye, Chaulnes, Peronne, and.. Bapaume, on the line south of Arras, or at Bruisne, on tho' Aisne, between Soiasons and Rheims. It is not unlikely, however, that necessity and the nature of the country may demand that an advance should bo'made in the south of Flanders, and 1 ' between La Baseee and Dixmudc, either into the heart of Flanders or towards Lille. An advance into Flanders might be carried out while .a landing is effected on tho Belgian coast. v- Tho argument against such an- advance as that last mentioned is that it would be very costly to attempt .to drive the Germans out of Belgium by attacks from the west. The country is 'too well supplied with railways and too well roaded. The Germans would bo able to t*hrow reinforcements ' forward with great" celerity. Tho regions • east of. Peronne and •north, of Aisne, between Soiseons and Rheims, would, although the; coun-

try is difficult, offer for the present good results if they could bo reached without too great a cost. BULGARIA. 1 Ferdinand of Bulgaria, it is said, received a shock when the ultimatum from Russia was presented to Him. Ho had no idea that tho perspicacity of the Russians would blast hi 9 intriguing so unceremoniously. Tho Russians saw that iiis vanity was making him a victim of Teutonio trickery and that he was being bound hand and foot by tho numerous German agents and Germanophile sycophants in his Court and in his Government. Ho has been" fairly outmatched by tho Allies and is caught in his toils. He has lost his head, metaphorically, and were it not for his German and military guards thero would bo a good chance of his losing it corporeally. His nation is divided in mind And there are all the signs of a revolutionary spirit among"his people; but, t if the Germans control the army there will, be no revolution unless the army revolts. Thero may even be a possibility of that happening, as many of the older officers haves refused to serve under the Germans. If the ultimatum of Russia gave him a shock, the landing of the forces of. the Allies at Salonika must have given him an additional one. It certainly has surprised the Germans and mostly everyone except, perhaps, the Greeks. The cables published to-day bear out tho line of argument adopted in yesterday's notes that the landing was to assist tho Serbians and, inferentially, the Greeks. It is the intention, it is said, of the Allied troops to hold the railway between Ghenegli and Velles." That part of the railway is rather close to the frontier of Bulgaria, and, if suddenly rushed by the Bulgarians, would cut off the means of quickly assisting ( the Serbians with men and arms. Velles, near Uskub, is about 65 miles north of Ghenegli, and the latter town is about 40 miles north of Salonika,. Salonika is not to be occupied by the Allies. It is to be left free for the Greeks to concentrate for, a move along the iSalonikaDedoagatch railway if necessary. Velles offers the Allied forces a road 'and railway by which to threaten the Bulgarian capital.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ODT19151007.2.56

Bibliographic details

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16508, 7 October 1915, Page 6

Word Count
1,770

NOTES ON THE CABLES. Otago Daily Times, Issue 16508, 7 October 1915, Page 6

NOTES ON THE CABLES. Otago Daily Times, Issue 16508, 7 October 1915, Page 6

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