THE ELINGAMITE DISASTER.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 12565, 20 January 1903, Page 3

THE ELINGAMITE DISASTER.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT. THE CAPTAIN'S CERTIFICATE SUS- • ' ' TENDED. (Per United Press Association.) i AUCKLAND, January 19. I The decision oi the Court of Inquiry into | the wreok of the Elingamito was given to- \ day. After gom; into particulars regarding I tho vessel, the decision proceeds: On Satur- : day, Bth November, the vessel's position was - ascertained a. .loon by observation and found to be 33.59 S. latitude and 166.45 E. , longitude, i'he weather had been fino up | to this time, and a good run had been made, j The ship's log has been lost With the ship, , and there, appears to be no written data to . which referonce can be made, but from , recollection the masler says the distance run j from b p.m. on the sth November, when the ] vo-sel left Sydney Heads, to noon on the . 6th was about 200 miles, and from noon on , the 6th co noon on the 7th 285 miles, and ] from noon on the 7th to noon on the Bth , 29b miles. ' Tho last-mentioned. 24 hours' j run would, deducting the difference in lime | running cast, give 12£ knots speed. The j distance from the noon position on Saturday 1 to a point, about eight miles south of the ■, West King on a S. 86£deg east course true ] was 262 miles, and with a speed of 12| knots i per hour this could be run in 21 hours, but | with 12 knots spsed in 22 hours. The vessel i would, therefore arrive at this point between < 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. on Sunday, 9th Novem- ( bei. At 4 p.m. on Saturday, the Bth, it was i discovered that the patent log had fouled, ; aha no Teliance could be placed on it to : denoie the distance ran. _ The speed was - therefore guessed at by the master and . second officer, and they estimated it at ; 12 Knots, although during the previous day a speed of 124 knots had been,shown, and there were no conditions to indicate a lesser speed. On Saturday afternoon the weather became hazy, and continued so throughout the night. At daylight on Sunday morning not" more than two miles ahead could be discerned. As the morning went on the weather became thick and foggy, and this I fog so increased that at 10 a.m. not more i <hun two ship's lengths ahead could be seen.- i It is necessary to here consider what was 1 the position of the master at this particular i point of time. His safety depended on his ; not having deviated from his course and i not having overrun his distance. Since the i wreck of the AVairarana in 1894 no master should plead ■ want of knowledge of the ■ currents off the Three Kings; but knowledge of strong currents and sea in the locality of 1 the Three Kings, Cape Maria Van Diemen, . nnd the North Cape has been comriton to seamen in these waters for many years past. Tho New Zealand Pilot mentions the fact, and the charts indicate it. The master could not rely on his log to indicate the distance win, and he could see no land, light, or mark by which to ascertain his position. One incans he had of averting disaster, and that was, by sounding. If less than 100 fathoms was found he would know he was in danger. He could then feel his way, and his chart would enable him, to estimate tho degree of danger. He had on board Sir William Thompson's patent sounding apparatus, andlie says he gave ordera for it to be prepared," intending to use it at 11 a.m. He •did not use it, and tho'disaster to bis ship was tho result. A ' look-out man was stationed at the forecastle head, the fog whistle was sounded at intervals, and at 10 a.m. the engines were, slowed down to "slow speed," giving, it is said, a speed of 4J knots. But the court is of opinion that, considering thenumb?r of revolutions (44 per minute), the pitch of the screw (18ft 6in), the fairness of tho wind, and probable current, a lonriderably greater speed was attained. Although the master had found at noon on Saturday that he was two or three miles northward of his course, he appears to have allowed nothing for the set during the succeeding period 0f,22 hours; but at 10 a.m. on Sunday he altered his course to N. 80 E. true, which would, put him still more to the. northward and more up to the Kings. He offers no reason for this alteration, except that he found it southerly est on a previous voyage, and 'he judged it wise to make it. Ho had no reliable data on which to found a reason for so doins. He did not know the speed accurately; he had even no special measures to ascertain it from the log after 4 p.m. on Saturday. / He could see no snfe distance, nor had lie ascertained his speed when going " slow ahead." Ho was making for a passage between the Kings and the mainland, which is 15 miles in width, if calculated on an area of safe water. After 10. a.m. the fog thickened until the master fays he could not seo more than