THE SITUATION.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 11943, 17 January 1901, Page 2

THE SITUATION.

PROPOSED FRENCH INVASION OF ENGLAND. SPEECH BY GENEPvAL MERCIER, (Fkou Oun Own Cobresto-vdent.) LONDON, December 7. General Mereier—the real mainspring of the infamous.conspiracy against Dreyfus—has given us something to think about and talk about and write about this week. On Tuesday last, speaking in his place in the French Senate, he proposed immediate preparations for a French invasion of England, not necessarily, as ho coolly explained, for instant execution, but for everything to he in complete readiness to be carried out at a moment's notice, should England's behaviour toward Franco demand chastisement. My New Zealand readers will remember my mentioning that something of this sort was to be proposed directly the French Parliament should meet after the close of the Exhibition. I daro say many people may have thought this a more rumour, as some did regarding the early information I was able to give touching the relations of England and France about Fashoda and the vast preparations which England had been making for more than two years to attack France at a moment's notice if she attomptc;! to interfere with us in the Soudan. However, the event justified me then, and it has done so now. But let me e.iy at once that already the more serious and.sensible class of Frenchmen seem greatly alarmed at General Meroier's outspokenness, and are trying their hardest to minimise the ill effeot that his speech may produce in England. But I trust that being thus " forowarned " will mean, as proverbially it ought to do, "forearmed" also. The circumstances were these:—A bill was before the Senate providing for an increase of the French fleet. The first speech of interest was that of M. Combes, who said that as the measure was brought in by the Government and recommended by the Naval Council he would voto for it, but ho should do so without any enthusiasm, as he maintained that a war between naval squadrons was virtually impossible, because the inferiority, of the French at sea, as compared not merely with England, but-also with the Triple Alliance, was manifest. He advocated defensive preparation,? in the northern sea; and offensive preparations in the Mediterranean, and condemned the construction of mammoth ironclads, which pigmy submarine boats might speedily render useless. M. Godin. replying on behalf of the committeo, justified a policy midway between the battleship system and tho cruisor system. France, he urged, could not stand still while Germany, America, and Russia were increasing their navies, without morally abdicating; and though tho pre-cut, like any other programme, was open to criticism, he advised the Senate to adopt it. Then General Mereier rose amid applause, and delivered the speech which is already historic. He began by remarking that he would have; preferred the bill to be discussed with those for the equipment of the ports and the defence of naval bases of operation., This bill was of a character purely offensive, and not defensive, like the others, so he should deal with it on that basis. As it stood, it could not but be approved, for in war, on land and. sea, offensive tactics should be the invariable programme. At the same time, he thought that the bill did not take full account of this axiom. Since 1870 the Fronch had reorganised their army in a remarkable manner, but they had not prepared to utilise their means of action in a judicious and rational way. They had been preoccupied about invasion of their own territory, but they had not sufficiently kept in view the hypothesis of.a disembarkation of their troops in the enemy's country. That was a matter which the time had come for them to take up. Going back on historical events, such as to the expedition to Ireland in 1797, the expedition to Egypt in the following year, and so on, General Mereier said that such tactics should be renewed in the undesirable event of a conflict with England. The times were now changed, of course, since tho days of Napoleon, but the force of resistance was not the same in certain countries. The events in the Transvaal showed that tho English Army, however valiant and solid, did not come up to the expected level. As to the English Navy, it was certainly powerful, but it had a large coast line to protect, and an extensive merchant service to guard all over the world. That of Franco might, therefore, be its equal at certain points, and be rendered superior to it by the adoption of new engines of destruction. A disembarkation in England was certainly realisable, and that was the opinion of a high military authority; it was also the opinion of Baron von der Goltz.. Moreover, in, England the Prime Minister had'recently expressed significant apprehension on the matter.

