DEFENCE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COLONIAL CONFERENCE, 1907.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 14245, 20 June 1908, Page 4

DEFENCE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COLONIAL CONFERENCE, 1907.

*» t Paper read before tho Officers' Club, ( Duncdin, by Lieutenant-colonel James /. Allen. No. I. 'flic Colonial Conference, 1907, sat for 15 \ clays betweon the 15th of April and 14th of .May last year, unci dealt with some } 26 subjects of 'great importance, including naval and military defence. If. is those ( latter that I propose to say something Jj about, this evening, and it can hardly be expected that, in the short time of the conference sitting and under the conditions ' existing at the time, .many direct results , can be pointed out. The conditions I allude to are those imposed by the cir- ] cuinstanccs—namely, in the first place, ' that the representative of the Dominion or ' colony would naturally desire to consult ' his colleagues and his Parliament before ' committing his country to any policy in J defence matters, other than the one in ' existence or which had been discussed and ' agreed to before his departure. The second ' circumstance, which rendered direct results difficult of attainment, was the impossi- ' bility of coming to an agreement on some ' material points, For instance, Dr Smartt, ! of Cape Colony, proposed a resolution with ' regard to the Navy that "the contribution < should take the form of a grant of money, ' the establishment of local naval dofence, ' or such oilier services, in such manner as ' may bo decided upon after consultation ' with the Admiralty and as would best ! accord with their varying circumstances." : This proposal scorns broad enough to em- ' brace everyone; yet one Bnds Sir Wilfred ' i Laurier paying on behalf of Canada, "We ' cannot agree to the resolution"; and so, ' the conference realising that unanimity was < aJI important, had to allow the proposal i to drop. ' The direct results of the conference, as i evidenced La- the resolutions agreed to, are two, namely: (a) "That, the colonies be authorised to refer to the Committee of i Imperial Defence, through the Secretary of i State, for advice any local questions in ■ regard to which expert assistance is deemed i desirable. That whenever so desired, a representative, of the colony whioli may , wish for advice should bo summoned to i attend as a jncniber of the committee (hiring the discission of the questions raised." (b) "That this conference welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of .state for War, and, without wishing to commit any of the Governments represented, recognises , and affirms the need of developing for the service of the Empire a general staff, selected from the forces of the- Empire as a whole, which shall study military science in all its branches, shall collect and disseminate to tho various Governments military information and intelligence,- shall undertake the preparation of of defence on a common principle, and, without in tho least interfering in questions connected with command and administration, shall, at the request of the respective Governments, advise as to the training, education, and war organisation of tho military forces of the Crown in every part ..of the Empire." Those who understand the constitution and objects of tlio " Committee of Imperial Defence" need no explanation of the, first resolution; and, indeed, it seemed a work of supererogation to pass it, for provision already existed for calling the committee together and for tlio very purposes mentioned/ill the resolution.. Up to March, 1937,. two important questions had come before the committee—namely, in • 1903, when certain points in connection with the defence of Canada were considered, when the Hon. Sir F.. Borden, K.C.M.G., Minister of Militia for Canada, sat -as a member of the committee; and again in Novcml>ar, 1905, when the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth asked the committee to prepare a general scheme of defence for Australia. This scheine was prepared and sent out by the Secretary of State in May, 1905 j but, as far as I know, no' representative of the Commonwealth sat on the committee. It scorns very clear from a study of the short debate that, the real reason of passing this resolution (a) was to ompltasise the right of the country asking advice to be represented. And so one finds Dr Jameson saying, "This goes a little further, ajul says that practically a colony lias the right lo be invited whenever .anything in which it is concerned or upon which it, has asked advice is being discussed by the Defence Committee." And Mr Deakin refers to the resolution as giving "a right to be present on our own motion when matters in which we are concerned are under discussion.'' There are some here probably who have, as