THE BOER WAR.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 12419, 31 July 1902, Page 3

THE BOER WAR.

; A SHORT HISTORY.

THE FALL OF PRETORIA.

The march upon Bloemfontein, grand military exploit though it was, was as mere child's play compared with the advance to Pretoria, which stands unrivalled in the history of modem warfare. It redounds to the credit of the British army, no less than to tlifl military genius of the veteran Field-marshal, that the march from Bloemfontein to Pretoria out-distances all previous feats of the kind. Indeed, for boldness of conception and success in execution, that 'grand triumphal march of Lord Roberts's army marks the British Corn-mondor-in-Chief as the first military genius of tho present time. The whole plan of campaign, from Modder River eamp to Pretoria, had been outlined from the start, and no circumstance, not even tho changing fortunes of war, induced Lord Roberts to diverge a single.point' from the original plan. There were subsidiary issues that liad'to be dealt with, but in spite of these tho major strategy of the campaign was never altered. Beforo detailing that re.nvarkable march it might not be out of place to compare it with past military feats that won for the leaders who planned them lasting renown. In 13V0 the second German army, inarching from Mctz to the Loire, taking all its corps together, averaged only 12 miles a day, tho 9th Corps—the fastest—averaging 13| miles. Tho march of Napoleon's grand array from the Channel to the Rhine in 1805 has always been quoted by military students as the fastest on record. Tho distanoe traversed by the three army corps was 400 miles, and tho timo occupied was 25 days, or an average of 16 miles a day; and it must not be overlooked that that march was performed under specially favourable circumstances of roads and weather, through a friendly country awl unopposed. Lord Roberts, on tho other hand, had to fight his way through the enemy's country all, tho way, over almost impassable roads, amid torrents of rain in . tho ■ rainy season, and where supplies could not be procured en route. The British amy, iu short, had to bo self-sus-taining all the way.. The distance from Bloemfontein to Elandsfontein is 254 miles, and the total distance was covered in 18 days, or an average of 14 miles per day. The second half of the march, from Krconstad to Elandsfontein, a distanc; of 126 miles, was covered in seven days, or an average of 18 miles a day, which constitutes a record in great military feats. "Boldly conceived,'precisely planned, carefully executed, it will take its place in military history as a' remarkable operation of war, worthy both of leader and followers." The objective of Lord Roberts's campaign was Pretoria—to strike at the heart of the enemy's country and to seize his arsenals and. military stores. "When Lord Roberts entered the Free State capital on March 13 he resolved to make a long halt for the purpose of resting and recruiting his wornout army. He further decided to make Bloemfontein his advance base for the invasion of the Transvaal, and not to move until 60 days' supplies for the pirny had liec-n brought .up from Cape Colony. Clearly the men and horses could not be asked to endure the privations they had been called upon to undergo during the swift, decisive march upon Bloemfontein. At the commencement of the campaign .it was necessary to quickly follow up the initial success; but the starvation prooess could not be repeated on the long march to Pretoria. The oharacter of the Dutch people is marked by strange contrasts—overweening confidence alternating with abject cowardice. To say that the Boers had got a great fright . by the phenomenal succes3 of Lord Roberts's ever-victorious army is only to state a bald fact. On all hands it was recognised that the Boer army was demoralised and disorganised; yet suoh is the wonderful recuperative power of the burghers that they soon rallied again when they found that lord Roberts made no attempt at immediate advance from Bloemfontein. De Wet, with a strong commando, essayed a counter stroke, and attempted to cut Lord Roberts's communications south of Bloemfontein.' On the 26th of March the Boers advanced upon Ladybrand simultaneously with Colonel Pilcher, who had been detached with a small force by General Broadwood to occupy the town. The Boer commando fell back upon Thabanehu, which was occupied by Broadwood. The latter, finding himself in the