NOTES ON THE CABLES

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16339, 23 March 1915, Page 5

NOTES ON THE CABLES

Br Shrapnel. THE ZEPPELIN RAlu. The largest fle-:t of Zeppelins that Germany has let loose upon" the Allies numbers four, and from all accounts the city of Paris was the objective. The attempt was, however, not very determinedly made. It may have been intended for a demonstration intended to convey to the French and their allies a foretaste of horrors to come. On the whole it iitmears from the weakness of the attack that the purpose of the visit was twofold—the effect on the Allies being one, and the political effect on the German public- being the other. The visit was i>aid to Paris shortly after midnight. It is a virtue of Zeppeline that they can travel at night, and in calm weather can steer by the compass. In that respect they "have an advantage over aeroplanes. '.they caa also \hover over any spot the commander of the vessal wishes I to bombard or observe. - Their disadvanage is their speed and inabilitv to turn quickly when attacked by aeroplanes. Thev are r.lso difficult to manoeuvre in a high wind. It is to be noted that the weather during their visits to Paris and Calais was misty and cloudy, the clouds probably being dull and low; When such meteorological conditions exist, there, is littlo wind, for a , slight wind dissipates fogs and mist. Zeppelin students and navigators have evolved the idea that misty weather or a heavy,- overcast sky is the ideal weather for making hostile attacks on the cities of the Allies. Such weather, however, would not suit for attacking the British fleet. To render any assistance to their own ships the crews of the Zeppelins would require a clear vi6w of the ships, and ships are much snaller than Paris or Calais, and have tb--> advantage of mobility. The small loss of life implies either that tht; attempt w,as not very seriously intended or that the precautions taken were sufficient. The vessels having been seen at Compiegne tp the north-East of Paris, and their direction having been noted, word was forthwith sent to Paris, and the alarm was given to i the citizens, probably by bells, as well as J bugles. Careful citizens would, on hearing the alarms, hasten to the basements of their buildings, where they would he oomnaratively safe. The curious would probably* I stay in the streets to "see the fun," and , take the risks.

The small loss of life suggests the idea that the bombs which were dropped, were for the less brutal purpose of setting fire , to buildings than for that of destroying life. The cables report that the bombs were incendiary ones. The visitors were made the targets of aircraft guns, and some hits have been claimed 7 ; but it is problematical -whether this claim can be justified. Possibly the two Zeppelins that turned back were slightly wounded and; set out homewards before matters rendered a rsturn to their baees impossible. The two that reached Paris were attacked by aeronlaoes, but the favouring mists enabled them to escape. It seems strange that airmen further afield near the fighting lines did not attempt to cut off the return. Evidentlv they were advised of the attack. By scouting wide from the Zeppelins' objective they_ would have a chance of intercepting the airships on their return, iinless the mists were" general all over France. When the atmosphere is foggy and cloudy visits from Zeppelins are to be expected. If the visit was meant to be a serious attack, and the reports of the slight harm done are true ,then either the Zeppelins were unlucky or are unworthy of the an:ount of study and money that has been expended upon their construction. MEMEL AND TILSIT Thp attack and capture of Memel by ;hc Russians is a new departure and points to a fresh attempt by the Russians to occupy a strip of East Prussia that is not easily defended by the Germans. Only one line of railway reaches the town. This railway, 91 miles long, is connected with Konigsberg. It must have been by that railway that many of the inhabitants fled to Konigsberg. The town has a population of about 25,000 inhabitants. It exports timber, artificial' manures, flax, linseed, and cereals. Its industries are cellulose making, chemical works, iron foundries, and shipbuilding. The harbour is not a very good one, there bsing only 22ft of water on the bar at the mouth of the Kurisches Haff Lagoon. Memel is on the coast, and is 'a fortified port. It is about 55 miles south of the Russian ice free port of Libau, which is also a. fortified port The Russian occupation of this port will be a considerable source of irritation to the German Government. It is possible that the Russians have occupied it in the hope that the effect may be to draw out the German fleet from Kiel. Another reason for the seizure of Memel is that it gives tho Russians a railway opening towards Konigsberg, which they have averred they will yet capture. It will bo a difficult matter to dislodge the Russians unless the Germans are prepared to blo-w the town_ to pieces from tho sea; but that would give' tho Russian fleet a chance to attack the German* both with: their surface ships and their submarines. The railway line from Memel, half way to berg, will be easily captured and held by the_ Russians as it runs up a very narrow strip of lahd between the Russian province of Koono and the Kurisches Haff Lagoon. This lagocn can also be utilised for moving troops upon Koningsberg. It seems that the possess ; on of Memel has passed from Prussian hands for good. Only the utter defeat of the Allies can gain the possession of that town again to Prussia. The appearance of the Russians in this extreme corner of the German territory seems to point to an invasion of Prussia from the north. The routs to Konigsberg from the Memel town and river has much more to commend it than the road through the Masurian Lakes by way of Lyck. The Russians are advancing on Tilsit from the north. They will have more difficulty in taking that town, as three of the strategical railways converge upon it, but much depends upon the number of men Germany can spare to protect it. To take the town and hold it, the Russians will have to make a fresh advance along the Gumbinnen railway lino to Insterbung, and thus out the railways that converge on Tilsit That is whit they will do if they intend to again make an attack on Konigsberg. AN INCREDIBLE PROJECT. The pj.ble3 contain a. report that the Russians in Transcaucasia intend to leave a force which will contain the Turkish forces near Erzerum. and that the main army will advance along the coast towards Constantinople. The project seems impossible. It would be co3tly in timo and men. Tho journey along tho coast is nearly 800 miles long when tho windings of tho road are taken into account. If it is over accomplished, such a journey will be one of the most daring and wonderful in the -war. It would bo much more feasible to land troops at Sinope, tho nearest point to Sebastopol. That could bo done easily under- the cover of tho guris of the Black Son. fleet. In that event one-half of the journey would bo accomplished without much hardship, and without much fighting. The march along the southern coast of the Black Sea is at present impossible. It might be effected if the Allies ■ were attacking in

