THE RUSSIAN OUTRAGE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 13180, 13 January 1905, Page 5

THE RUSSIAN OUTRAGE

PROFSSOR DICKY'S VIEWS. (Fkou Our Own Coruksponmnt.) LONDON', December 2. Professor Edward Dicey, C.8., lias just brought out a very .timely article upon the whole question of tho North Sea outrage. It is published ill the December issue of a leading review, and however strongly it may conflict with what has been the prevalent British sentiment and opinion hitherto upon every., point put forward, is still worthy of serious consideration. l'rofessor Dicey begins by stating tlio origin of the case thus:—"l think all fairminded persons, whatever their nationality, will admit that at first sight England had every reason to regard the attack upon the British iishing fleet oil" the Dogger Bank as an utterly unjustifiable outrago. . . . From an English point of view there was no escaping the conclusion that the attack committed upon a number of inoffensive British iisherman was not only a gravo brcach of law, but was also ail outrago which no self-respecting nation could afford to let pass unpunished.' 1 Baltic fleet by force would inevitably have After showing that to have stopped the meant war, upon which tho British Government was noli justified in entering when it had received a positive assurance from Russia that she had'a complete answer to tho British case, Professor Siccy takes exception to tho action of Russia in allowing all its officers, excepting four of inferior rank, to proceed with the Baltic fleet, keeping back only thoso four as witnesses. All that was done must havo been dono cither by tho direct order of the admiral, or elso under his authority, expressed or implied. i rofessor Dicey thinks Lord Lansdownc was under a misapprehension wJion liq referred at tlio Guildhall to a distinct statement having been rcceivod by him from tho Russian Government that the persons found by tho commissioners to be guilty shall bo duly "punished," and ho contends that it never could havo been supposed that Russia would accept either from England or from an international commission any dictation as to the actual punishment to bci inflicted upon any officer proved a wrong-doer. Next Professor Dicey sets forth what will bo tlio , general clmraetor of tlio Russian case. lncy will make no attempt to disputc the fact; that the shots directed against tho iNorth Sea fishing fleet wore flretffrom Russian, pirns under the orders of Russian omcers. Russia will plead as justification ot her action that she. had received trustworthy information of tho presenco of .Japanese torpedoes in tlio North Sea for tho purpose of sinking tho Russian Bailie fleet at (he outset of their perilous voyage. Item will probably admit that, tho officers of tho Baltic licet sailed under orders to firei at oneo upon any torpedo boat they had reason to suspect was sailing under tho flag of Japan; she will declare that her officers saw, or believed they saw, Japanese torpedo-boats approaching under suspicious circumstances; and she will conclude by affirming that oil' the Dogger Bank her officers were only exercising the recognised rights of belligerents by attacking an enemy's vessel of war, regardless of any injury they might indict on neutral mercantile.vessels which might obstruct tho success of their attack."

It is the belief of the Professor that tho first impulse of most English readers will bo to regard such defence as uttcrlv untenable, but be goes on to say: "I doubt whether this first impulse can bo justified on serious consideration. I liavn no love, and but scant rcs|>ect, for Russia, but it seems to ine utterly improbable that tho attack on tho British fishing smacks coidd have been made out of more wanton spite. . . It is common fairness to admit tlwt tho "Russian fleet had some reason for its action ; and the only reason which can possibly bo alleged is tho fact that it had cause—or what comes to much tho same, thought, it bad cause—to believe that it was about to bo attacked by Japanese torpedoes. . . Either the Russian officer*,, who are prepared to swear Ihcv did see torpedo boats which they hud good reasons to believe were Japanese, are <iat worthy of' credence, or' wo must accept their statements, whether erroneous or otherwise, as inad'o in good faith. Upon tho former hypothesis it is useless to take part in the proposed inquiry: upon the latter hypothesis it is well-nigh impossible to prove that-the authors of the outrage did not seriously entertain a !>elief which would reniovo the olfeucc, of which they stand charged in British opinion, from the category of wanton outrage into the category of acts within tho limits of legitimate belligerency. I take it that, accordin;! to tho-code of warfare, in as far ns such ft wrto ran bo si id to exist..two belligerents fighting agaiuffc each other on the high seas are not bound to suspend their attack upon ono another for fear of inflicting damage on neutral vessels which may accidentally have come within their lino of fire. If this is so it seems as if Russia had at least a prima facie ease which wo cannot, honestly refuse to consider." Professor Dicey expresses bis own belief that the conflict of opinion as to the Dogger Hank outrage is capable of explanation'without directly impugning tlm good faith of. either party. He attributes the Russian attitude to the state of mind naturally produced by Ibe terrible smashing up of nil the cherished illusions in which Paissia had indulged until Iheeo were rudely dispelled bv (he extraordinary military 'successes o f ilnpnn ill the present war. It ifi thought 'likely enough that one or more of Russia's innumerable spies may have, forwarded a warning ns !o Japanese gunboats lying hi.i in various out-of-the-way nooks, and sailing falsoly under British oolours, while- tho state of panic all-prevalent in Russia would cause implicit credence to bo given to any story, however it'ild, that might seem to fit in wi*h the Russian idea that there was "treachery somewhere."