two lengths ahead; qitd some of the seamen, and the look-out man in particular, gave a much less distance. At 10.45 the catastrophe happened. Some seconds before the look-out mnn saw the danger, the master, from his place on the bridgo, saw breakers on the port bow, and at once rang the telegraph for "Full speed astern," and then the lookout lealled " Breakers -ahead " and rang his belli Tho wheel was put hard a-port. ' The order to the engine room was repeated from below. The engines stopped, but did not reverse. Tho master repeated the order more than once, but no movement came from tho engines; ancl : then the third engineer, who was sent for the purpose by the cihief engineer, came on the bridge and informed the master, who then said with truth that it was too late. The vessel was then on the rocks ahead and also broadside on to rocks a-port. Not than two minuteß would elapse from _the time danger ■was discovered until the vessel struck bow on. The master asserts that if tho engines Lhad gone astern when ordered the ship would have been safed, as she was then two lengths from-the rocks. Surveying engineers assert that when the order was given the ship was then on land, and they suggest that the cause of the engines not working was either that the propeller was held externally ir that the bottom of the vessel was so injured by contact with The land that the tunnel shafting was thrown out of alignment and jammed. The disputed facte will be dealt with hereafter as far as possible. The court wishes to ..first deal with ihose facts that are not clouded by contradictory evidence. The vessel struck at 10.45 a.m., and almost immediately it was apparent- that recourse must be had to the boats and rafts. The master ordered the boats to be got out, and told the chief steward to provision them as well as ho could. Tho passengers, assisted by tho stewards and stewardesses, put on lifebelts, and, there seems to have been no deficiency in. the number of belts required either by passengers or crew. The stewards amd stewardesses did their duty Well. Naturally . there would be some confusion, or seeming confusion, when 126 passengers wera obtaining and fastening on 1 lifebelts, but no panio or oven disorder appears to have taken, place. The work of lowering the boats was not performed well. , There was more confusion and less discipline than should have been the case, oven under the slress of the situation. There wera 56 male. members of tho crew on board. If these had been properly distributed every boat could have been got out iu a few minutes. The seamen should have been mixed willi other members of the crewso that a proportion of each clnss should have attended io each boat. Evidence was given of neriodicnl boat drills' having been held on board. Accepting the statements made as to these drills as accurate, it is npparent that no thorough or efficient drill was held. What' occurred was this: The Whistle for boat drill sounded; some of the men turned up round one,boat, tho small dingey, and it was hoisted out of the chocks to the rail. The rest of (lie drill was taken as. performed, end an irksome matter of form was considered as having been gone through. When the occasion arose for testing the valun of such drill it showed its inefficiency. No compasses were kept in the boats. The compasses were fceut in a locked box on the bridge,"'mul to this fact may bo attributed,the loss of many lives. The report then proceeds to deal with the lowering of tbo. boats, stating that No. 1 boat (starboard forward lifeboat), capable of carrying 50 people, was lowered amid a

good deal of confusion. The life line fouled tho falls and acted imperfectly, and the disengaging gear did not work. After smashing against the side of tho ship for some timo the falls were ovenlually cut, and some 23 people, including-six children, got into the boat, and Captain Reid, an experienced seaman, who was a passenger iil tho ship, took charge of the boat under the master's authority, and immediately pulled off to find a landing on one of the islands. Captain Reid says he wanted others, especially men, to come with him in tho boat, but tho master ordered liirn'away. This was a most regrettable error of judgment. Before so large a boat should have left the ship enly half filled with people it should have been ascertained what other boats were available for those people left .on board. The boat left the ship in a dense fog, without a compass or provision l ;, and the reason given for not putting compasses into the other boats could not have applied at tho timo to No. 1. The compasses were in a box on the bridge, eiid could have beer obtained. There was a dense fog prevailing at the time, and the chances of finding the wreck with or without a comnass were few. Captain Reid had with him in this boat four of the ship's company, six male and scvon female passengers and six