force from Adana, in the south of Aflia Minor, and a junction of forces were made r across the peninsula. That -would be bril- ~ liant strategy, but very risky.

GERMAN STRATEGY CONFUSED

Tho reason for the violent fighting which is taking place in Upper Alsace towards Mulliausen and on the German side of the Vosges Mountains is difficult to understand. It seems, however, to be an attempt to ■create political distraction by wounding Germany in a place to which political considerations compel the German general staff ' to give attention. These political considerations must contuse the general strategv of the headquarters Btaff at Berlin "The Allies, no doubt, are working that point for all it is worth. Tho Germans cannot concentrate their great military force-'"at' any one point. That is the inherent weakness of their defensive position in Central Europe. : They canimt leave the defences of East Prussia; they are afraid of invasion by way of Cracow and Silesia; political considerations make them hold on to Belgium. The German authorities have _ continually asserted that Great Britain is now the sole ' objective, and to retire from Belgium would arouse almoit a revolution in Germany. In the Hungarian field Germany must lend assistance to prevent the separation of Hungary from Austria, for if Hungary withdrew from tha conflict, Germany would lose not only supplies of men with, which she keeps Russia at bay, but would lose-the source of much material in the form of metals, petroleum, and. foodstuffs. The attack, then, of the French on Upper Alsace seems a part of a great plan to keey the German forces fighting at tour diverged points at extreme distances from each other. That prevents the German* from strengthening their lines at any one point, and therefore makes it impossible for Germany to- begin another great offensive, since the Allies with their now ample forces could hold up any German offensive, and at the same time break through th'e ; lines • where* the Germans were compelled to weaken their forces by withdrawals of reserves _ It is probable that it is these' attacks in Upper Alsace and on the slope* of the Vosges that are enabling the French j to advance in the Argonne and the Champagne country. The German lines in the * ' Champagne district are showing just now a perilous thinness. ■ *

ANSWER TO CORRESPONDENT. " Constant Reader."—A Continental army corps, all arms considered—that is, including infantry, cavalry, and artillerynumbers about 43,000 men. Such a corps is divided into two divisions, each division consisting of two brigades. Each brigade is made up of battalion* ' , or regiments.^