NOTES ON THE CABLES

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16384, 15 May 1915, Page 10

NOTES ON THE CABLES

Br flHUAwno, EVENTS IN GALICTA AFFECT ITALY. There is -a vague implication in the oabk>n that the A-Ustro-German forces have readied the San River, and it is further implied that tno part of the San which they havo roaohed is immediately west of Przemysl. The liernw.ns claim that they aro within 25 or 50 miles of mat city. If so, they must havo reached that part of the San which flows northwards from, San ok, and thou tums at right angles to tlio eastward, flowing in this direction past the north of Przomysl. The report lacks confirmation, but wo have tho Kaiser s boast in. an address to his troops in Western Galicia that tho Germane have now recovered half of Galicia from tho Russians, that this has been done mostly by the Germans themselves, and that ultimate success against tiireo powerful nations can be attained more easily by the German officers taking- over tho whole control of the Austrian armies. Austria should take fright at that idea, Mid if sho values her existence as a sovereign State, should make peace with tho Allies at once. Once the Austrians lose tho control of their military forces and thoir very great material resources which are so neoessary for the construction of military machinery, tho Germans, if thi»x,aro successful, will never let their grip of the country relax. Moreover. tliat is a possible condition of affairs that Italy must light to death against. German success would mean the obliteration of Austria as an independent country, and a German revengo on Italy which would reduce that country to almost abject servitude. The reason why Germany is so anxious to concede the Trentino, a small part of Western Austria, and give Italy a free hand in Albania, is to conserve the outlets to the Adriatic Sea—namely, Trieste and Fiume. Germany wants those ports for the purpose of controlling the Mediterranean, with the Adriatic as a huge naval base. Italy would, if the war terminated favourably to Germany, be compelled to oomo under the control of Germany, for the Germans have the idea that from the Adriatic they can dominate the whole of tho Mediterranean, Egypt, and the rest of Northern Africa, The panGerman party had it in their ambitions to wrest the north African possessions from the Frenah. That is why the Germans, before Britain declared war, were silent when Sir Edward Grey, through the British Ambassador at Berlin; asked Germany what her intention was in regard to the French colonics. Italy's status as a Power with the right to be heard hi the councils of the Great Powers of the world'is in danger, therefore, and .she must in defence of her sovereign- rights enter this war to assist in bringing about the utter collapse of the pan-German menace, let alone the moral factors that should sway her. THE LOSS OF THE GOLIATH. , The Goliath, whicii has been torpedoed in the Dardanelles, was a pre-Dreadnougiit battleship, oompleted in IdOO. Her displacement was 12,950 tons, and her speed 18£ knots. Her armour piato was 6in steel plate, and her armament consisted of four 12in guns and 12 6in guns, and numerous qu'icfctirers. Her design being over 16 years old she was as much out of date compared) with either British or German battle cruisers as the old Canopus was. The loss of the vessel itself is not so much a matter of concern as the loss of so many of her brave and skilfully trained crew. The question, arises: Where was she when She was sunk? Out of this emergds a series of interesting questions. One wants to know whether she was operating outside the Narrows or inside, and how it came about that she became a marie for Turkish destroyers. If she was torpedoed by destroyers, as Mr Winston Churchill says, why was she not protected by other vessels'! She wa3 torpedoed at night; !but even at night she could have been guarded against attack by other vessels using their searchlights. It cannot bo that the French were being landed in the Narrows when the occurrence took place. Their landing place must have been somewhere south-west of Kilid Bahr. If.so, it is possible that too much was. taken for granted, and it seems • that precautions were neglected' on the presumption that the Turkish commanders would not hare the temerity to venture so near the Allied ships. ■ The practice of withdrawing the vessels from the Straita at night will, of course, have been noted by the Turkish naval authorities, and plans for attacking the first boat that was \to be sent to cover any landing -will havo been duly laid by the Germans and Turks. The loss is tho more regrettable because it could have been avoided, for, if Turkish destroyers could manoeuvre at night in those places, tho Allies' destroyers should - have been able to do the same. Though the Allies have suffered the loss of a very serviceable vessel for such work as that in which she was engaged, it must be oonceded that the Turks have carried out a smart piece of daring work, and it does not redound to our credit, that the enemy's destroyers were not observed and held off by our own destroyers or larger vessels. It is plain that the attack was not anticipated, and- whatever -way the matter is