presence of a superior force, decided to retire to . Bloemfontein. While executing this movement, it will be remembered, the head of hie column was ambushed bv a force of the enemy at Koorn Spruit, and a large number of prisoners, together with guns and convoy, captured. • Included among the prisoners were 17 New Zealanders of the First Contingent, most of whom were sitting in the waggons at the time of the disaster. Leaving a strong post at Thabanchu, the Boers pushed on to Dewetsdorp, driving out the email British detachment which had been sent there by General Gatacre. By April 4 the Boer commando had reached Reddersburg, on the way capturing three companies of the Irish Rifles and two companies oi the Sixth Mounted Infantry Regiment. Finding their further advance opposed by a strong British force, the Boers fell back on i Dewetsdorp. Meanwhile another commando had advanced to Wepener, and surrounded the vanguard of General Brabant's force. Such was the position of affairs on April 9. Lord Roberts thereupon ordered in all out- ) lying detacliments and despatched a strong force to deal with the Boer raiders. In consequence of the movements of the forces under Generals Bundle and Brabant, the Boers evacuated Dewetsdorp and Wepener on the night of April 24 and retired on Ladybrand. "According to all the rules and experience of war," says a critic, "the* attempted counter-stroke by the Boers on the British' rear would only have been justifiable had it been made with a forco superior to that which Lord Roberts could oring to bear on any threatened point of his line of communications." But instead of that being the case the Boer force only numbered 7000 while the strength of the British troops concentrated at various points between Bloemfontein and Springfontein amounted to fully 25,000 men. Still, despite the disparity between the Boer and British forces, De Wet gave Lord Roberts a good deal of trouble before he was finally driven off. 'The defeat and dispersion of De Wet's force waa for the time being of secondary importance, compared with the necessity for preserving intact the railway communication with the sea base." The possibility of further advance depended upon the railway between the seaport and the advanced base. When Lord Roberts learned that the Boers were retreating on Ladybrand he ordered General Pole-Carew in from Dewetsdorp to Bloemfontein; sent General French with the cavalry and General Rundlo to Thabanchu, while General Chermsid® had to remain at Dewetsdorp. At the same time General lan Hamilton was to press on to Thabanchu and endeavour to intercept the Boer force retreating northward. But General Hamilton's progress was necessarily slow, as Tie had to fight De Wet's rearguard all the way, and the Boers clung to successive positions with all thoir wontcxl tenacity when fighting behind cover. It was not until the afternoon of the 27th that Hamilton readied Thabanchu, whero he was joined the same day by French, who had come up from Dewetsdorp. Tho British army was now deployed on a 3ino extending 40 miles from Bloemfontein to Thabanchu. Lord Roberts disposed his army in two columns. The 7th and 11th Divisions, with Hunter's Brigade of Mounted Infantry, composed the left column, which the Fieldmarehal personally accompanied; while the Oth Division (under Colvile). Bruce Hamilton's Brigade, and Ridley's Mounted Infantry formed the right column, under General lan Hamilton. The 6th Division, under Kolly-Kenny, was left to hold Bloemfontein, and tha Bth Division, under Bundle, at Thabanchu, bad orders to clear the right flank of the advancing army up to Senekal. On tho 30th General lan Hamilton moved out his mounted infantry brigade on the Winburg road, and found a Boer forco posted in a strong position at Houtnek,

under command of General Botha.. ISruco Hamilton's Brigado and French's Cavalry reinforcod lan Hamilton during tho night, The Boer position was attacked on the following day, May 1, and driven out, when Botha retired in a, north-easterly direction. After driving of!' Botha's commando French took his cavalry Iracki to Hloomfontoin to lest, leaving Broadwood's Brigade with lan Hamilton, wiio also rested. On the 3rd Lord Koberta entered liramlfort with tho left column, driving out J)e; la Key, who also made off in a north-easterly direction. Onthe 4th Button's Mounted Infantry reconnoitred up to tho Yet River, while lan Hamilton advanced to within 20 miles of Winbiirg.