This reference to Lord Salisbury's speech evidently caused a good deal of uneasiness among the Senators, and when General Mcrcier went on to say that he was about to explain a plan of his own for the invasion of England, which would be not only certain of success but also quite' inexpensive in its character, there was a general shout of protest and the President entreated General Merrier not to enter into the details of his scheme. General Mercier calmly proceeded. He said that the system which he was about to explain had been tried by the Japanese with excellent results. The cost would not exceed 10 million francs for preparations on the Channel coasts, and i? 0 million francs for those on the western and Mediterranean shores. He would be asked, " Why are you drawing England's attention to all these questions?" But this was nothing new to their neighbours, to whom Sir Charles Dilke, Lord Wolseley, Lord Salisbury, and others had told all that there was to say as to the risks of a landing. At the present moment these risks were rather imaginary, as no preparations had been made for such an operation. , But they might -soon become serious if France was ready for the necessary sacrifices. Of course, such preparations would uevcr imply a provocation to war or a desire for war. But to be ready for war meani the possession of means to en-' sure respect for rights and interests. Even if this only had the effect of compelling England to take lip the same military burdens as the other Powers of Europe, it would bo a, very good result, as this would be one more' reason for believing in the maintenance of peace. _ , . Here' a Senator interposed with the inquiry, ',' Are you speaking now to France or England?" Genoral Mercier took no notice of the interruption. He proceeded -with his speech, which is reported by authority .in the Paris Journal Officio], the report being revised by the Speaker, as in the case of the New Zealand Hansard. According to the authoritative report, General Mercier said:—"l believe that several studies prompted by a train of ideas like those contained in tho article in the Revue des Deux Mondes have been undertaken by naval engineers occupjdng an official position. They have advocated the employment of special ships drawing little water and carrying as little superstructure as possible, so that they might bo less casrly sighted. They would ho sufficiently plated to be proof against projectiles of small calibre. Such shins, 150 metres in length, 18 metres in brc.idth.~nnd flrawing at the outside 2 metres of water, would be of about 4500 tons burden, would require engines of 4000 horse-power, and would transport 1500 men. Their cost can he estimate! at 4,000,000/ (about £160,000). But tin's would be a very heavy expense. In 1597 I myself had drawn up at the Fourth Army Corps, which I had. the honour to command, a detailed study of a plan of a- landing in England, and I gave two conies "

Hero the General was interrupted, by loud remonstrances from the Republican benches, which elicited counter cries of approval from the Reactionary party. One Senator asked, " Where are we going?" • General Mercior resumed: "I do not perceive the objection," lie said. "I gave two. copies of this work—one to the President of the Renublic, tho other to tho Minister for 'War. It was executed by a very distinguished officer, who accompanied it with a great deal of useful information. I consider that this scheme, when complotcd, rectified on a few points, and brought down to date, as throe years havo already rollad by since it was drawn up, might serve as a basis for a rapid and very economical solution of tho question." At this stage fresh protests aroso, and M. Mlieres. who presided, interposed, " Do you think, General, that it is right to give to the Senate and to confide to public opinion documents, or indications of documents, which ought not, perhaps, to leave the War Office?" Some of the Senators applauded, and a Member exclaimed: "But surely the General will not do this?" "Monsieur lo President," replied General Mercior, "I consider that thorn is nothing that should, not bo stated in all that I am about to say hero. They are rreneral indications, the solo object of which is to arrive at an estimate of the expense which you must have to enable you to juds;o whether yon can accept the proposition which I shall soon submit to you." ' " You might, perhaps, furnish this ostimato without entering into particulars," remarked M. Falliercs. "I defer to the President," said General I'lercier, " and I suppress the few explanations, veiy inoffensive though they are, which' I was about to have the honour of making lo tho Senate. I assume that this gap is filled up, and I proceed." Then, after alluding "to the Chino-Japanese war, and mentioning the probablo cost of the transport flotilla, General Morcier said: " It would have returned to our ports about 48 hours after it had left them. It would bo ready for a'