I had. .1 very hazy idea of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and for their benefit it will bo well to explain. Tho "Committee of Imperial Defence" has no fixed composition: it is a skeleton or nucleus body summoned only when it is wanted. The British Prime Minister is tho omy continuous member, and he calls together whomever lie thinks suitable. It is purely a consultative body, having no executive powers or administrative functions, and ;he objects are to provide the means of discussing questions of a general or local character relating to defence. On the establishment of the "Committee of Imperial Defence" it was decided that tho "Colonial Defence Committee" shouid ba regarded as a sub-committee of that committee. This results in the skeleton whole having a substantial limb, for the " Colonial Defence Committee" is a permanent ms'.itution consisting of: Chairman (Colonial Office representative), the I'oriiiaiient Undersecretary of State for the Colonies. Members: Admiralty representatives—The Director of Naval Intelligence, the Naval Adviser to the Army Council; War Office representatives—The Director of Military Operations, tlio Director of Artillery, the Director of Fortifications and Works; Treasury representative, the Assistant Secretary to the Treasury; India Office repiescntative, the Military Secretary India Office; secretary, a military oificer. Tho " Colonial Defence Committee" has for its objects the details of questions relating to colonial defence and their uniform treatment ;. and so colonial defence schemes, reports on colonial forces, colonial acts and ordinances relating to defence are referred ' lo them for their remarks. The second resolution, dealing with a " General Staff for the service of the Empire," by its wording shows how diffi- , cult it was to secure unanimity, for whilst it gives approval to certain general principles, embodied in a statement by tho ■ Secretary of State for War, it affirms tho need of developing a "General Staff" for the service of the Empire with a rcserva- • tion—namely, non-committal of any of tho Governments represented. To estimate the . value of this second resolution it is neccs-1 , sa-ry to have a. clear idea of the functions of the "General Staff for the Empire" and . of the importance attached to it by Army . and Navy authorities' in Britain and the ■ members of the conference. The "General s Staff" ill Britain was a result of Lord : Eshcr's committee in 180*, and it received I formal and complete shape as late as Army i Order in September, 1906. In setting it ■ up the naval organisation, which bad been - 60 conspicuously siicctssfiil, was taken as - a type. Mr Haldano, speaking to the con- : forence, likened the General Staff to "a 3 brain for the army,", and fays that it t resulted from one great principle recommended by tho Esher committee—namely, "tho organisation and business administration of tho army in peaco must bo kept J entirely distinct'from tho service which f consisted in tho study _ of war problems - and iu the higher training of the staff - and of the troops." i The importance attached to the General 1 Stall' and the ideas of the Home Govcrn- • nient, and, indeed, tho conference itself, i may well be gathered from Mr Haldanc s - own words, which I now quote: "My main I purpose in addressing the conference is > to suggest for'your acceptance the opinion i that, the General Staff which we _ have , created at Home, and whieli is in its : infancy, should receive, as far as possible, r an Imperial character. I will dofine what ,' I mean, It is not that we wish in the j slightest degree own to suggest that you s should bow your heads to any direction 0 from Home 'in military matters, but tho r General Staff; officer would have as his i> function this: Trained in a great common is school, recruited, it may be., from the 1 most varying parts of the Empire, but i educated in military science according to a common principles, he would bo at the :- disposition of the local Government, or of ii the local Commander-in-Chief, whether he :, were Canadian. British, or Australian, or t New Zcalander, or South African" tor t giving advice and furnishing information e based upon the highest military study of i, the time. The General Staff is a class by s itself in tho army. It is so with the German army, and it is so with the Japanese army: it has just so in the Russiou army, and it is so in the 0 French [>rmy. It consists of tho most tl highly-trained officers, picked men recruited 0 for their known capacity, specially trained, ■< and then detailed to be at the elbow h of the commanding officer. The commandl> ing officer, according to the theory of the r 'General Staff,' is unfettered; he has the r complete' power of accepting or disregnrdi- ing the advice of Ms General Staff oflicor, but 1» has at bis, c]bow, somebody.