On the sth Lord Roberts advanced with tho left column to the Vet River, and drove tho Boers from thoir positions south uf the river, which Hutton crossed. Next day ,Lord Roberts advanced to Smaldcel, while lan Hamilton, with the right column, oecupied Winburg. Next day both columns halted, and on the Bth French came up witli his cavalry, forming the left wine of the advancing army. Ilutton oil the'left and Broadwood on the right reconnoitred up to , the Zand River, and reported the enemy in force strongly posted on tho north bank with artillery. But Lord Roberts now had the Boora fairly on the run, and no position was strong enough to induce them to stand when once an enveloping force threatened them. Oh the 10th the passage of the Zand River was forced by tho mounted troops, aided by tho artillery, the Boers only resisting long enough to get away their'guns and conroys. So rapid was the advance of the invading army -that the Boers offered no opposition, and vacated their entrenchments at Boschrand before the British came in sight. Without further opposition Lord Roberts entered Kroonstad, ■ 128 miles from Bloemfontein, on the 12th. President Steyn fled to Lindley the night beforo, while Botha with the Transvaal burghers, retired to the Yaal River. At Ivrocnstad Lord Roberts halted for 10 days to repair the railway and form an advance depot. Those 10 days might liave been priceless to tho Boers had jliey taken tho fullest advantage of them, but by this time they were without a capable leader; and had already degenerated into guerilla commandos, acting to a great extent independently of each other. On the-Zlst of May the second stage of the march began, the culminating act of Lord Roberts's great plan to crush the' Boers by a There 'Was a consensus of opinion in military circles that the Boers would make a determined stand at the Vaal River, but the now method of afiack developed by Lord. Roberts had completely upset all Boer notions of defence. The left column reached the Rhenoster River on the 23rd, the Boers having vacated their strongly cntrcnchd position on the north bank as soon as they discovered that lan Hamilton had found their left flank. Next day the cavalry and mounted infantry were sent to the Vaal River, and French crossed that same evening at Pary's Drift, while lan Hamilton marched westward on Bosehbanlc. The advance of the whole force upen the Vaal River was pushed with all possible despatch. and the passage of the river sucaccomplished on the 27th. The Boere did not wait, but fell back as soon as they discovered that French had slipped round their flank. On tho 28th Lord Roberts's column' advanced to the Klip River xinopposed, the Boers abandoning all their entrenched positions beforo the British eamo in touch with them. Next day the main column reached Elandsfontein, still without opposition, and took possession of the railway junctions with Johannesburg. A Boer force was strongly posted three miles south of that town, but an enveloping movement bv lan Hamilton, French, and Hutton drovet the Boers off northwards. The Boers making no further stand, Johannesburg was surrounded' on the 30th. and called upon to surrender within 24 hours. The. keys were handed over to the victors next -day, and Lord Roberts ordered a halt for a couple of days. By. this time the President of the Transvaal realised that the house of cards he had at such tremendous cost built had come tumbling about his ears, and fled from his capital. Paul Kruger, who was to "stagger humanity' when the British advanced upon Pretoria, had incontinently fled, leaving his wife and womenfolk behind him; but in his -hurry he did not forget the gold in the Pretoria Bank and the Government treasure chests! Everyone had expected that the' Boers would mako a stand at Pretoria, with its elaborate fortifications and arsenals; but all the heavy guns had been sent to the front with the Boer army, and Lord Roberts had pressed his advance so fast that i)°i time was allowed to restore the guns to the forts—those empty, useless structures which remained only as fitting monuments of Boer folly and Kragerian madness.. On Juno 3 Lord Roberts advanced his whole arniy upon Pretoria, next.day attacked the Boers in their entrenched position at Six Mile Spruit, and at nightfall drove tliem into Pretoria., That samo night General Botha offered to surrender the town, which Lord Roberts entered on June 5, 1900, and hoisUd the British flag, never again to be lowered wo devoutly hope. •