second operation of tho same kind, which, would, perhaps, be easier than the first, as it is possible that a portion of the crews of the English fleet would be hastily recalled to England, for tho defence of the points threatened by the invading army. But in order to render such a result possible, it would have been necessary to adopt beforehand, and with tho utmost care, the following meaiures:-Tho drawing up of a plan for the combined mobilisation of the army, the fleet ami the transport flotilla; the completion of the embarkation material; the creation of a transport flotilla; the study of plans of landing, of campaign, and of action on several spots. The General concluded as follows:-"The measures to which I refer are neither difficult ;nor onerous. They would at the most cost ,tne third of the price of a battleship. It would bo a. sword of Damocles which might, be allowed to fall or left suspended as we pleased, They would simply complete the bill. I shall vote for the bill, but I shall ask the House to append to it the following resolution: 'The Senate invites the Government to lose no time in completing the arrangements for the mobilisation of the army and navy by the preparation of all that is necessary for the embarkation and disembarkation of an expeditionary corps with the utmost possible rapidity.'" Although the General achieved his main object—that of creating a sensation, which he certainly did —his motion was not at all favourably received by tho Senate. A storm of loud protests arose, and the President of tho Senate promptly pointed out that tho proposed resolution was out of order, or could only be brought in aftor a previous interpel-, lation on the subject. Here the Minister of Marine (M.'de Lanessan) interjected with strong emphasis, " And tho Government could not possibly accept it."

This utterance was greeted with hearty approval by the Senate generally, among whom, as among all reasonable Frenchmen, there exists no desire to rush into war with England, but, on the contrary, an extreme disinclination to be forced into one which must be disastrous to France, whichever way its result might go. • But. nothing can affect the fact that such, ft speech has been made, and made in tfie French Senate by the head of the French army. That fact alone affords material for earnest consideration. The immediate effect has been to create a profound sensation both in France and in England. In France the general tendency has been to condemn General Mercicr for bringing forward such a' proposal at all, which, it is considered, should have been reserved for the most secret discussion in the Navy and .Military Councils of the nation. Several of the Paris journals utterly ridicule Mereier and his scheme, and strongly condemn this Heedless stirring up of ill-feeling at a time when an Anglo-French entente is so particularly desirable in the interests of both nations. In England there has been a disposition to deride Mereier and his proposal, but there is a distinct undercurrent of uneasiness and anxiety. It is quite clear that in case of any misunderstanding between England and France the French policy will be to strike a sudden and unexpected blow at London— the heart of England—instantly upon war being declared or having become manifestly inevitable. England's policy as regards France was very similar when tho Fashoda trouble loomed threatening, only, of course, had war then become unavoidable the British fleet would have attacked tho French coast and ports, instead of an attempt being, made to penetrate inland to Paris. The French idea, on the other hand, is to strike at the heart of the Empire—and so paralyse further resistance. And an. uneasy feeling prevails that this clanger is not as yet at ail adequately guarded against. Naturally, General Mereier has been " interviewed-" in Paris. When asked if there were anv arriere-pensee behind tho extraor-. dinary discourse which had attracted so much attention on both sides of the Channel, General Mereier replied in the negative. "My wife is an Englishwoman." he said. "My personal feeling toward England is very friendly. I would have much preferred that the subject discussed in the Scnatcyesterday had come up, as it ought to have done, in July, before Mr Kruger's journey, through Franco had rendered the question of AngloFrench relations a matter of practical politics. But as the increase of the fleet was only debated yesterday, I was obliged to take the opportunity when it came. In saying what I did. 1 spoke as a Senator and a patriot, treating the question from a theoretical and historical standpoint. But Ido not wish to indicate that I believed a war with England was imminent or desirable: on the contrary. And the best proof that my attitude in absolutely a theoretical one is that more than three years ago I made a personal study of the project of landing troops in England, for the benefit of the officers of my staff. As a soldier, I was obliged to reckon with every possible eventuality. A war with England is among the possibilities, and, in my opinion, if that event should ever unhappily arise we could only turn the immense superiority of bur army to advantage by taking the offensive and landing troops in Entdand. I hope a war between Franco and Englond will never take place. We shall never declare war unless England forces it upon ns. for if such a thing should happen it would be an unspeakable disaster for both countries."