who is there with knowledge, with a suggestion, with advice furnished with all c the i-esourccs which are supplied n from the centnl school from which s tho Goneral Staff officer comes—namely, n the headquarters of the General Staff.'! I, And then, lalor, Mr Haldane, speaking of e exchango of staff officers, gays: "But sup- t. •'posing we wore studying at Home in tho 0 General Staff great quest ions of Imperial q defence, and, amongst others, questions of k Imperial defence in Canada, what an h advantage if would ho to 11s, and I think ( to you also, if we sent you a General Staff i ofiicor in exchange for 0110 of your General v Staff officers who should come over here, v and who should ho working with us at the 1: very problems which concern the defence t of I ho Empire, as a whole, in Canada! t And so with all the other affairs in the 0 Crown's dominions. It seems to mo that I we might- broaden the basis of this General I Staff which we have created. It is a s purely advisory organisation, of which com- 1 mand is not a function, The beginning, of ' course, would have to be very modest. If < those things wore organised, and if we were f to bring about such an interchange of f officers as would tend to make tho work * of tho General Staff in the largest sense » the work of a military mind which had < surveyed tho defence of the Umpire as a c whole, it would, it seems to me, do much c to bring about that uniformity of pattern ( in organisation and in weapons and in ' other details regarding military matters ( which is to some* extent cwmtial if there ( is to be.effective co-pporation in a great £ war." Finally, Mr Haldane concludes his ' sjxsech with these words: "I would like to ' say that if it is agreeable to the conference j to adopt. 6ome such resolution as this I ' should not desire, that we should slop ' there, but I should suggest that you should ' Knd your experts over to the War Office ' to confer with our General Staff and any ! other department- as to the way of making an immediate beginning in carrying out : tll/5 broad' principle which the resolution affirms." If this resolution is given effect ; to in the,spirit of Mr Halclano's closing [ words it is not difficult to conceivo how far-reaching the results may be. In the ' first place the question of dofenco will become' moro than evor an Imperial. con- ! corn, and tho brain that is thinking out the whole question will bo not that of Great Britain alone; but will receive a stimulating and sustaining power not only from the Olcj Country, with its long history of great records and stirring traditions, but also from modem offshoots of tho Motherland, untrammelled by the and; vigorous with youth and laudableaspirations. Once this Imperial brain on naval and military affairs has set-to work every part of the Eqipire may rest assuivd the last and bast word abut defence will -be made known' tq them, and it is impossible to conceive, .that any portion of the Empire can ignore the advice given. All that follows in tho train of such export advice must make more secure the permanency and solidarity of tho Empire, for the fighting and defensive machine will have its various parts brought into harmonious relation, so that the power to defend or to s trike as a collective whole may, through organisation, and similarity in arms and training, be so great that no oiw dare rouse the machine to action. The affirmation by the Colomal Conference- of the need of' developing for the service of tho Empire a General Staff is, after all, only a resolution by the conference, and to carry the principle into effect it is necessary that each part of the Empire should produce soma practical result. Much lias already 'bjsn done, and wo in Now Zealand have,'as you are aware, organised within tho last few years - a Council of Defence which may be looked noon as this Dominion's "General Staff." Jb remains now to bring into 'effect the interchange which was so often spoken about at the conference, the principle of which finds embodiment in the resolution when it, speaks of the General Staff as "selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole." The discussion shows the Colonial' Premiers to| liave b-son fairly •unanimous, the pue question raised by Sir ■ Frederick Borden, of Canada, whether the General Staff was to have independent authority throughout the Empire and in tho different- dominions, being satisfactorily answered by the • assurance it was to be it ; " purely advisory Ixxly," and the local General Staff responsible to the Minister." i I do not, however, think that tho scheme of a General Staff as suggested has no weaknesses. It lias, and one would like to know what those countries who hnvo had tho organisation in existence for some , time have 10 say as to the attitude of the 1 regimental offer who finds himself tied . to regimental duties, or 0" the commander ■ who commands, hut has alongside him an- : other to advise. I have myself heard' _ from officers in Britain, who complain that ! ambition u to> some extent stifled; that : lire plums of the service and the advan- ■ tago-is with tho'General Staff oflicer. 