THE RELIEF OP MAFEKING. While Lord Roberts was fully occupied with the conduct of his great campaign to Bloemfontein and Pretoria, he did not overlook the beleagured town in the north-west, rojand which had beat, so long angry waves of vengeful hate. Mafeking, a littlo frontier town on the Cape-Buluwayo railway, was isolated on Octobcr 14-, and was fortunate in having Colonel R. S.'S. Baden-Powell, of the sth Dragoon Guards, to guido its fortunes during the memorable siege that followed its investment. The Boers meant to reduce Mafeking as the initial move in their game, but they reckoned without their host, with the resourceful Baden-Powoll at the head of affairs within the tbwn. Believing that the almost defenceless town could be carried by assault, Cronje resolved to hurl a strong force of about- 8000 against it, but the first experience of the Boers with BadenPowell somewhat damped their ardour.' They succeeded in wrecking an armoured train that had left the town and was returning, and thinking they might liave a weakness for armoured trains Baden-Powell sent one out with a couple of tracks' of dynamite. Sure enough the Boers attacked, and when the driver uncoupled the engine and steamed back they came closer and' fired a. volley, thinking the trucks might conceal troops. The result was that the dynamite oxploded, killing a number of Boers, and completely shattering the nerves of all within, a considerable radius. Thenceforth the' fioers treated the armoured train, ( which did signal sen-ice throughout the siego, with respect, and never attempted to come to close quarters with it. Before ho left England BndenPowell remarked to a friend:'" I hope they will give me a warm comer"; but littlo did lie know that the hottest corner in all the war was to be reserved for his special benefit. And, as all the world now knows, it is to his remarkable genius and marvellous resourcefulness that Cronje expended the whole strength of his commando in vain, and, retiring disgusted, left the task to a subordinate, who violated every canon of civilisation in his diabolical attempts to redueo the town. In addition to fivo 7-pounders. one 10-pounder, two luupp 12-pounders, and a, 94-pounder Creusot gun,' the Boer , commander sent to Pretoria for.a Krupp 100pounder, Against this weight of ordinance all that the Mafeking garrison had to reply with was some obsolete muzzle-loading 7poundcrs. The character of the bombardment may be imagined from the fact that on the 24th of Octobcr and the day following about 300 shells were sent into the town, but. fortunately, without doing any serious damage, As Baden-l'owell put it, on another occasion, in a characteristic) message: " October 21. All well. Four hours' bombardment. One dog killed." On the 25th, under cover of a heavy shell liro, the Boers assaulted the town from all sides, but were met with such a fusillade from rillcs aud Maxims, and were so terrified by exploding that they soon gave up the attempt. On October 27 a successful sortie was made upon thoenemy's trenches at night, and some splendid work was got in with the bayonet. The moral effect of the frequent night sorties was such as to deter the Boers from pushing their trendies closer to the town, and BadenPowell soon resorted to counter milliner. The 7-pounders could not reach the Boer " Long Toms" from the town, but the garrison had the trick of carrying their sap to. well within range, and then some lino morning, when the Boer gunners stood to their guns to sholl the town, tlic-y suddenly found themselves under sholl fire from an unexpected quarter. The moral effect of, this practice was also good, and saved ilafelcing no end of bombardment. Very early in the siege Cronje thought Badon-PowelL would rccognise the futility of holding out, and sent a messenger demanding surrender. The reply was characteristic of the defender of Mafeking: "Tell General Cronje I will let him know when we have had enough." Gronje's' reply was 26 hours' shell fire, during which 300 shells were sent into the town. But space forbids entering into details of the scige of this little frontier town. The story has been told with many variations by numerous writers, and has now passed into current history. When Cronje left in disgust to take a more important command. General Synmaii tried his hand at bringing Mafeking to reason; but in Jiaden-Powell he founfl more ilian a match. As the siege continued, and still no sign of surrender, Synman deliberately r-hellod the women's laager, and resorted to all this brutalities of a savage. A considerable portion of his force consisted of foreign mercenaries of every nationality—the scum of Europe—men who have placed themselves outside JJib jiale of civilisation by their