Apart from a nervous dread of torpedo attacks, Admiral Rozhdcstvcnsky's squadron started on its' voyage under conditions not calculated to inspire confidence either ainid tho officers or their crews. Consisting, as tlie Baltic fleet did, of old ironclads patched up in hot liaste, with admittedly faulty machinery, scratch crews gathered under coercion from all parts of tho empire, manned by inexperienced sailora and officers, there was little to inspire any confidence. " Moreover," he says, " every member of each ship's company, from the captain to the cabin boy, had doubtless learned before starting that in the opinion of the Russian Aditiiralty the squadron would possibly, if not probably, be attacked during its passage from Libau to : th-j, Straits of Dover by Japaneso torpedocrs or submarines, sent out under ■ falstf colours and shrouded with mystery. Even in the best regulated navies the crew is rarely ui full possession of its senses till some days after leaving port, and there is nothing incredible in the supposition that under such conditions - 'both officers and men should in tlie foil off the Dogger Tiank have mistaken one of their own vessels fof a Japanese lorpedoer. Neither can I assert." he adds, " that the torpedo boats which the Russian officers dcolare they either saw themselves, or knew to have been seen in the North Sea by others, were phantom Tessels."

In view of-the cortainty that the Russian fleet was confronted, in their judgment, by tins danger of being suddenly blown to atoms during their outward Voyage, Professor Dieev doubts " whether our demand for the infliction of any .punishment upon the officers who were the immediate authors of (he-Hull outrage, n-quite in accordance with abstract jiistioe," He thinks that "tlio rail gravalnan of our ease against Russia, is Mint her. Goyernmenti tiiowing that her fleet

was sailing under, orders to tiro at any Japanese torpedo they might ehanco to encounter, did not give warning to. the Govoriimo.it of a friendly neutral Power Mich as England, in otder, that our mercantile marine , !" tlio North Soa-shoiild iiofc be exposed to the unnecessary , danger," ami ho believes the simple explanation of ihe wholo • ghastly transaction to bo that {tin o.'ficers of one ,or moro «■ (ho Russian ineii-of-war mistook sotno of tiicir own torpedo boats for Japanese vossols of war,' aiid, owing to .the fog—fliehtdl, perhaps, as well "as material—by which tliey were surrounded, fired upon Hufnian torped<k'is which, havihg drifted; out> of their right bourse, had got mixed up witlr a fleet of British trawlhig boats. Tlio Professor tnnkes short work of the report that the alleged Warning to RtisSia as to the preseilco of Japanese vessels ciuiio from Germany. He has investigated this matter, and finds that, on the contrary, Russia. had warned the Governments of Germany, Sweden, and Denmark that the Baltic fleet would probably be ; attacked in. its passage through the Genua,ti Oeoan, which showed that a naval attack on tlio Baltic fleet in the neighbourhood of the Dogger liaiil; was regarded by Russia as a ljossiblo, if not a probable, contingency, wherefore it may bo assumed as almost a matter of certainty that orders were given from tlio Russian Admiralty to the officers of the-fleet us (o their duly in tho event of their sighting Japanese torpedo boats, and if the officers who gave the orders to tire only followed the instructions given them, a-de-mand for the punishment of the Russian officers who may bo shown to. have given the orders to tiro is inconsistent with equity, if not with law.