1 If the direct results of the Colonial Con-' i ferenco as embodied in tho two resolutions • wo jiavo keen considering were all that.had ' been done, it i 6 safe to say a great step forward in Imperial organisation has been taken; but, to my mind, tho indirect '■ results arising from the discussion itself, -' from the suggestions that were put forj ward by tha. British Army Council in I papers propar-ed by the General Staff, and ' tho statements made by the Secretary of • State for War (Mr Haldane) and the first ' Lord of the Admiralty (Lord Twcedmouth) I will be us t'reat, or greater, than the moro, ] direct results. -Mr Haldane, for; instance, ? refers to "a certain broad plan of .military organisation for tho Empire" as thb "prao- ." tical point" ho lias to put before the conference—a broad plan, which embraces the organisation of the Home Poroes of the various self-governing dominions of the j Crown, "if not to a common pattom. o because rigidity of pattern," says he, " wo " recognise, is impossible with the varyin» ' oiroun.s!ances of- the various countries^ . yet with a common end-in view and with '_ this common oonception." Then to explain tho attitude of the British General x Staff reference is made to four papers a circulated for the information of the j Premiers. These • papsrs I have read, and „ ns they aro full of siiggcstivencss, aix] .. contain principles ( that represent the rel( suit of British experts' reflection up*on the -j events of the late war, it is necessary to refer to them"" more particularly. The first paper, prepared by the General a Staff, is entitled '•The_Strategical Condi- ,, tions of' the Empire from' the Military i- Point of View." • It lays down three t 'fundamental principles-Thirst, the obligai- -tiou imposed on each self-governing com--0 munity of providing a s far as possible for 0 its own local "security; second, the duty of r arranging for mutual assistance upon some 1- definite lines in caw of need; third, the 0 necessity for the maintenance of that s?a e supremacy which alone can ensure any s- military co-operation at all. Those fundas mental principles, it is pointed out, are d recognised and acted on- in the Mother y Country, which provides for its own secue rity by maintaining troops organised for il the most pa.rt on a non-permanent basis d to repel raids from oversea—namely, tho d " territorial army "; secondly, it provides y a, striking force—an expeditionary forceit ready to assist other threatened portions, " designed to act swiftly, and it possesses a 1S iia-vy sufficient to eecure maritime com- '" mand, and to permit of land forces being a moved by sea fr,om place to place in caso [i of war in furtherance of the military rel" quirements of the Empire. The striking, '"' expeditionary, or field force is to consist '" of 160,000 men organised in six large divif sions. with four cavalry brigadis from the II existing- regular army, supplemented by a [5 "special reserve" of 3500 officers and " 75,000 men, of whom somewhat over a . third will ho required on mobilisation for necessary work with ammunition columns V and other non-combatant services, for !' which highly-trained men are not essential, s tho remainder being availablo as drafts. ." Tho territorial a;nny i s to consist of tho remaining forces of the Crown—Militia, n Yeomanry, and Volunteers—to 1» amaJga- "; mated into a single -homogeneous territorial • army. This is to be some 300,000 strong, 7 organised in 14- divisions, and is to con- [ tain all arms and all services in their due u proportion. It to have a uniform rate „ of pay and a uniform system of training, i 0 ' ami is to spond at least eight days in camp j 5 each year. For the territorial forco meii „ are to enlist between 18 years and 24 years ie on a four-years' agreement, and they will |t bo allowed to volunteer for foreign service. 0 A recent cablegram informed u 9 that the 1(J cnlisimcnt of tile territorial army had been jf a failure, but of this I am not certain. Ie That the first principle—self-defence by ~, each locality-cannot he carried out. in all , r cases is admitted, the defence of India m being the concern of the Empire as a )f whole, whilst certain naval bases require (v to .be garrisoned by regulJr troops from ,' e the United Kingdom; still, the general ie principle holds good, roost certainly for in ns in New Zealand, and it must form the' ie basis of our military system, for, as the at paper says: " In connection with this indi.(l vidual responsibility for local defence, it J, must lie understood, that though tho navy w may be ablo'to guarantee tho different d- parts of tho Empire against maritime ie attack on a, serious scale, his Majesty's ie chips cannot absolutely assure British terrid- tory under all circumstances against raids r, from oversea. In the caso -of seaports ly_ easily, accessible, io .feostjle enterprise, aajd.