children. It was .doubtful if. Amy of the port boats could he launched, and, as it iturnwl out, it was a fatal mistake to send or take ft large boat away from the ship half loaded. Captain Reid nnd his party effected a landing about 4 o'clock that afternoon, and were soon joined by No. 3 boat (tho dingey) and No. 5. They were too exhausted to mako any attempt to return to tho wreck that afternoon,, or.to look for the .afts they knew were somcwborc near; but at 4- o'clock the next morning an attempt was made, but was unsuccessful, and after being out till 8.30 o'clock on Monday night without food they managed to .effect a landing on the Big King, and were rescucd by the s.s. Zealandia, on Tuesday morning. A mistake was made in prematurely leaving tho ship. A very courageous attempt, was made to redeem it the following day, but it shared the fate of most attempts to eo redeem failure at a crisis. Captaim Reid was, however, successful in rescuing the fore cabin steward from a perilous position on a rock. Tho people who had been landed from No. I. No. 3. and No. 5 were rescucd next morning by the Zealandin." Tile lowering of the other five boats is then described in detail, and the report proceeds:—With the exception- of 'No. none of the boats when they left the wreck had any provisions other than water. There appears to have been' a beaker of water in each of the lifeboats, but none in the dingey or gig. There were no compasses in any of the boats, and probably the loss of No. 4, with its occupants, and much suffering to tho occupants of the other boats and rafts, arose front this omission, Tho compasses were kept in a locked box on tho bridge, the key to which was in the chart room, Tho chief officer says he tried to get the compasses, but tho box containing them was washed overboard. But if thi« is true, it could not have happened while the boats wore being got out, as there was no great rolling for some time, and no seas swept the ship for some 15 minutes after sho struck. Tho chief officer was himself swept off tho ship at tho last, and it must have been very shortly Iwfore this that ho looked for the compasses. There was ample time to get the compasses liofore the boats left the ship. The chief officer suggested that the practice df keeping the boat compasses in the locked box was approved by the surveyor ill Melbourne, but that rfScer in an official communication repudiates this suggestion, and alleges that at his last survey in April, 1902, the compasses were in the four lifeboats, and were then in good condition. There is no difficulty in keeping compasses safely and in good order in tho respective boats. Several methods of doing this have been pointed out. Apparently unablo to find a place in any boat, some of tho passengers and crew got out the two rafts. These Tafts wore secured on the awning deck. No knives were attached to the rafts, .and difficulty was experienced in cutting tho lashings, which w:cro too hard to untie. Nineteen people, managed to get on one raft and eight on Hie other, and soon after getting clear from tho week three were taken by smaller raft from the 19 on the.'larger, thus making the respective numbers 16 and 11. Dr G'oldic, who was on the smaller raft, says they had two oars, and that they asked tho boats which-camp near them to take them in tow, but met with no response. They were fortunate enough to reach a landing that evening, and n&xt morning were sighted by Captain Reid. and eventually rescued on Tucxlay by tho Zealandia. The large raft had a more terrible experience. This raft was not so buoyant (is the smaller one, nnd the battening or decking was constantly under water. Mr AVetherilt-, an experienced marine engineer nnd inspector of machinery for the New Zealand Government, who was a passenger, gave evidence that they had one oar, one Tollock, and a paddle, no water, or provisions. The second cabin stewardess (Miss M'Guirk) was on board this raft. Mr AVetherilt says they besought the purser (in No. 5 boat) to keep near them and to take Miss M'Guirk into his boat, but neither request was granted. The boats would r.ot come alongside, apparently from fear of lwinir rushed. One boat had a sail on, and Mr AVetherilt is positive that this boat, could see them, but passed them by. The raft drifted about until Thursday afternoon, when it was found by H.Af.S. Pcnetiin. During the period from Sunday to Thursday the people on board were without food or water and constantly wet. Right persons died, including Miss M'Guirk. The statements published as to unnatural conduct by those on the raft are unwarranted.- Thirst, Imncror. cold, exposure, and confinement wrecked the reason of «ome. Eight died, and tho survivors suffered as severely as men can sufte and live, but there appears no foundation for any charge of unnatural conduct. •