devilry during that memorable siege. Tha bombardment steadily continued, and by tlie beginning of April," 1900, it was estimated that,WOO 241b ?holls and several thousand smaller projectiles had been thrown into the town, special attention having been paid to the women's laager and hospital. All the while the bravo garrison were enduring the direst privations; but the personal magnetism of their, resourceful. commander inspired tliem witii confidence in their ability to hold out till' the long-lookcd-for relief eame. Colonel Plumer, with a small Rhedesian force, attempted to relieve tho town. On March 31 Plumer, with 270 mounted men, a few mounted infantry, and one Maxim, advanced to within eix■ inilos of Mafeking. Simultaneously the garrison made a sortie from the town, but after an hour's heavy fighting Plumer had again to retire, with a lose of 47 killed and wounded and 13 missing. Plumer himself was wounded in 'tho right arm, and bad his horse shot under him. By litis time feeling at Homo ran high, and it was' feared that Lord Roberts meant to leave Mafeking to its fate, as of small importance in comparison with his .principal campaign. It was thought that Lord Metliuen had been despatched to the relief of Mafeking; but his subsequent withdrawal dispelled that hope. Lord lioberts had, however, another plan, which only became known after the town had been relieved. For a time hope centred in Sir Frederick Cah'ington, who had been sent from Bcira with the Australian Bushmen and the Now Zealandcrs of tho Fourth and Fifth Contingents, and no doubt the Boers were quite as much puzzled as were the quiet, stay-at- j home folks concerning Lord Roberts's intentions'regarding the beleaguered town. | Having asked Baden-Powell to hold out a! little longer, Lord Koberts secretly despatched a flying column for the relief of Mafeking. So well was the secret guarded that no one except the officers in charge of the column knew its destination. The column . pushed up from Kimberley, making a wide ' detour westward of the railway to avoid encountering the enemy on the wav. Sir Frederick Carrington and Colonel Plumer were in communication with tho relief column under Colonel Mahon, and cooperated with liirn in finally driving the Boers away from the town. On May 13 the Boer commandant, Eloff, a nephew of the President of the Transvaal, who was sent to supcrscdo Commandant Synman, made a determined and partially successful assault upon the town in (lie early morning. The Boers rushed tho pickets and entered the Cane Protectorate Regiment's camp before the rest of tlie town knew what had happened. But "flip man who never sleeps" was quickly rilert, and promptly improvised a ' second line of defence. It was a time for instant action, for the Boers under Synman had simultaneously 1 made a strong musketry demonstration on the eastern side of the town. Despite the enervating effects of tho long siege and the soul-crusliing influence of hope deferred. nil the old lion in Mafeking's brave defender was aroused. Cool, collected, and j determined, he set. about trapping the almost foolhardy Eloff, and succeeded in completely ' surrounding him. Eloff fought stubbornly all day, but at night' was forced to surrender, leaving 10 dead and 19 wounded. The Boer commandant, 107 Boers, 17 Frenchmen, and a number or Germans wero taken prisoners, and so ended the most serious'danger the besieged town had experienced. The loss to the garrison was six killed and 11 wounded. It. is generally recognised in military circles that had Synman pushed his attack) Mafeking must, have fallen, but jealousy of Eloff. no less than fear of Baden-Powell, rendered his assault only, lwlf-hearted. A better fate was reserved for the noble garrison who had upheld tho honour of the flag under such, trying circumstances. Colonel Malian' and Colonel Plumer joined hands at Massibis, near Pitsani, on May 15. On the 13th Colonel Malian had fought tho Boers in thick bush, and lost five men killed and 24 wounded, but they punished the Boers most severely,; and the latter withdrew. On the 17th Colonel Mahon encountered 1500 Boers posted in a strong position nine miles from Mafeking, and after five hours' fighting drove them off. He then entered Mafeking with the relief column at 4 o'clock on Friday morning, May 18. A portion of Sir Frederick Carrington's Colonial Bushmen, consisting of Canadians, and Queonslanders,. took part in the relief. Dismounted, these men advanced by forced marches through heavy sand, and