affording sufficient inducement for an enemy to attack, r.iitls must \x provided ngfiiiiht by local defences and local garrisons. Ido not jn'opcso at llie nreiciifc moment to discuss further this ijiicsiion ol local responsibility for local defence, except to say that, in my opinion, it is in the, evolutionary slagc-one country •having' ono idea, another a different one. It U quite conceivable thait as a result of .the knowledge gained at the canforence, and by consultation with the Home authorities, (ho development will bo on sound lines. i~ii<u- on i will put, before you the sctiemo winch has I*oll placed bclon the Commonwealth .for local detenu-, promising aub? 'J- saying that Lord Tweclniouth staW-S that Ins -Majesty's Government was ready 10 consider a modification of the existing arrangements so j m , K as t l, s „,„,(* ions of unity of command ami direction of _ tlw licet i s maintained. The second tundament.il principle - namely, mutual assiuuwo upon some definite lines 1 case 0 need-raised u mucil moro difficult question (or the Premiers to solve. Its acceptance involves us in responsibility or the. mauuonance of tho Empire itself, ith all 1.3 land r sponsilnlmes, treaty obligations, and (lutes of preserving order amongst half cml.scd races. By accepting Uii. Uootrino of mutual support in need '• we commit ourse ves to the third great principlcnamoly supremacy ,it sea, for, as is pointed out in the lirst paper on strategical conditions " When those territories are. separated from each other by the sea, such combination is, wholly dependent 011 the possession of maritime command.'" But there was moro than naval supremacy iu the mind of the General Stall when 'they proclaimed this second fundamental principle, and they make this clear. Let HlB quote what they say: "It must be clearly understood that naval supremacy is power- • less, unaided, to bring a great war to a successful conclusion, a iact wluch has been proved by history in all ages." "The. Empire- is confronted by dangers against whioh naval force can offer it little if any protection." "It is impossible, to overrate the advantage of having in every case a system of military organisation capable of being readily assimilated to that of the many other contingents which would compose the Imperial army." It was then an Imperial army, composed of many contingents, which the General S,tafl had in its mind when, it put before the conference the second fundamental prin. ciplc—" mutual assistance on definite linei in case of need." And now let mo tell you in their own words how they represented the- case'to '(he colonial Premiers. • "But the one lesson of the iiusso-Japanoss War. which stands out ck\ar and well defined, admitting neither argument nor disclaimer; is that that nation, of whioh the naval and military authorities are in a. position to make their preparations for emergency on a definite plan, and with a full knowledge of the strength and organisation of the forces which they will he able to put ■■ in the field at the critical moment, starts with an incalculable advantage over an opponent who does not enjoy the same position. War is in the present day becoming moro and more an exact science. The gallantry of the troops, the genius of a commander, the purely fortuitous circumstances inseparable from operations in the field—all may to some to sway the issue. But it is adequate preparation, leading up to a well worked out plan of campaign, which is the paramount factor in securing a decision, and a plan of campaign can 110 moro be worked out ' without knowing what troops are available to carry.it out than a building can be erected without first laying its foundations." Then the General Staff go on to admit the' difficulty, of the. selfgoverning colonies guaranteeing " that "contingents of any given strength and composition can.be counted upon by thoEmpiro at tlio vital* point in caso of need," and end the paragraph with this pregnant sentence: "They feel, however, that it is their' duty to point out that tho lack of definite provision for common action between the various military forces of tho Empire deprives those forces of- much of the power which they might otherwiso exert at- a time of national danger." Then the paper goes on to deal with certain details, explaining the necessary provisions for common action; but before referring to thorn I pause to emphasise tho main idea which was evidently in the mind of the General Staff, and to say how far the United Kingdom in its reorganised