THE NAVAL BALANCE.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16003, 20 February 1914, Page 8

THE NAVAL BALANCE.

BRITAIN NEEDS THE WHOLE SEAa

ADMIRAL MAHAN'S WARNING. (Fboii Our Own Correspondent.) LONDON, January 7. At the moment there seems to be a contest between the Little Navy party in the Cabinet and the First Lord of the Admiralty. The Mail publishes an interesting article by Admiral A. T, Mohan, the American naval authority aiid historian, on England's present need ot naval strength. He say's: "At the present moment the mere security of the British Islands is conceived to be so far imperilled that it has prompted a radical change in the distribution of tho British Navy, the leading feature of which j& tho concentration around the isalnds themselves of a very large majority of the battleship force. Subordinate to this, but directly related to it, has been the withdrawal —tho drawing back—of the Mediterranean Fleet from Malta to Gibraltar as its definite headquarters."

This, to' students of military history, is analogous to the case of the commander whose force is too few to be distributed as widely as ho would desire except by hazarding the possibilities of concentration. Having regard to the Mediterranean only Gibraltar is not so good a military pbsition as Malta, because it is not so far advanced, less central, and more remote from the possible scones of action. "On the other hand a fleet at Gibraltar not only is nearer to the British seas, in case of u summons thither, but also is more readily reinforced from those seas if it should bo thought expedient to strengthen it before proceeding on a mission." "The naval force is too few for distribution in both the British Seas and the Mediterranean, too small for the Mediterranean division to be advanced as far as in former days." THE MEDITERRANEAN POSITION. ''The Mediterranean began to be of broad international consequence," writes the admiral, "hi the days of Cromwell As the expansion of England progressed its broad bearing upon universal European conditions remained, largely because all the colonies of European States were affected by fluctuations in conditions internal to Europe itself. Needless to say that the Suez Canal and the development of Australia and New 1 Zealand into Imperial self-governing communities have again expanded the question and cmplvaised the value of the Mediterraneans as a central controlling position.The developments of the past century have made the Adriatic the western limit of the debatable ground in the Mediterranean rather than the eastern, which it was to Nelson. The Levant has become the local front of operations. But while this is true as regards the Mediterranean itself, it has not changed the, significant feature of that sea as being itself in the whole a central position, and still further as affording exit to the two great scenes of maritime interest, the Atlantic and the Pacific. Attention should fasten on both these facilities, for New Zealand and Australia, and more reremotoly Canada, arc now readily accessible through Suez to fleets acting on the Mediterranean—a condition still little over 40 years old. Further, it is known that Canada and the Australasian communities hold tenaciously certain views which may be said to unify in a common purpose the British Pacific Commonwealths, and thus indisputably to constitute a great Imperial interest dependent in possible contingencies upon naval preponderance in the Mediterranean. THE NEW POWER OF FRANCE. "The recent development of European policies have substantially secured the Western Mediterranean to British transit, while at the same time promising to increase the hc/ards in the eastern basin. The transactions with France concerning Egypt and Morocco, to which Spain lias been in a measure a party, would tend markedly to affirm the Triple Entente, even if the exigencies of the balance of power, under tJio development of the Triple Alliance, did not impose another and superior necessity. The French navy, with the now determined increase, if attained and maintained, will probably suffice to the mastery .west of Sicily, especially if supported bv a British contingent—at all events, it is intended so to suffice ; but the condition of control throughout the sea will depend upon ability to push forward and to sustain occupation in superior force to the eastward of Italy. Here enter as factors the increases of the Triple Alliance, emphasised and affirmed by the jealousies between ite two southern members. However far Italy and Austria may agree together—like the lato Balkan allies— to attempt exclusion of other navies from, or at, least preponderance for themselves in, the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, their rivalry as regards the Adriatic and the Balkan Peninsula assures a race of comnctition in nawd armament the reciprocal effects of

which will be to ensure a double growth. Under tho alliance this duplex development will be available to contest local control by an exterior State, with tho consequences before indicated. CAN WE HOLD IT? " Tlho avowed and executed purpose of Germany with regard to the force of her navy and the rivalry between Italy and Austria ensuring a similar, if smaller, development in the Eastern Mediterranean constitute the main elements of the contemporary naval situation as adverse to Great Britain. That tho Near East will continue for a generation the. tinder-box whicth it bias been for a. half-century past is more than ever likely from tho events of the last twelve months. If a general war should grow out ot the present critical situation, how certainly can the British navy secure Egypt and Suez? Whether France alone, formerly tho enemy, or whether France with the sapport, of Great Britain can maintain the control of trade security and militarv effectiveness throughout the foa. is the point in question. It will not Ix? sufficient to secure the woetorn half. The British Empire needs tho whole sea for Imperial movement of commerce and for Imperial naval effectiveness, dependent upon the movement of fleets essential to the existenoe of the Empire."