Although it would by no means exonerate the master if it were shown that the ship would have escaped if the engines had reversed, and that there was no cause external to the engines to prevent them reversing, it is nceessary to consider the evidence adduced on this "point. The issue is simple and clear. The engineers say in effect that the vessel was wrecked before the order to reverse was riven. Every other witness called says that there was ample time to revcrso.and get clear after the order was given and be-fore the vessel touched at all. Unfortunately, the_ chief engineer is lost, and therefore the evidence of the person responsible for tho condition of tho engines is not obtainable. The sccond, third, and fourth engineers gave evidonee. They say that the engines were. in perfect order, but did not reverse' when the reversing; gear was put over. Tlieysay the vessel bumped simultaneously with the order to reverse, and that the, tanTcs discharged through the .air pipes into tho engine room. They suggest that the propeller was held externally, and that therefore the engines could not reverse, or that 'the vessel was so nuicli injured by contact with the land as lo throw the tunnel shafting out of alignment. The court is of opinion tliat there was lio grounding astern until after the vessel 'struck forward. If the stern of the vessel was held she would not, have swung stern into the rocks. The vessel was gliding smoothly ahead at at least four and a-halt knots, and,, probably, at a considerably greater speed, when the order to reverie came. Her engines stopped, and she continued to proceed with the way she had on until she struck, how on. No one on board outside the engine room perceived any touching or bumping such as was deposed to by the engineers, and their story is at variance with tho known conditions existing at the time, The engineers all told the same story, advanced the same theory, and showed the same reluctance to speak candidly about the engines. Whether the engines were jammed, or whether they were too slack, or whether the steam had been so lowered as to prevent sufficient power being applied when required lo reverse, or whether there was any other cause for the defect the court is unable to say. But it is clear that, owing to some defect in the engines, the reversing gear would not act. and the chance of ,thiis saving the vessel was consequently lost. Unsatisfactory as the testimony of the engineers was, arid dangerous as the condition of the engines probably was, the court cannot hold the surviving engineers responsible for what happened. They were at their nosts and obeyed orders. This court cannot punish them by suspending their certificates or ordering them to pay ccsta.

Although poHiWy the vessel could have boon extricatrd from her danirer had the engines been in perfect order thft master 18 none the l*ss responsible for having so lost tho ship. The court finds that the master has hewi guilty of grossly negligent navigation—in driving full .speed through a fog up to 10 a.m. 011 Sunday, when he must havn known ho vor near land; (2) in neglecting to sound before end after 10a.m.; (3) in altering his course 'without sufficient reason; (4) in proceeding at four anda-half knots or over without sounding; (5) in not carefully ascertaining his speed when going u slow ahead"; (6) in guessing his speed from noon, Saturday, at 12 knpts/when everything nointed to a higher fiDeed. The cdurt finds" that after the- wreck ft grave error of judgment was ; committed by toe master in allowing I boat'to Ipavo the ship, and to leave with only half^the complement of people'■ the' boat was able to

carry. No sufficient excuse has been urged either by the master or Captain Reid for ! £0 leaving the wreck. . j The master and first officer are to blame . for not having all the boats properly equipped and the tackle in proper order and the crew efficiently .exorcised in boat : drill. Tito rafts were abandoned by tho boats. Those in the boats should have stood by the rafts as Ion? as'possible. The master and officers should have kept both boats and rafts together until at least a concerted plan of notion was arrived at. The court is of opinion that, while the certificates of the first and second officers must bo returned to thorn, their conduct is not commendable, cither in handling the boats at. the time of. the wreck or in leaving passengers adrift on rafts. Tiie court orders the of the master. Ernest Baeot Attwood,. No. 679, Victorian Board of Trade,'to bo suspended for one year, and that the said Ernest Bacot Attwood do pay to the Honourable tho Minister of Marine for New Zealand the sum of £50 towards the costs of this inquiry. " . The certificates of the other officers of tho sliio are to be returned to them. r Jf,c report is signed by Mr W. R. Hasolden (sliriendiavy magistrate), Captains George G* Smith and William Waddelova (nautical a'rcmsors), and Sir George Twigden (engineer assessor).