army seliomo is complying with fundamental principle No. H—namely, "mutual assistance "'in case of need. You will have gathered, probably, that' the idea' of the General Staff with regard to mutual assistance was that a great Imperial army should be available, drawn from the Mother Country and the self-governing Dominions; that the strength of tne various contingents should be known beforehand j that, the organisation and preparation should bo on a delinite plan; the provision for common action should also' 60 definite, and that all this should lead up to well worked out plans of campaign, which needed an all-powerful navy with command of the sea, so. that the Imperial army could bo placed at the vital 6pot with the least possible delay. The reorganisation of, the forces of the United Kingdom has taken place on this supposition,, so that at tho present moment one finds the Secretary of State for War informing the colonial Premiors what the Mother Country is doing in making its contribution, to this endnamely, providing a " striking force "—an expeditionary force is the proper phrase, the striking force is that small portion, of it designed to act swiftly and ready to assist any portion of the Empire. , This expeditionary force, the basis of tho ideal Imperial striking army, forraod at tho present by the United' Kingdom, comprises tho regular army, and the essence of tho whole thing is that it is expected to be ready at a moment's notice to strike wherever the vital spot may be. Before considoring tho positions of,,the self-governing Dominions and tho attitude of the colomal Premiers towards this ideal Imperial striking forco, I woidd make.short reference to a few details which the Goneral Staff thought necessary to bring before the conference. Those are applicable not alone to the expeditionary force, but also to the Home Defence Forces, whether in , the United Kingdom or elsewhere, for as a matter of fact the territorial army forHomo defence, in the view of the General ] Staff, is to be 'organised and twined in the same manner as the regular or ex- , .poditionary army. Firstly,, then, stress is '. laid on the necessity for "adequate training of tht troops." "Though'the guerilla- . (they say) is formidable enough in defence . r of his own country! he cannot conduct,an i offensive campaign, ■ and he is practically ( powerless to bring any war to a suei cessful conclusion." "Man for man, therefore, the armies to take tho field must ' be as efficient and highly trained as those j whom they are to meet in battle." I \ need not labour this point, and proceed to ' the second. "Efl'cctivo training of the \ rank and file is, however, impossible unless the officers charged with the duty are 1 versed in -the arts' of the military pro- ! fession." And again: "But whatever form ' military schools of any portion of the Empire may take, sucli schools are essential ' not only to secure the lighting efficiency 1 of the local forces, \vk also to supply a ' nucleus of experts on the art of war, ' capable of advising .their Governments, 5 capable of appreciating the peculiar defence " requirements of the land in whioh they ' live, and ear/able of meeting upon common k ground the experienced professional officers ' of the regular army, who deal with the 5 strategical problems of the United King- } dom and tho Empire generally." The third ' detail I draw your attention to is the 1 "necessity to bring together the various r military forces of the Empire in the matter s of training, of education, and of comr munib' of thought," and in amplification 1 of this the General Staff paper refers to • tho Staff College at Camborley as open 3 to all under certain necessary restrictions, 1 and expresses the hope that colonial officers • in increasing numbers will fit themselves ' as graduates upon the Goneral Staff. Then i 1 reference is made to the necessity for an - adequate reserve of officers, and to tho 3 hope that the colonies in this respect will 3 work on similar lines, and it is pointed , 01ft that steps have been taken for intert ehanao of officers between self-governing ' colonies and between such officers and those s of the regular army at Home and in 1 India. And this idea of interchange, in 1. the mind of the Geneva! Staff, is •more e embracing than. to include officers only, 1 for they say: "It is perhaps a matter . for consideration whether whole battalions,,. y squadrons, or batteries might not oeea--1 sionally be interchanged between different a, portions of the Empire,"'