looked at, the presumption comes into the mind that there has been over-confidence on the part of the Allies. Of these mounting naval losses the most will be made in Germany, where they will serve to hearten up the hopes of the people. Nor _ are such _ losses without weight in creating impressions among-neutrals that aro in a stato of hesitancy whether or not to take part in the activities of the war. On the other hand, tho -work of a British submarine, in the Sea of Marmora, was equally meritorious, and, though the economio value of the loss of two gunboats and a transport is a small set off against the loss of a pre-Dreadnought vessel carrying 12in guns, still the loss of such vessels to the Turks and Germans is proportionately heavier than the loss of an almost out-of-date battleship is to the British. The profit and loss account in'regard to the moral effect either way amongst the Turks will be about equalised; but if there is any balance it will be against the Turks, much more so if tho transport was filled with troopa. LAND OPERATIONS AT THE DARDANELLES. Official reports as to the land actions at the Dardanelles are .remarkable for their meagreness, and the reports which are received by way of Athens are somewhat indefinite and ore not to be absolutely -relied upon. From • what can be gathered, there is a force operating eastwards of the positions occupied by" the New Zealanders and Australians, its* purpose being to distract and delay reinforcements being sent landwards to the relief of the Turkish forces which are opposing the British north-east-ward of Krithia. The Turks may also be sending forces to prevent the occupation of Maidos and thus to keep a line of retreat open for their forces that have been fighting against the landing parties. If the story be true that the Turkish staff has removed its headquarters from Gallipoli to -Rodosto, on the Sea of Marmora, it seems that tho Turks have come to the conclusion that their hold on the Peninsula is exceedingly precarious. If a force has been landed north of the Narrows and behind Gallipoli, then as soon as all tho allied forces junction a forward movement will be made with all possible speed so as to inflict as much loss on the enemy as possible. Unless the Turks strongly reinforce their troops between Gallipoli and the Narrows, the opposition to the allied forces cannot be maintained much longer. A threat by tlip Russians to land troops on the Black Sea side would have a great weakening effect on the Turkish strength on both sides of the Dardanelles. Germany knows that, of course, and also knows that the opening of tho road into tho Black Sea will, have a tremendous moral effect in Russia and upon the neutral Balkan States. This is one of the great reasons why Germany is pushing forward her attacks in'" Western Galicia with such strength and impetus. It is of vital, importance to her that the Dardanelles should, not be opened, and she is forcing the pace_ in Galicia to prevent, if possible, a Russian force from being sent ■ against the Turks from Odessa. With tho fall of Constantinople all Germany's dreams of Empire in Asia Minor and all her commercial rights will vanish into nothingness. THE WESTERN BATTLE Between La Basseo and Arras Germany admits serious losses. Tho Berlin press tells its public, however, that the loss is more than counterbalanced by General von Mackensen's great successes and captures in Galicia. That admission by Berlin confirms the French claim to the far-reaching: effects of the allied victory in this region. The capture of Carency and Ablain and the crest of . the hills to tho east gives tho French command of 'the plains stretching away to DouaL Any further advance by the Allies will have an immediate and telling effect on tho German position to tho southward of Arras. In fact, it will make tho positions of the German forces between the Sonrmio and Soissons extremely shaky North of La IJasseo tho British position at Aubers and Bois du Biez tends to weaken tho i»sition of the Germane in the valley of tho Deule, which runs north-eastward from near La Basseo through Lille. The road on the Jeft side of the Deule is now -tho control ol the Allied guns. In

thoir attack towards Haubourdin, near Lille, tho British must not only havo used this road, hut, havo crossed it. Unfortunately, the attack was unsuccessful, and, on the Germans being reinforced from l.ille, tho British had to retire, after suffering very, heavy losses. The capturo of Haubourdin would havo out tho communications between Lille and La lijissec,; but the town would have been difficult to hold l on account of tho Germans being able to turn the guns defending Lille upon it,. On the extreme flank near the sea the Belgian anil French troops have obtained considerable aaeendancy over the German forces; and havo inflicted very serious losses upon the enemy, besides gaining a considerable amount of ground northwards and east of St. Georges. Tho position of the British at Ypres boro the brunt of the srreat German offensive, and between Lille and La Bassee the British had the worst position to attaok. Their efforts in the latter place would liave been moro successful if tliev had had_ moro machino guns, cannon, and ammunition.