accompanied Colonel Plumer to the meeting place of the combined forces near Pitsani. From Massibis the combined foree had to march 25 miles to Mafeking, which distance wan covered principally by a night march, and the Boers were so completely surprised that Synman:had barely time to make good his escape. There were many instances of conspicuous bravery, and the Queensland Bushmen, in tlie fight before Mafeking, are credited with " magnificent recklossness," yet they came through seatliless. The rejoicings throughout the British Empire were, of the most enthusiastic character, people simply giving themselves up to the abandonment of joy. During the later days of tlie protracted siege the suspense everywhere became almost unendurable, and the reaction when news came that the town had been, rejieved sent the people wild with delight. History records longer sieges; but none that were borne With such magnificent' courage and such a, display of fertility of resource as the siege of Mafeking. For 217 days, like a rock in mid-ocean, the little frontier town withstood the raging tide of a vengeful in-' vesting force. Driven to the direst straits lor foot], subsisting upon horseflesh, aye, and horse hides'even, the capture of a, swarm of locusts came as a welcome change. There were brave men and braver women in Mafeking, for, uncomplaining, in the midst of. constant danger, suffering, and privation, they nobly upheld the courage, of the men I)y their splendid devotion. The brave defender of Mafeking was promptly promoted to Major-general, m just recognition of his magnificent servico to Queen and Empire. The history of warfare records no grander feat than the march of the relief column under Colonel Mahon, which averaged 20 miles a day, eclipsing Lord Roberts's famous march to Kandahar, which averaged 16 miles a day. ° \ AU j CULLER'S SECOND NATAL CAM- ! PAIGN. ' i M Inle Lord Roberts was crumpling up tho ' Boer army and "driving the Boers liko geese, to use the not inept expression of then- through' the : Buffi. , tato and lhe Transvaal, ' Buller 9 operations on the right flank of u! fc re , ot , war to a great extent . . °f- „In order to grasp the true significance of Lord Roberts's strategy it will b oi necessary to briefly follow General Buller in his second Natal campaign. After falling back from Ladyemith at the end of th* B?'' 1 Boers ' ook °P » Position on iP ev S Range ' which a rofs the north-eastern angle of Natal, blocking tho way by road and rail through Newcastle to; the Transvaal. General Buller s instructions from the Commauder-in-Chief were to watch this position, and occupy tho attention of the Boers so as to prevent them crossing into tlie Free state to assist their comrades, who wero opposing Lord Roberts's advance. Buller f'orn i OO , cffec 'ivo infantry, , 6000 mounted men, and 120 guns. According to his own estimate, the Boer foree opposed to Buller did not exceed 7000 men- , but of course they had all the advantages of. strong defensive position. Having recoived instructions to move forward siwnltaneously with Lord Roberts's advance from Bloemfontem, Buller divided his lorcc into three mam columns, and left Ladysmith himself with the right column on May 10 i ilus column, consisting of 14,000 men, with ; 60.gnus imd W0 supply waggons, was concentratod at Sunday's River' Drift on the 1 tcllmving day. The centre column (Hildyards Division) was loft at Elandslaagte with orders to advance along the railway and co-operate with Buller's turning movement by the Helpmakaar road. The left column (Lyttolton's Division) was directed in. ul!> *. a '-°ng the old road to Newcastle, the lirst Cavalry Brigade remained near , •l/adysmith, watching the approaches to Van • hrenau 3 P as 3. The distance Buller's (nkunil had to traverse to Newcastle was mi m was covem ' nine days, the, Boers made 110 attempt to stand against tile overwhelming forcc brought against them, and simply fell back before tlie T.ritish advance. Some comment has been mace upon tho fact that Buller made no i[ tempt- to cut off the Boer retreat with Jus immensely superior fcrce: but probably he had other aims in view which have not been disclosed. Buller made a halt at Newcastle to repair the railway and connect bis communications, which was accomplished bv - the 28th. Meanwhile Hildvard marched to I Ltreeht and Lyttelton to Vi-vbreid, to de.-,,- j the right flank of BulWs advance. Utrecht: surrendered on the 30th, and on .Time 2 : Buller met Botha at Majuba. and arranged n- three days' armistice to allow the Boer leader time to consider proposals for his